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1
Introduction
1.1 General Background
The capacity of an economy to produce goods and services is the result of economic
activity that occurs in a complex web of interdependent processes. In recent decades,
decreases in trade and communication costs have resulted in increased interconnectedness
among economies. This is also known as the wave of internationalisation, which is
characterised by the emergence of production sharing across nations (Johnson and Noguera,
2012), foreign direct investment (Gestrin, 2016) and international mobility of human-
capital (Freeman, 2010).
In a distilled framework, we can think of the economy as having three key players:
consumers; producers; and institutions. Consumers increase their utility by demanding
the available goods and services in the economy. Producers combine various inputs to
make inputs for other production processes, or final output for consumption. In turn,
institutions set the regulatory environment in which firms operate and guarantee law
enforcement for all transactions in the economy.
Production units (henceforth firms) are considered the focal point of modern economic
systems. While the role of consumers and institutions is indispensable, firms typically
1
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receive the most of attention in policy making circles: they are seen as main drivers
of economic growth through production, job creation, trade and innovation. Therefore,
understanding how firms function and make decisions is essential to welfare-enhancing
policy-making. In an ideal world, we (researchers/policymakers) could identify a firm’s
underlying processes by fully specifying its entire production structure (alternatively
production technology). However, in the real world, this is practically impossible because
many inputs to these processes are either unobservable (e.g. management practices,
acquired characteristics of workers, innovation, etc.) or hard to measure with scientific
objectivity (e.g. innate characteristics of workers, know-how, etc.)
Given the limited ‘access’ to the full set of information, we can only identify the
production technology of a firm up to a certain extent. The unidentifiable component
to be recovered is treated by the literature as an unobserved ‘residual’ term, labelled
“productivity.” Intuitively, it captures the extent to which firms depend on certain processes
and technologies that we cannot observe in the data. Frequently, productivity is treated as
a ‘black box,’ however, I prefer to call it our ‘extent of ignorance.’1 This is because, similar
to the observed part of production technology, productivity has an unobserved underlying
structure with various determinants. Such determinants could be either actions of the
firm (e.g. importing, exporting, offshoring, etc.) or changes in its operating environment
(e.g. opening up to trade, external trade shocks/crises, changes in regulatory environment,
etc.).
The level of complexity of this underlying structure considerably rises due to endogenous
or exogenous changes induced by the latest wave of internationalisation. Indeed, there
is a consensus in the theoretical trade literature that productivity heterogeneity at the
firm-level is a key dimension for explaining various observed adjustments induced by the
internationalisation of economies (Melitz and Redding, 2014). Therefore, productivity
needs to be explored thoroughly at the micro-level in order to unravel its true determinants
and hence its relative importance for economic growth. Because productivity is not a
directly observable outcome, we are left to compute/estimate it to the best of our ability.
Several productivity indices have been proposed at the firm-level, ranging from single
factor productivity to total factor productivity. The former is calculated as output per
unit of input (e.g. labour productivity) and is mainly convenient for validating theoretical
1Abramovitz (1956) was the first to call it as “a measure of our ignorance.”
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predictions about productivity. However, labour productivity is as an incomplete measure
of performance since it disregards the contribution of other equally important inputs (e.g.
capital and material). As such, total factor productivity has gained popularity as the
most representative proxy for productivity. In response, a series of estimation techniques
has emerged in the applied production function estimation literature, with structural
approaches prevailing (Van Biesebroeck, 2008).
Structural approaches include both dynamic panel methods (Arellano and Bond, 1991;
Blundell and Bond, 1998, 2000) and proxy variable methods (Olley and Pakes, 1996;
Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg et al., 2016). The main focus has been to solve for
endogeneity, also known as ‘simultaneity’ or ‘transmission bias.’ Such bias originates from
the fact that firms know their productivity level when they decide which inputs to use
(Marschak and Andrews, 1944). Overall, this leaves researchers to choose from a basket of
estimators, each of which has its own limitations depending on the application of interest
and quality of available information.
Despite their popularity and prevalence in applied work, proxy variable methods
are based on a set of restrictive assumptions that could fail to hold in various economic
environments. Such failure translates to potentially serious identification issues. However, a
considerable amount of empirical work across various strands of the literature systematically
disregards the sensitivity of these estimators. This could lead to biased productivity
estimates and, in turn, false conclusions about its true determinants. If the case, inaccurate
policy recommendations stemming from research would ensue.
1.2 Contribution
With this in mind, the major contribution of my dissertation is twofold. First, I
underscore the importance of productivity measurement by demonstrating how different
measures, assumptions and estimation procedures affect economic conclusions. For this,
I focus on commonly ignored misspecifications when identifying both productivity and
its determinants, relative to a ‘state of the art’ approach. I aim to raise awareness about
the sensitivity of results to estimation methods and provide empirical support for the
‘superiority’ of a certain estimator. Note that this estimator is not a panacea; it is also
based on assumptions that could potentially prove restrictive. Nevertheless, it is the best
3
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available alternative in terms of both the potential biases it corrects for and its empirical
robustness.
Second, building on the proposed state of the art estimator, I try to fully explore
the determinants of productivity. Since we live in an increasingly complex world, it is
important to ‘back out’ the determinants of productivity rather than simply assume they
are randomly generated. In an internationalised and interconnected context, the aspects
that I explore include trade, supply chains of production, input market imperfections and
ownership structures.
Overall, knowing which type of firms have significantly been driving the economy or
suffering during good and bad times is expected to provide policymakers and institutions
with a strong reference point for shaping future policies.
1.3 Methodological Approach
Throughout all chapters, I use a state of the art production function estimation
procedure proposed by Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2016) (herein GNR). I empirically
argue that this is the most competitive available procedure to identify productivity,
compared to other proxy variable estimators.
Despite their popularity and prevalence, proxy variable methods suffer from identifi-
cation issues when the production function contains at least one flexible input such as
materials. These issues are in no way new. They have been highlighted by Mendershausen
(1938); Marschak and Andrews (1944); Bond and So¨derbom (2005); Ackerberg et al. (2006)
and more recently formalised by GNR. Intuitively, there is not enough variation outside
the production function system to identify the flexible input.2
To circumvent this problem, applied economists have focused on value-added pro-
duction functions where the flexible input, materials, is subtracted from output and
thus ‘disappears’ from the production function. Such a specification, however, will fail
to identify the true variable of interest, i.e. TFP, even under very strong assumptions
2Firm specific prices, to the extent that they are exogenous, can potentially serve as instruments
for flexible inputs and be used to solve for the identification problem (Doraszelski and Jaumandreu,
2013). However, in practice it is hard to find prices at the firm/plant level that reflect differences in
expected rather than chosen prices (Griliches and Mairesse, 1999; Ackerberg et al., 2007). Therefore, in
most datasets, prices will capture market power and input/output quality differences rendering them
endogenous (Fox and Smeets, 2011; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Atalay, 2014).
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(Bruno, 1978; Diewert, 1978; Basu and Fernald, 1997). Estimates suffer from a value-added
bias causing the dispersion and heterogeneity in TFP to be overstated. Intuitively, one
erroneously attributes the variation of material inputs to productivity and resultantly ends
up with a distorted image of the productivity distribution, which can cause misleading
policy implications.
GNR propose a simple estimator for gross-output production functions with at least
one flexible input. They establish identification by exploiting information in the first order
condition with respect to the flexible input from the firm’s static profit maximisation
problem. This flexible approach controls for both the transmission and value-added
bias. It imposes no specific functional form, nor does it rely on strong assumptions
used by alternative proxy variable frameworks, for instance the assumption of scalar
unobservability to invert the proxy function (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin,
2003; Ackerberg et al., 2006). In line with most of the the proxy variable methods, the
GNR procedure follows two-steps and allows us to both estimate the production function
and identify the potential determinants of productivity. This is the baseline procedure
upon which inference is drawn and empirical robustness towards alternative assumptions
and procedures is tested throughout my dissertation.
1.4 Data
Given the empirical nature of the dissertation, access to firm level data was essential. In
Chapter 2, I use the Annual Accounts, VAT declarations and Transactions Trade dataset
from the National Bank of Belgium (NBB). The combined dataset is representative of
the Belgian manufacturing sector with detailed information on the balance sheet and
trade activities of individual firms. This is a rich dataset that eliminates potential biases
towards large firms and is particularly suitable for providing broader insights into various
firm characteristics and their relative importance for aggregate economic activity.
For the remaining chapters I draw upon information in the Augmented Amadeus
(AUGAMA) and the European Multinational Network (EUMULNET) datasets. These
datasets are constructed by Merlevede, de Zwaan, Lenaerts, and Purice (2015) using
information from Amadeus, a European firm-level database collected by Bureau Van Dijk
Electronic Publishing. Specifically, the AUGAMA and EUMULNET datasets provide
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a consistent time series that correct for the possibility of firms being dropped from
annual observations due to having exited the market. The datasets provide detailed
information at the balance sheet and ownership level for a panel of firms across 26
European countries for the period 1996-2014. Merlevede et al. (2015) describe the
construction and representativeness of the data at length. The countries, sectors and
periods considered in each of the last three chapters depend on the research question and
representativeness of the data required to address it.
1.5 Empirical Applications
In light of the above, my Ph.D. contains four distinct chapters, which feed into the two
main contributions that I bring to the intellectual community. In what follows, I explain
each chapter in turn.
1.5.1 Aggregate Productivity and Trade
In Chapter 2, I, along with my co-author, examine the micro-level determinants of
aggregate productivity growth for the Belgian manufacturing sector during the period
1998-2012. Given the lack of consensus on how to compute and decompose aggregate
productivity we start this chapter by demonstrating the presence of biases in the decompo-
sition of aggregate productivity. Such biases are induced by different productivity indices
even within decomposition methods. We confirm important biases arising from ignor-
ing output-price differences across firms, estimating physical productivity under varying
assumptions (e.g. timing of demand shocks), assuming common production technology
at the manufacturing instead of the industry level and sample selection. We show that
failing to correct for these biases may result in false conclusions about the evolution of
aggregate productivity and the decomposed components.
After controlling for such biases, we decompose aggregate productivity based on groups
of economic significance. We introduce a new dimension to the decomposition based on
firm-attributes. This allows to assess whether there is a handful of firms driving aggregate
productivity. Results suggest that large incumbent firms that engage both in exporting
and importing determine the evolution of aggregate productivity. Over time, the increase
in their average productivity dominates the steady decrease in the covariance between
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their market shares and productivity. This pattern is more intense after the burst of the
2008 financial crisis. All other groups contribute negatively, with signs of convergence
in some cases. Finally, we provide a multi-country extension of our analysis using the
AUGAMA dataset containing manufacturing firms from 18-EU countries. In addition to
the previous results, we see that the within-firm component of firms from advanced EU
nations is driving aggregate productivity of the manufacturing sector in Europe.
Overall, firms increase their productivity over time. Furthermore, those that experience
the largest increases are both more deeply engaged in internationalisation and larger in
size. All other firms lag behind and prevent aggregate productivity from reaching its full
potential.
1.5.2 Supply Chains
Chapter 3 analyses whether indirect effects of internationalisation occur through the
domestic supply chain. A large literature has examined the relationship between export
and import behaviour on the one hand, and direct productivity effects of firms’/industries’
offshoring behaviour on the other. Yet, potential indirect or spillover productivity effects
of internationalisation have received less attention. I, along with my co-author, analyse
potential productivity effects for a given firm that are associated with the internationali-
sation behaviour of other firms in the domestic economy. Since sharing new knowledge
with related parties along the supply chain is more likely than sharing it with competitors,
we focus on the effects of internationalisation by local clients and suppliers of a given
firm. Local firms may then experience indirect productivity effects of internationalisation
through participation in the domestic supply chain.
We investigate productivity effects for a given firm resulting from the internationalisa-
tion behaviour (i.e. import or export of intermediate inputs) of domestic upstream and
downstream industries. We consider a small open economy to analyse productivity effects
along the supply chain driven by trade in intermediates in related industries. We combine
firm level data for Belgian manufacturing firms for the period 1995-2011 with input-output
tables. The latter are used to construct industry-level measures of inter-industry offshoring
and inshoring intensities based on a measure proposed by Merlevede and Michel (2013).
As in most empirical international trade research, productivity measurement is a core
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element in our analysis. Therefore, we point to common specification biases in applied
work before interpreting the overall effects with our most preferred methodology. Our
results can be summarised as follows. First, we demonstrate and confirm important biases
that arise from ignoring the dynamic nature of productivity and specifying a value-added
rather than a gross-output production function. Failing to correct for these biases may
thus result in false conclusions about productivity’s true determinants.
Second, only upstream inshoring, i.e. the export of intermediates by a given firm’s local
suppliers, appears to be a robust channel of inter-industry productivity effects in Belgium.
Sourcing from industries that also export these intermediates is associated with higher
productivity levels of a given firm. This effect likely stems from access to intermediates of
higher quality that are also exported. In support of our result we find these effects to be
stronger for firms and industries that are less likely to be directly internationally involved.
The effect is more prominent for smaller firms, for firms with non-multinational status,
and for firms in relatively upstream and/or low-skill intensive industries. Finally, we do
not find such effects if the destination of the exported intermediates is either China or
Eastern Europe.
1.5.3 Market Imperfections
In Chapter 4, I examine how changes in the operating environment of firms coupled
with increased international trade affect firm performance. More specifically, I estimate
the firm-level effect of frictions in the input market on productivity across various types
of firms. Even firms operating in economies with the most flexible input markets face
adjustment costs that impact both firm-level and aggregate outcomes (Hamermesh and
Pfann, 1996). Input market rigidities can be seen as a financial constraint that affects
the firm’s investment decisions and thus its productivity. This relationship is potentially
amplified by the interaction with trade and trade frictions. However, neither theoretical
nor empirical literature have introduced a consistent way of identifying the impact of all
input market rigidities on firm-level performance.
I bridge this gap by estimating the impact of input market frictions on firm performance.
Firm-level frictions in capital and labour are expressed as the wedge between the marginal
revenue product and marginal cost of each input, respectively. I introduce them in a
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standard model of production function estimation to directly gauge their effect on future
productivity as well as the production function’s parameters. For this analysis, I use
the AUGAMA dataset with firm-level information on the manufacturing sector of 16 EU
countries for the period 2002-2007.
On the one hand, firms facing increased labour market frictions experience increases in
their future productivity that are smaller for exporters. This suggests that domestic firms
are less willing to incur the costs associated with adjusting their tangibles, i.e. workforce.
Hence, they rely relatively more on intangibles, i.e. organisation and managerial practices,
that increase their future productivity via learning mechanisms. On the other hand,
productivity effects from capital market frictions are less prevalent and uniform for all
types of firms, pointing to the fact that capital is less-flexible and more-costly to adjust.
1.5.4 Ownership Structures
Finally, Chapter 5 explores how ownership structures shape the production technology
and productivity of firms. The literature documents a scarcity of firms transferring
tangibles within ownership structures. This is suggestive of the theoretical argument that
firm ownership is primarily used to facilitate the efficient transfer of intangibles. In this
paper, my co-author and I analyse the validity of this alternative explanation.
Using both the AUGAMA and EUMULNET databases, we carefully construct a
European panel of majority owned parent-affiliate relationships with full information on
both sides. In turn, we extend the state of the art production function estimator, i.e.
GNR, to account for transfers of intangibles between the parent and its affiliate, and
effects on the future productivity of affiliates.
We find that the productivity of the parent is both a significant intangible input in
the affiliate’s production technology and a key determinant of the affiliate’s productivity
dynamics. Domestically owned affiliates experience larger technology transfers from their
parents while foreign owned affiliates benefit more from productivity increases induced by
learning mechanisms. Overall, we identify, at the firm level, the importance of productivity
transfers from various types of ownership structures and confirm the theoretically based
argument that firm boundaries exist to facilitate the transfer of intangibles.
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Compositional Changes in Aggregate
Productivity in an Era of Globalisation and
Financial Crisis?
2.1 Introduction
Policymakers consider productivity a key element of economic growth. However, trends
in aggregate productivity are uninformative about their micro-level determinants which
shed light on productivity itself. As such, various alternative methods to decompose
aggregate productivity have been proposed. The decomposition literature spans from
the seminal contributions of Baily et al. (1992) and Olley and Pakes (1996) to the most
recent contribution of Melitz and Polanec (2015). The ultimate goal is to capture essential
microeconomic sources and assess their relevance to aggregate productivity.
?This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Catherine Fuss who is affiliated with the Economics
and Research Department of the National Bank of Belgium, Berlaimontlaan 14, 1000 Brussels, Belgium
and Universite´ Libre de Bruxelles, e-mail: catherine.fuss@nbb.be. We thank Ruben Dewitte, Gerdie
Everaert, Rebecca Freeman, Joep Konings, Bruno Merlevede, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Glenn Rayp and
David A. Rivers for their comments and suggestions. The views expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bank of Belgium or any other institution
to which the authors are affiliated. All remaining errors are our own. The extension of the application in
Section 2.4.3 is based on a paper co-authored with Bruno Merlevede.
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Decomposition analyses typically include two basic steps. First, since productivity
of the aggregate is not directly observed, researchers rely on measures of aggregate
productivity. These measures are computed as weighted averages of firm-level based
productivity indices, i.e. labour productivity or total factor productivity.1 Second,
the analysis proceeds with using one of the available methods to decompose aggregate
productivity. However, there is no consensus in the literature on which approach to follow;
the choice depends directly on the research question and micro-level data at hand.
The majority of the decomposition methodologies focus on shifts in the distribution of
firm-level productivities (within-firm) and the reallocation of market shares (between-firm)
for various groups of firms. These groups mainly include entering, exiting and incumbent
firms. However, firms operate in a globalised environment where competitive forces lead
to productivity-enhancing restructuring. It is has been shown, both empirically and
theoretically, that the most productive firms select into internationalisation, i.e. trade
and FDI (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Melitz, 2003; Helpman et al., 2004), and learn once
they engage in such activities (Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008; De Loecker, 2013). Such
firms have higher sales, pay higher wages, and are more capital and skill intensive. Most
importantly, only a few of these firms account for the bulk of internationalised activity
(Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008).
To better understand the microeconomic determinants of aggregate productivity,
research on this topic should include decompositions that are based on firm attributes of
economic significance, e.g. trade, size, skill intensity, geography, etc. To our knowledge,
only a few studies on the decomposition of aggregate productivity take these factors into
account. Bo¨ckerman and Maliranta (2007) test for regional differences in the aggregate
productivity growth of the Finnish manufacturing sector.2 Bartelsman et al. (2013) find
that variation in distortions (i.e. overhead labour and quasi-fixed capital) can explain
cross-country differences in the resource reallocation component. Collard-Wexler and
De Loecker (2015) examine the reallocation of resources within and between different
types of production technology in the US steel industry.
For the case of Belgium, Van Beveren and Vanormelingen (2014) find that human
capital intensive and/or internationalised firms exert higher aggregate productivity growth
1This approach is also known as ‘bottom-up’ (Balk, 2016).
2Also for Finland, using a similar dataset, Hyytinen et al. (2016) exploit cross-regional differences to
illustrate their proposed procedure for statistical inference using the Olley and Pakes (1996) decomposition.
12
2.1. Introduction
which is driven by the within-firm component. However, they use a revenue-based
productivity measure. Both theoretical (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Edmond et al.,
2015) and empirical (De Loecker et al., 2016; Garcia-Marin and Voigtla¨nder, 2013) studies
confirm that variable markups are an important margin of adjustment for firms during
various trade and regional integration policies.3 As such, revenue-based productivity
measures are also driven by the variation of firm-specific prices (Foster et al., 2008;
De Loecker, 2011). This is bound to bias both the contribution and evolution of the
decomposed components, as noted by Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) and confirmed by
Eslava et al. (2013) who find larger trade-induced effects on allocative efficiency for
price-adjusted productivity measures. Therefore, markups/prices consist of an important
margin.
Overall, two important observations emerge. On the one hand, the literature delivers
a plethora of results that vary quantitatively and qualitatively, even within decomposition
methods. Such discrepancies are potentially driven by biases in the estimates of micro-
unit productivity indices, which are mechanically transmitted to aggregate productivity
measures. On the other hand, the decomposed components mask potential heterogeneity
induced by various attributes of the firm. In both cases, we can end up with a distorted
image about the micro-foundations of aggregate productivity, how they evolve over time,
and how they react to changes in the operating environment of firms.
In this paper, we examine both of the above cases. First, we assess the effect of
biases on various productivity indices for a given decomposition method of aggregate
productivity. Such biases are frequently ignored in the empirical literature when computing
firm-level productivity and include: using single factor instead of total factor productivity;
the estimation of revenue instead of physical productivity;4 the estimation of physical
productivity under alternative assumptions for the timing of the demand shocks; the
presence of differences in production technology across industries; and the selection of
samples with larger firms.
3In line with this argument, Epifani and Gancia (2011) show how the distribution of markups distorts
the allocation of resources. Thus, trade can affect welfare through distributional changes in markups.
Similarly, Peters (2013) considers the case where misallocation stems from output market imperfections.
4Foster et al. (2008) examine the effect on the components of aggregate productivity growth from using
revenue based productivities. They use a dataset with information on output prices and quantities and
thus directly observe measures of physical productivity. However, such datasets are rare and researchers
mostly rely on monetary values and aggregate price deflators. As such, further structure and assumptions
are required to estimate physical productivity.
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Second, we proceed using the most competitive productivity estimates available, i.e.
the case of imperfect competition in the output market where demand shocks are observed
by the firms post production and the production technology varies across industries for
a representative sample of firms. Note that the chosen estimator is not a panacea; it is
also based on assumptions that could potentially prove restrictive. Nevertheless, it is
the best available alternative in terms of both the potential biases for which it corrects
and its empirical robustness. With these estimates in hand, we decompose aggregate
productivity based on economically significant firm attributes, i.e. trade, size, geography,
and combinations.
For the analysis, we use a detailed firm-level dataset representative of the Belgian
manufacturing sector, for the period 1998-2012. The following findings emerge. Despite
the empirical convenience in validating theoretical predictions about productivity, single
factor productivity (e.g. labour productivity) leads to biased empirical conclusions about
‘true’ productivity (e.g. total factor productivity). Moreover, we confirm significant biases
in the evolution of aggregate productivity in the absence of controls for output-price
differences across firms (Foster et al., 2008).
Similar biases emerge when we estimate physical productivity (i.e. a` la De Loecker,
2011), under seemingly similar modelling assumptions. For example, if demand shocks are
observed by the firm when deciding its inputs, physical productivity cannot be separated
from markups and demand shocks without additional information, i.e. physical output or
firm level prices. On the contrary, by assuming that demand shocks hit the firm ex-post
production we can back out a measure closer to true physical productivity that we also
consider the most competitive one for our decomposition analyses. Equally important is
the bias from estimating production functions at the manufacturing instead of the industry
level. In this case, we erroneously attribute variation from cross-industry differences in
production technologies to aggregate productivity. Finally, sample selection, i.e. sample
with larger firms, induces non-negligible biases in decomposition results.
After controlling for the aforementioned biases, we find that the reallocation of
resources across firms has been decreasing steadily since 1998, with a drop during the 2008
financial crisis. Van Beveren and Vanormelingen (2014), using the same database for the
period 1997-2009, find the opposite effect, i.e. a positive contribution of the reallocation
mechanism on aggregate productivity growth. However, we see that this discrepancy
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in results is driven by price differences in their revenue-based productivity estimates,5
supporting our expectations about the significance of distributional changes in markups.
On the contrary, a decreasing trend in average firm productivity was reverted during
the 2008 financial crisis. Note that the decreasing trend is mainly induced by small-sized
firms which account for more than half of the sample size. Also, entering and exiting
firms are minor contributors to aggregate productivity growth. This can be reconciled
with the findings of Garcia-Macia et al. (2016) where incumbent firms that rely on own-
product improvements instead of creative destruction appear to be the drivers of aggregate
productivity growth. Overall, the within-firm component of incumbent firms drives the
evolution of aggregate productivity, especially after the 2008 financial crisis.
We further exploit the richness of the data and find that two-way traders, i.e. both
exporters and importers, are the main contributors to aggregate productivity (growth).
Interestingly, firm-size (in terms of employment) is not a determining factor of aggregate
productivity compared to the internationalisation status of firms. Finally, we provide a
multi-country extension of our analysis using a dataset containing manufacturing firms
from 18-EU countries. On top of the previous results, we see that the within-firm
component of firms from the North drives aggregate productivity of the manufacturing
sector in Europe.
Results suggest that the reallocation of resources across Belgian manufacturing firms
decreased over time. There is a growing literature which attempts to understand the drivers
of resource missallocation across firms and how this translates to aggregate productivity
growth. Hopenhayn (2014) provides a detailed literature review on this topic. The main
idea is that various policies and institutions prevent firms from equating their marginal
revenue products of inputs with their marginal costs. This, in turn, has implications for
aggregate growth. For example, we observe a large increase in missalocation during the
2008 financial crisis. This suggests that, on top of other distortions prevalent in the market,
financial constraints can be considered as a potential source of missalocation during that
period.6 However, our analysis can only provide suggestive evidence of potential distortions
and is thus silent about their exact nature and taxonomy.
5Their result matches ours when considering the case of perfect competition in the output market.
6See Hopenhayn (2014) for a nice literature review on the relevance of financial constraints in explaining
misallocation and selection.
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In addition, we find that resource reallocation is not a sufficient mechanism to explain
the evolution of aggregate productivity. For this reason we need to look at changes in the
distribution of firm-level productivities. On average, firms increase their productivity over
time, and those that are most successful are both more deeply engaged in internationali-
sation and larger in size. All other firms lag behind and prevent aggregate productivity
from reaching its full potential. As indicated from our production function estimates,
learning mechanisms are important in explaining differences in the evolution of the within
firm component and thus aggregate productivity growth. The idea is that firms learn
from their actions, i.e. trade. This suggest that theoretical modelling should move to
more complex structures where static reallocation is combined with dynamic learning
mechanisms. Overall, we expect our results to be insightful both for Belgium’s and other
European economies’ efforts to deregulate and reduce frictions in response to increased
global competition and stagnated economic activity.
With the above in mind, the remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2
describes the empirical methodology and Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 2.4
presents an analysis of potential biases and the main results from the decompositions for
different groups of firms. Finally, Section 2.5 offers concluding remarks.
2.2 Empirical Methodology
We discuss three important components of our methodology. First, we document
the computation of aggregate productivity. This includes the choice of a productivity
measure and estimator, and market share weights. Second, we motivate our choice for
the decomposition method of aggregate productivity that is best suited for our analysis,
and generalise it to account for the number of additional groups we consider. Third, we
describe how to obtain standard errors for the decomposed components.
2.2.1 Productivity and Weights
The literature offers a number of alternative choices for productivity estimators and
measures (ωit), and for market share weights (sit). Since aggregate productivity does
not always represent productivity of the aggregate when certain assumptions fail to hold,
there is no consensus on superior alternatives. Balk (2016) provides a detailed discussion
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of how specific choices can affect the decomposition of aggregate productivity. Overall,
the choice ultimately depends on the research question and available data.
Following Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998), Foster et al. (2001) and Collard-Wexler
and De Loecker (2015), we base our analysis on measures of gross-output productivity
and deflated nominal gross-output shares as weights.7 We consider alternative produc-
tivity measures such as: labour productivity; total factor productivity under different
assumptions in the output market; total factor productivity under different assumptions
regarding the extent of common production technology across industries; and total fac-
tor productivity when facing sample restrictions. Using a given decomposition method
and weights, we are then able to infer the implications of choosing specific productivity
measures on aggregate productivity and its evolution.
We start with labour productivity (LP ), defined as the share of output over labour.8
We then switch to an estimate of total factor productivity assuming perfect competition
in the output market (PC). This competing productivity index provides the closest
approximation to disembodied technological change.9 For the estimation, we consider a
flexible gross-output production function Yit = Fκ(Kit, Lit,Mit)e
ωit+it , with Hicks-neutral
total factor productivity ωit (herein TFP). In logs, the production function to be estimated
is of the following form:
yit = fκ(kit, lit,mit) + ωit + it (2.1)
where yit, kit and mit are log values of deflated (at the industry level) sales, beginning of
the period capital stock, and material costs, respectively, and lit is the log of the total
number of full-time equivalent (FTE) employees of firm i in period t. κ represents the
level of common production technology across firms fκ(·), i.e. sector or industry. TFP is
unobserved to the econometrician but known to the firm. Ex-post shocks, i.e. after the
firm’s decision on input use, are picked up by it.
Capital is assumed to be predetermined and therefore chosen one period prior to the
7Using weights based on nominal gross-output or labour shares results are qualitatively robust.
8See Balk (2016) for a review of the potential biases induced when aggregating labour productivity.
9Most, if not all, estimates of total factor productivity are different from disembodied technological
change, known as the ‘Solow Residual’ (Solow, 1957). They also include the impact of inputs that are not
measured or available in the data (e.g. management practices and human capital skills). Results should
be interpreted bearing this in mind.
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realisation of TFP. Labour is assumed to be a dynamic input, meaning that it is variable in
period t but has dynamic implications due to the presence of adjustment costs. Therefore,
it is chosen during the realisation of TFP, i.e. between t− 1 and t. The only flexible input
is material that freely adjusts in each period and has no dynamic implications.10
Estimation of the production function is based on the two-step estimator proposed by
Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2016) (herein GNR). On top of the transmission bias, i.e.
firms observing their productivity when choosing their inputs, this estimator controls for
the value-added bias that arises from estimating a value-added rather than a gross-output
production function. A detailed description of the assumptions, steps followed, and its
dominance over competing estimators can be found in GNR.11
Similar to most proxy variable methods, this procedure identifies both production
function parameters and the effects on current TFP (in expectation) of lagged observable
actions of firm i in period t. In principle, we should control for any action or change in
the firm’s operating environment. However, due to data limitations we can control only
for variables observed in the data. We expect trade to be the most important control
especially when considering Belgium, a small open European economy during the latest
financial and Eurozone crisis. Such controls are also internally consistent with the choice
of firm attributes (e.g. trade and size) used for the decomposition analysis in the following
section. For example, two-way traders represent firms most engaged in trade and largest
in size (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2008).
For our specification we consider a controlled Markov process where, in addition to
lagged TFP, we allow past experience from export (De Loecker, 2013), import (Kasahara
and Rodrigue, 2008), and two-way trade to affect current TFP.12 Following Aw et al.
(2011) and De Loecker (2013) we use the following flexible parametric specification for
10Results are robust to the alternative assumption that labour is predetermined.
11See GNR for an exposition of the sizeable effects of value-added bias on productivity heterogeneity.
In Chapter 3, my co-author and I stress the importance of such misspecification when estimating learning
by doing effects.
12With lagged values, we inherently assume that it takes one period for actions to affect TFP. Such an
assumption can be relaxed and tested for robustness against alternative specifications with deeper lags.
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the productivity process:
ωit =
4∑
j=1
ρjω
j
it−1 + ρxxit−1 + ρmmit−1 + ρxmxmit−1 + ρxωxit−1ωit−1
+ ρmωmit−1ωit−1 + ρxmωxmit−1ωit−1 + ρt + ρs + ξit
(2.2)
where xit−1, mit−1 and xmit−1 are dummies reflecting whether a firm is an exporter,
importer or two-way trader, respectively. These groups are mutually exclusive and the
reference group of purely domestic firms is subsumed in the constant. Also, ρt and ρs are
fixed-effects that account for relevant unobserved macroeconomic shocks and aggregate
structural differences across industries, respectively.13 ξit captures, unanticipated at t− 1,
exogenous shocks that affect firm’s TFP in time t.
Based on estimates of the production function coefficients
(
fˆκ(·)
)
and ex-post shocks
to production (ˆit), we can compute TFP (ωˆit) and other relevant variables, i.e. output
elasticities of inputs and returns to scale, for firm i in period t, using equation (2.1). In
addition, using equation (2.2), we can also directly identify the effects on future TFP when
engaging in international trade that can be causally interpreted as: learning by exporting(
∂ωit
∂xit−1
)
; learning by importing
(
∂ωit
∂mit−1
)
; and learning by two-way trading
(
∂ωit
∂xmit−1
)
.
With the available firm-level data, we do not observe physical output at the firm level,
but only monetary values which we deflate at the industry level. Under the assumption
of perfect competition in the output market of each industry, both LP and PC produce
indices of physical productivity. However, under any type of imperfectly competitive output
market structure, price differences across firms emerge. In this case, the productivity
measures should be interpreted as revenue-based (Klette and Griliches, 1996).
To avoid potential price biases in aggregate productivity as shown in Foster et al.
(2008), we estimate TFP controlling for unobserved variation in firm-specific prices. To do
so, we circumvent the data limitations by introducing more structure and assumptions in
the empirical model. This includes an iso-elastic demand system coupled with monopolistic
competition, similar to De Loecker (2011).14 However, the approach we follow is more
13Fixed effects enter additively in order to restrict the parameter space and improve the efficiency of
the estimation. This should be considered with caution since non-linearities in the fixed-effects would
saturate the model, resulting in incidental parameters bias.
14Note that we do not have data on multi-product firms and thus need to assume that each firm
produces one unique variety.
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flexible since it is able to identify time-varying instead of constant markups by assuming
a CES demand system with time-varying elasticity of demand. This is expected to be
insightful to the extent to which, on average, firms adjust their markups over time.
Under these assumptions the production function to be estimated is of the following
form:
rit =
(
σt + 1
σt
)
fκ(kit, lit,mit)− 1
σt
yt +
(
σt + 1
σt
)
ωit + χit +
(
σt + 1
σt
)
it (2.3)
where rit is the (observed in the data) log value of deflated sales at the industry level,
given by rit = (pit − pt) + yit. pit and pt are the log values of the output price of firm
i and the aggregate output deflator (aggregate price index), respectively. yt is the log
value of a quantity index serving as an aggregate demand shifter. This is computed using
the log value of a simple average of deflated sales. χit captures firm specific demand
shocks, σt is the time varying elasticity of demand derived from a generalised version of
a CES demand system and σt+1
σt
is by construction the inverse of the markup. It is now
straightforward to see that not accounting for price differences in the output market (i.e.
PC) leads to estimates of both the production function parameters and productivity that
are decreasing functions of any potential unobserved (heterogeneity in) markups.
To control for the price bias, we follow the estimation procedure proposed by GNR (see
Appendix C4 of their paper) and provide estimates based on two different assumptions.
Firms are either assumed to observe demand shocks post production (IC), or, alternatively,
demand shocks are observed once firms make their input decisions (ICalt). The former is
preferable, because it permits TFP to be identified separately from demand shocks and
markups.
Note that this estimator is not a panacea; it is also based on assumptions that could
potentially prove restrictive. For example, if the assumption for IC fails to hold then
we end up with a productivity estimate where we cannot net out demand shocks, i.e.
ωit +
(
σt
σt+1
)
χit, similar to ICalt, i.e.
(
σt+1
σt
)
ωit + χit. Nevertheless, given the data at
hand, it is the best available alternative in terms of both the potential biases for which it
corrects and its empirical robustness for identifying true TFP. We expect these two cases
to be informative about the extent to which two seemingly similar assumptions, within
the same estimation method, lead to different conclusions about aggregate productivity.
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We also estimate TFP based on IC when excluding micro firms15 (ICsize), in order
to explore whether decompositions are sensitive to sample selection. A sample that drops
small firms could potentially bias the impact of entry and exit on aggregate productivity
(Foster et al., 2002). Finally, for each of the above cases, we consider two alternative levels
(κ) of common production technology across firms fκ(·). First, we estimate TFP by pooling
all firms in the manufacturing sector (Manuf). Second, we estimate TFP by pooling
firms in each industry (Nace) separately.16 This allows us to examine the importance
of properly accounting for differences in production technologies across industries on
aggregate productivity.
TFP is a unitless measure. To guarantee that our measure is insensitive to measurement
units and allows for transitive comparisons, we compare it to a reference firm at the start
of the period (see Aw et al., 2001; Pavcnik, 2002; Van Biesebroeck, 2008). Therefore, all
productivity measures used in the decompositions are expressed as the difference between
each firm’s estimated TFP and that of a reference firm with mean TFP in the same
industry in the base period.
2.2.2 Decomposition of Aggregate Productivity
We define aggregate productivity (Ωt), as the share weighted average of the log of firm
productivity:17
Ωt =
∑
i∈Πt
sitωit s.t.
∑
i∈Πt
sit = 1 (2.4)
where sit =
∑
i∈Πt
(
Yit∑
i∈Πt
Yit
)
is the share weight, Y is real output, and Πt is the set of all
active firms in each period.
Various methods to decompose aggregate productivity have been proposed. On the
one hand, several decompositions examine the margins of aggregate productivity levels
(static). On the other hand, a variety of decompositions focus on the sources of aggregate
15Less than 10 employees and up to e2 million operating revenue (European Commission, 2017).
16We use the A∗38 industry classification that represents intermediate SNA/ISIC aggregation. See
Table 2.A.1 in Appendix 2.A for correspondence with the NACE Rev.2 2-digit classification.
17The arithmetic mean of the logs is equivalent to the geometric mean of the levels. See Balk (2016)
for a brief discussion on the implications of alternative aggregation methodologies. Melitz and Polanec
(2015) derive and decompose the arithmetic mean of both the logs and levels of productivity. Results
remain similar.
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productivity growth (dynamic).18
We follow the widely used method of Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP), where productivity
is decomposed into two components in each period:
Ωt =
1
Nt
∑
i∈Πt
ωit +
∑
i∈Πt
(sit − s¯t)(ωit − ω¯t) = ω¯t + cov(sit, ωit) (2.5)
where Nt is the number of elements in Πt, ω¯t is the unweighted average of productivity
(within-firm), and cov(sit, ωit) is the covariance between market share and productivity
(between-firm). The latter is of particular policy interest since it is considered as an
indicator of underlying mechanisms of aggregate productivity (growth). For example, for
the case of a deregulation of the US telecommunications equipment industry, OP interpret
higher values of the covariance term as a reallocation of resources to the most productive
firms. Similarly, Bartelsman et al. (2013) provide evidence that lower values indicate
the presence of market distortions induced by policies, which can explain productivity
differences across countries.
On the one hand, Balk (2016) describes the covariance term as a ‘statistical artefact’
that does not necessarily represent key microeconomic mechanisms. On the other hand,
Maliranta and Ma¨a¨tta¨nen (2015) provide both empirical and theoretical evidence that the
covariance term performs well when capturing important distortions, i.e. output tax and
subsidy scheme, compared to others, i.e. entry and exit costs. Therefore, we need to use
theoretical models that capture the extent to which certain types of distortions explain
differences in the marginal value of inputs across firms. Hopenhayn (2014) provides a
detailed review of such models and summarises their relevance in explaining productivity
gaps. Overall, we interpret the covariance term as a measure of resource (mis)allocation,
bearing in mind that it most likely does not capture all potential market distortions and
even if it does we will not be able to identify their exact nature and taxonomy.
It is straightforward to extend the decomposition for a number of disjunct groups:
Ωt =
∑
j=Ψt
sjt
( ∑
i∈Πjt
sit
sjt
ωit
)
=
∑
j=Ψt
sjtΩjt s.t.
∑
j=Ψt
sjt = 1 (2.6)
18See Melitz and Polanec (2015) for an empirical comparison between their approach and various
dynamic decomposition methods.
22
2.2. Empirical Methodology
where the set Ψt defines the abbreviations of the names of the mutually exclusive groups
considered
(
i.e.
⋃
j∈Ψt Πjt = Πt and
⋂
j∈Ψt Πjt = ∅
)
, sjt is the aggregate market share of
group j, and Ωjt is group j’s aggregate productivity.
To measure the contribution of each group on aggregate productivity, we use a reference
group At ⊂ Ψt. This way, in each period, we can express the aggregate productivity
contribution of the complement group(s) Act as:
Ωt = ΩAtt +
∑
j=Act
sjt
(
Ωjt − ΩAtt
)
(2.7)
where At ∩ Act = Ψt.19
To understand whether the aggregate productivity of different groups is driven by
changes in the average productivity or reallocation of resources within each group relative
to the reference group, we insert (2.5) into (2.7):
Ωt = ω¯Att + covAt(sit, ωit) +
∑
j=Act
[
sjt
(
ω¯jt − ω¯Att
)
+ sjt
(
covj(sit, ωit)− covAt(sit, ωit)
)]
(2.8)
where, for each group j, ω¯jt =
1
Njt
∑
i∈Πjt
ωit is its unweighted average productivity and
covj(sit, ωit) =
∑
i∈Πjt
(
sit
sjt
−
∑
i∈Πjt
sit
sjt
Njt
)(
ωit− ω¯jt
)
is the covariance between its market share
and productivity.20
On the one hand, our main focus is on the cross-sectional importance of the productivity
distribution of different groups of firms, i.e. entry and exit, trade, size, geography, and
combinations of those, on the aggregate.21 Therefore, we compute equation (2.7) and
(2.8) for each period in the dataset.
On the other hand, we are also interested in the contribution of certain groups of firms
19To motivate their analysis, Maliranta and Ma¨a¨tta¨nen (2015) use this specification to identify the
contribution of non-staying firms on aggregate productivity.
20Maliranta and Ma¨a¨tta¨nen (2015) use a transformation of this equation, defined as ‘Augmented Static
OP Productivity Decomposition’, to study how entering and exiting firms contribute to the covariance
term. Collard-Wexler and De Loecker (2015) define this equation as ‘within technology’ decomposition
and combine it with a ‘between technology’ transformation of the OP decomposition. Their goal is to
explain changes in aggregate productivity through changes within and across two vintage technologies in
the steel industry.
21See Maliranta and Ma¨a¨tta¨nen (2015) for a discussion on the importance of static measures on
understanding the components of aggregate productivity growth.
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to aggregate productivity growth. In this case, due to compositional changes between
firms over time, the literature suggests a variety of dynamic decomposition methods,
spanning from the seminal contribution of Baily et al. (1992) to the most recent one of
Melitz and Polanec (2015). However, if we look carefully, our analysis so far is sufficient to
directly identify the contribution of certain groups. For example, for the case of surviving,
entering and exiting firms, the terms in brackets in equation (2.8) are analogous to the
terms considered in the ‘Dynamic OP Decomposition’ developed by Melitz and Polanec
(2015). Therefore, when considering entering firms, they can be directly interpreted as the
contribution of entering firms on aggregate productivity growth.22 Finally, for all other
groups, the yearly differences of each component in equation (2.8) can be interpreted as
approximate percentage contributions to productivity growth.23
2.2.3 Statistical Inference
The empirical literature on the micro-level determinants of aggregate productivity has
typically assessed the relevance of the components of aggregate productivity on the basis
of visual inspections. However, this approach casts doubts on the validity of the results
since it is not based on formal statistical inference. Even though the decomposition is an
exact procedure, i.e. analysis of variance, there is inherent uncertainty induced. As in any
empirical work, the analysis is based on micro-level data. Even in the case of accessing
census datasets covering the full population, the analysis will still be subject to sampling
error.24
To take this uncertainty into account, formal statistical inference is needed. However,
with few exceptions, most of the empirical literature is silent about these issues. Foster
et al. (2006) create a regression analogue to both decompose productivity growth in
components for continuing, exiting and entering firms, and provide estimates for their
22Since in a dynamic context exit is forward looking, we can interpret the minus of exitor’s (Ac) t− 1
counterpart from equation (2.8) as the contribution of exiting firms to aggregate productivity growth.
For the contribution of surviving firms, we can use the yearly differences in the reference group At plus
their counterpart in brackets for exiting firms (Ac), as shown in equation (2.8).
23We under(over)-estimate when exiting firms in the group of interest have lower(higher) aggregate
productivity compared to surviving firms. The magnitude of the bias depends on the relative importance
of each group in terms of market shares.
24Note that any of the productivity measures used in the decompositions are either computed or
estimated and therefore susceptible to measurement error. See Hausman (2001) for a short review on the
potential biases induced from mismeasured left hand side variables in econometric analysis. However, as
is typical in the decomposition literature, this is something we do not account for in our methodology.
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standards errors, respectively. Collard-Wexler and De Loecker (2015) retrieve standard
errors after bootstrapping the decomposed components of aggregate productivity growth
along the TFP estimation procedure.
To address this issue we follow the procedure introduced by Hyytinen, Ilmakunnas, and
Maliranta (2016) (henceforth HIM). This regression-based method allows us to retrieve
point estimates with autocovariance and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors for
each component in the OP decomposition. The idea is based on the dissection of a simple
regression:
E[ωit|sit] = E[ωit] + cov(sit, ωit)var(sit)−1
(
sit − E[sit]
)
(2.9)
that reveals the potential for estimating the components of an OP decomposition using
an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. A pooled OLS regression of firm productivity
on a full set of time dummies and scaled25 share weights gives estimates for both the
within and between component in each period. The point estimates are numerically
equivalent to the right hand side components in equation (2.5) and the standard errors
are autocovariance and heteroscedasticity-robust.
Following HIM, with the relevant scaling of the regressors, we extend this approach
to account for the mutually exclusive groups considered in equation (2.8). Overall, we
retrieve a time-series of point estimates, with their respective confidence intervals, that
we illustrate in time-line charts for an easier interpretation.
2.3 Data
We use the Annual Accounts, VAT declarations and Transactions Trade dataset from
the National Bank of Belgium (NBB). The combined dataset is representative of the
Belgian manufacturing sector with detailed information on the balance sheet and trade
activities of individual firms.
We focus on the sample of Belgian active manufacturing26 firms that file unconsolidated
accounts27 over the period 1998-2012. We retain firms reporting sales, capital stock at
25Demeaned shares weights over the cross sectional variance times the number of firms in each period.
26Table 2.A.1 in Appendix 2.A provides an overview of the NACE Rev.2 2-digit industries and their
correspondence to the more aggregate A∗38 code that represents intermediate SNA/ISIC aggregation.
27This refers to accounts not integrating the statements of possible controlled subsidiaries or branches
of the concerned company.
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the start of the period, number of employees in FTE, material costs, and exporting and
importing status.We remove outliers using the BACON method proposed by Billor et al.
(2000).28 The manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products (19) is removed, due to
the insufficient number of observations for estimating TFP at the industry level. Overall,
we end up with an unbalanced panel of 21643 firms and 178695 observations for the period
1998-2012 (see Table 2.1 for summary statistics for the firm-level variables in the sample).
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean St.Dev. p25 p50 p75
Salesa 178695 10855 87434 382 1048 3754
Capital stocka 178695 1699 12843 62 218 696
Material costsa 178695 8542 74713 218 665 2630
Employment in FTE 178695 35 159 2.4 6.8 21
Surviving 178695 .94 .24 1 1 1
Enteringb 178695 .034 .18 0 0 0
Exiting 178695 .026 .16 0 0 0
Experimenting 178695 .0015 .038 0 0 0
Domestic 178695 .56 .5 0 1 1
Exporting 178695 .064 .25 0 0 0
Importing 178695 .1 .3 0 0 0
Two-way-Trading 178695 .27 .44 0 0 1
Notes: a monetary variables in thousand Euro, b includes Experimenting
firms. NBB database for 21643 manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2012.
We need to deflate monetary variables using the appropriate NACE Rev.2 2-digit
output deflator from the EU KLEMS database to estimate TFP. Real output (Y ) is sales
deflated with producer price indices. Capital (K) is tangible fixed assets deflated by the
average of the deflators of various NACE Rev.2 2-digit industries (Javorcik, 2004b).29
Real material inputs (M) is material inputs deflated by an intermediate input deflator
constructed as a weighted average of output deflators, where country-time-industry specific
weights are based on intermediate input uses retrieved from input-output tables. Labour
(L), is the number of employees in FTE.
For the decomposition analysis we construct dummy variables which classify the firms
in mutually exclusive groups to be considered in each period. On the one hand, Surviving,
28BACON stands for Block Adaptive Computationally efficient Outlier Nominators. It is a multiple
outlier detection method. The variables considered in the method are log of output, labour, capital and
material.
29Electrical equipment (27); machinery and equipment n.e.c. (28); motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers (29); and other transport equipment (30).
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includes the firms that exist both in t − 1 and t + 1. Entering is a backward looking
variable and considers the firms that do not exist in t− 1 but exist in t. Inversely, Exiting
is a forward looking variable and takes the value of 1 when firms are present in t, but
not in t + 1. Experimenting consists of firms that appear only in t. Since the latter
group represents only 0.15% of the total sample, i.e. approximately 5% of entrants,
we incorporate it in the Entering group.30 Therefore, we end up with three mutually
exclusive groups of firms: Surviving; Entering; and Exiting.31
On the other hand, when considering trade, Domestic, Exporting, Importing and
Two-way-trading, are mutually exclusive dummy variables indicating whether, at each
point in time, a firm is purely domestic, exporting, importing, or both exporting and
importing, respectively. We see that 44% of the sample engages in some type of trade
activity, which is consistent with Belgium’s economic history as a small and heavily trade
oriented economy.
2.4 Results
In this section we first assess the importance of various productivity indices for a given
decomposition method and share weights. Then, based on the most competitive case,
we analyse the components of aggregate productivity in detail. Finally, we provide a
multi-country extension of our analysis using a pan-European dataset.
2.4.1 Productivity Indices
Production Function Estimates. Table 2.2 presents the production function
estimates for the cases discussed in Section 2.2.1, i.e. PC, IC, ICalt and ICsize. In
the first column, under perfect competition in the output market, firms face decreasing
returns to scale (RTS). In the presence of price differences across firms, output elasticities
of inputs and thus RTS will be biased downward since we only observe sales deflated
at the industry level (Klette and Griliches, 1996). The size of the bias is an increasing
function of the inverse of the markup. Columns 2 and 3 confirm the existence of such
a bias. Compared to column 1, all estimated output elasticities have higher values that
30This choice is made in order to reduce the complexity of the analysis. It does not distort the
contribution of entering firms in the decompositions.
31Note that the variables are constructed based on information from the initial sample.
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result in increasing RTS. This is the outcome when firms charge higher prices that exceed
their marginal costs.32
Table 2.2: Production Function Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PC IC ICalt ICsize
¯ˆ
θkit 0.062
∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
¯ˆ
θlit 0.267
∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009)
¯ˆ
θmit 0.633
∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.710∗∗∗ 0.756∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.020)
¯ˆ
RTSit 0.963
∗∗∗ 1.077∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.029)
¯ˆ
RTSit − 1 -0.037∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.029)
¯ˆ
Markupt 1.121
∗∗∗ 1.121∗∗∗ 1.104∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.028)
Learning by . . .
Exportingit−1 0.002
∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Importingit−1 0.004
∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Two-way-Tradingit−1 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 154637 154088 154088 69565
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Each column is estimated using all
manufacturing firms.
¯ˆ
θkit,
¯ˆ
θlit and
¯ˆ
θmit are averages of the estimated output elasticities
of capital, labour and material respectively.
¯ˆ
RTSit is the average of the estimated
RTS.
¯ˆ
Markupt is the average of the estimated annual markups. The lower panel gives
the average, of the estimated in equation (2.2), effects on future TFP from exporting,
importing and two-way trading. Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 200
replications over the GNR two-step estimation procedure and reported in parentheses
below point estimates.
Note that, even though the estimator in column 3 does not separate TFP from markups
and demand shocks, results are similar to those in column 2. Since markups only vary over
time, time variation is captured by the aggregate yearly demand shifter in the production
32Multiplying any of the estimated output elasticities and RTS in columns 2-3 with the inverse of their
respective markup leads approximately to the estimates of column 1.
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function (2.2) and the time fixed effects in the Markov process (2.3). Therefore, coefficients
for the estimated production function and Markov process are fairly similar. Nevertheless,
this does not imply that TFP estimates from IC and ICalt are similar, since the latter
entails variation in markup and demand shocks, i.e.
(
σt+1
σt
)
ωit + χit. Results hold when
estimating any of the previous cases for each industry separately (see Tables 2.A.3-2.A.6
in Appendix 2.A).
In the lower panel of Table 2.2, we find that firms learn from international trade,
i.e. Exporting (De Loecker, 2013), Importing (Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008) and Two-
way-trading. To our knowledge, the latter effect has not been reported in the literature.
However, it is an intuitive result, since firms that engage in exporting and importing are
more likely to benefit from both activities. In addition, there appears to be a ranking
in terms of the learning effects. Be it at the fourth decimal, the long-run33 learning
effects range from 4.60% for Two-way-trading firms to 3.65% for Exporting firms (see
Table 2.A.2 in Appendix 2.A). This suggests that, in the long run, firms that both export
and import benefit the most from internationalisation.
Performing the analysis per industry reveals that this pattern is only significant in a
few industries (see Tables 2.A.3-2.A.6 in Appendix 2.A). This is in line with Lileeva and
Trefler (2010), where the heterogeneous productivity impact from exporting is explained
by a firm’s initial productivity level as well as differential effects from investing.This
result can also be reconciled by the fact that a large share of Belgian manufacturing
firms export products that they do not produce, i.e. Carry-Along Trade (Bernard et al.,
2012). Therefore, the potentials of learning by exporting are expected to vary across firms
depending on the nature of trade. Overall, heterogeneity in the result emphasises the
importance of controlling for technological differences across industries, i.e. estimating
production functions at a more disaggregated level where firms are technologically more
uniform.
Note that the learning effects reported above point to the potential determinants of
future productivity. At first glance this could be considered sufficient to describe the
drivers of aggregate productivity growth. However, aggregate productivity is a share
weighted average of firm-level productivity indices. Even if the determinants of firm-
33The long-run effects are calculated using estimates from equation (2.2). Each effect is computed
as the product of the average short-run effects on future TFP from exporting, importing and two-way
trading times 1/(1− ρ) ∗ 100, where ρ is the average persistence of TFP.
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level productivity are known, this is not the case for the share weights used to compute
aggregate productivity. Overall, these results can be informative only for the determinants
of the within component of aggregate productivity. As such, we need to explore each of
the components of aggregate productivity further.
Aggregate Productivity. In Figure 2.1, we compare the evolution of aggregate
productivity under various assumptions, estimators, and samples. The top left panel
uses simple labour productivity. We find that aggregate productivity has been increasing
for the Belgian manufacturing sector since 1998, with a temporary downturn during the
financial crisis in 2008 and the Euro-zone crisis in 2011. However, this trend is inconsistent
with the other alternatives we consider.
Figure 2.1: Annual aggregate productivity.
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Notes: Authors’ calculations. Ωt is the share weighted average of the logarithm of produc-
tivity with deflated nominal sales as weights. The shaded area represents the autocovariance
and heteroscedasticity robust 95% confidence interval following the procedure of HIM.
When comparing the second and third columns, we see that even a seemingly ‘trivial
assumption,’ i.e. the aggregation of firms in groups, can bias the measure of aggregate
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productivity. Intuitively, as pointed out earlier, there is heterogeneity in the production
technology across industries. If not properly accounted for, i.e. in the second column,
TFP estimates mismeasure the contribution of certain industries on the aggregate. This
reiterates the importance of estimating production functions at a more disaggregated
level. Therefore, even within the same TFP estimator, different assumptions about the
environment in which firms operate can lead to significantly different predictions.
Further, in the third column, trends in aggregate productivity are found to be distorted
when price differences in the output market are not accounted for, i.e. PC differs from
IC.34 This suggests that firms adjust their prices when hit by shocks, which is an important
element both at the micro and aggregate levels. Notice that the two middle panels in
column 3 reveal patterns that are reasonably similar. However, the micro-mechanisms
behind these aggregate fluctuations may differ. For example, TFP estimates under
ICalt also include demand shocks and markups that potentially drive the components of
aggregate productivity in a different way than under IC.
2.4.2 Decomposition
OP Decomposition. In Figure 2.2 we decompose aggregate productivity and only
consider TFP measures that are based on production functions estimated at the industry
level, i.e. Nace. Each row contains panels for aggregate productivity (first column) and an
OP decomposition with a within-firm (second column) and a between-firm (third column)
component. Shaded areas represent autocovariance and heteroscedasticity robust 95%
confidence intervals (by year). The last column plots estimated markups for the cases of
imperfect competition considered.
We see a sharp decline in markups during the financial crisis in 2008 which lasts until
2012 when economic and political uncertainty in the Eurozone prevailed. This provides
suggestive evidence that markups are an important margin of adjustment for firms in the
presence of shocks.35 Such an adjustment is expected to be prevalent in the decomposition
analysis of aggregated micro-units. This becomes clear when we compare the first two
34Foster et al. (2008) are the first to report this result. They mainly focus on how price differences
across plants affect the contribution of entering and exiting firms on aggregate productivity growth.
35Our analysis can accommodate only time-varying markups that vary across industries but not across
firms within industries. Therefore, we are unable to elaborate on incomplete pass-through (Melitz and
Ottaviano, 2008; De Loecker et al., 2016). However, the analysis is sufficient to highlight the distortive
capacity of markups on the decomposition of aggregate productivity.
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rows (in which we do not control for price differences) with the other rows. The trends are
sufficiently different to illustrate that it is imperative to control for such price differences
in the estimation procedure (Foster et al., 2008).
Figure 2.2: Aggregate productivity, OP decomposition and markups.
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Notes: Authors’ calculations. Ωt is the share weighted average of the logarithm of productivity
with deflated nominal sales as weights and is the sum of the components in the second and
third columns. All TFP measures are based on production functions estimated at the industry
level (Nace). The shaded area represents the autocovariance and heteroscedasticity robust
95% confidence interval, for each point estimate of the OP decomposition, following the
procedure of HIM. Markup is the average across industries of estimated markups in each year.
In the third and forth rows we see that seemingly ‘minor’ differences in a certain set of
assumptions may have a considerable impact even within the same estimation procedure.
In the forth row, from 2009 onwards there is a vast increase in the covariance term. This
is interpreted as an ‘improvement’ in the reallocation mechanism, which is in line with the
within-firm component contributing positively to the evolution of aggregate productivity
during that period. However, the row above suggests a relatively constant reallocation
process. This discrepancy is generated by the fact that the TFP measure used in the
forth row, ω˜it =
(
σt+1
σt
)
ωit + χit, is an increasing function of ωit (true TFP as identified
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in the third row), σt+1
σt
(inverse of markup) and χit (demand shocks). When the markup
decreases, ω˜it increases and hence, from the properties of the covariance, the between-firm
component increases mechanically.
Finally, the last row of Figure 2.2–which uses a similar estimation procedure as the
third row but excludes micro firms which account for more than half of the sample–shows
that using a restricted sample might skew results and lead to incorrect conclusions. To
correct for the biases described above, we proceed with the decomposition analysis for
TFP estimated using the IC procedure on an industry-by-industry basis for all firms in
the sample.
Entry and exit. In Figure 2.3 we consider a decomposition for the following groups
of firms: Surviving (S); Entering (EN); and Exiting (EX). The group of surviving
firms is taken as the basis, whereas entering and exiting firms are shown relative to this
group in the second and third rows, respectively. Summing both components of the
OP decomposition, i.e. mean (second column) and covariance (third column), gives the
aggregate productivity for each group (first column).
The last two rows show negative contributions of groups EN and EX on aggregate
productivity relative to S. If EN had not entered and EX had exited earlier, aggregate
productivity at time t would have been on average 0.52% higher. On the one hand, if
firms are to exit in t+ 1, they depress aggregate productivity in the present period. Once
they exit, aggregate productivity increases by roughly 0.25%. This is because their current
aggregate productivity is, on average, lower compared to the group of surviving firms. On
the other hand, entering firms (EN) reduce aggregate productivity (growth) by 0.27%
due to their lower aggregate productivity compared to incumbent (S) firms.
The gaps in the aggregate productivity of groups EX and EN relative to S are
mainly driven by the differences in the covariance term. In the last row, the gaps in
both components of the OP decomposition have been narrowing over time for the group
of exiting firms. These gaps have remained fairly stable over time for entering firms.36
This suggests that the group of exiting firms, unlike the entering ones, were relatively
more productive near the end of the sample period and thus contributed less to overall
36Melitz and Polanec (2015) report similar results when decomposing aggregate productivity growth in
Slovenia with their preferred decomposition method. The results can also be reconciled with the concept
of dynamic selection introduced by Sampson (2016).
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productivity growth.
Figure 2.3: OP decomposition with entry and exit.
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Notes: Authors’ calculations. Ωt is the share weighted average of TFP with deflated nominal
sales as weights and is the sum of all of the components in the second and third columns. TFP
is computed from a production function estimated under IC at the industry level (Nace).
The shaded area represents the autocovariance and heteroscedasticity robust 95% confidence
interval, for each point estimate of the OP decomposition, following the procedure of HIM.
In absolute terms, the contribution of both EN and EX on aggregate productivity
(growth)37 has been small because of their small market shares. This confirms earlier
findings by Foster et al. (2008), Maliranta and Ma¨a¨tta¨nen (2015) and Melitz and Polanec
(2015) for US manufacturing, the Finish business sector, and Slovenian manufacturing,
respectively. Overall, Surviving firms in the Belgian manufacturing sector are responsible
for the bulk of aggregate productivity (growth).38 This result is not surprising given
Belgium’s level of economic development.
37See aggregate productivity growth in Figure 2.A.1 in Appendix 2.A.
38Note that both entry and exit are defined on a yearly basis. Therefore, fast growing young firms
of high potential are expected to be in the Surviving category of our sample. Dumont et al. (2016)
find that across the EU, surviving entrants gradually become more efficient and contribute positively to
aggregate productivity growth.
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Both the mean and covariance components of the group of surviving firms (S) are
important determinants of the evolution of aggregate productivity.39 Interestingly, they
started moving in opposite directions from the start of the financial crisis in 2008. The
average productivity of group S in 2007 shifts from a slowly decreasing trend to an
increasing one. There is a clear upward trend when we exclude micro firms (see Figure 2.A.2
in Appendix 2.A). This suggests that a big part of the variation is driven by micro firms
which seem more responsive to changes in their operating environment. These firms are
on average less productive and represent more than half of the sample.
The relationship between market shares and productivity has weakened over time, with
a considerable drop from 2007 onwards. This suggests that an increase in the presence
of resource misallocation prevented the Belgian manufacturing sector from reaching its
full potential. Van Beveren and Vanormelingen (2014) use the same dataset for the
period 1997-2009 and find that resource reallocation is a positive and stable contributor
to aggregate productivity growth. However, their estimates do not control for price bias
and results are driven by changes in markups. This can be seen from the fact that our
results in column PC in Figure 2.2 qualitatively verify their reported estimates for the
respective period. Overall, after the outbreak of the financial crisis, the increase in average
productivity of incumbent firms dominated the increase in the misallocation of resources,
and determined aggregate productivity (growth).
Trade. In Figure 2.4 we further decompose surviving firms in four mutually exclusive
groups based on their engagement in international trade: Domestic (S, 1); Exporting
(S, 2); Importing (S, 3); and Two-way-trading (S, 4) firms. Figure 2.4 shows that pre-
dominantly incumbent two-way traders determine the evolution of aggregate productivity.
The trends of the OP components for group S, 4 are in line with those for group S in the
previous figure. The other groups lag behind, but for exporting survivor firms (S, 2) we
observe some signs of convergence up to 2007 followed by a divergence thereafter.
It appears that firms that exclusively export were more affected by the financial and
Euro-zone crisis than Two-way-trading. These firms are likely not diversified in terms
of exporting destinations and therefore suffer more from any negative macroeconomic
39For further empirical support on the mean component see: Foster et al. (2008). For further empirical
support on the covariance component see: Aw et al. (2001); Foster et al. (2001, 2006); and Melitz and
Polanec (2015).
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shocks. In the Mayer et al. (2014) context, in response to trade/macroeconomic events,
these firms need to skew their sales towards their better performing products in order
to increase their productivity. However, for Exporting firms this adjustment is expected
to be smaller compared to Two-way-trading firms, since, in the case of Belgium, they
are relatively small firms that sell less products to fewer countries (Bernard et al., 2014).
Therefore, the scope for adjustment in the product margin is limited for these firms.
Figure 2.4: OP decomposition with entry, exit and trade
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Notes: Authors’ calculations. Ωt is the share weighted average of TFP with deflated nominal
sales as weights and is the sum of all other components in the panel. TFP is computed from
a production function estimated under IC at the industry level (Nace). The shaded area
represents the autocovariance and heteroscedasticity robust 95% confidence interval, for each
point estimate of the OP decomposition, following the procedure of HIM.
Size. In Figure 2.5 we decompose the set of surviving firms in size-based mutually
exclusive groups. Four size categories are determined using the EU’s definition that
depends on staff headcount and turnover criteria (European Commission, 2017): Micro
(S, 1); Small (S, 2); Medium (S, 3); and Large (S, 4). We find that Large firms drive
aggregate productivity, while other size groups remain relatively unproductive. This result
is in line with findings of significant TFP differences between small and large firms in
36
2.4. Results
Van Biesebroeck (2005). Interestingly, the less productive Micro, Small and Medium
groups follow a similar path of convergence over time.
Figure 2.5: OP decomposition with entry, exit and size
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Notes: Authors’ calculations. Ωt is the share weighted average of TFP with deflated nominal
sales as weights and is the sum of all other components in the panel. TFP is computed from
a production function estimated under IC at the industry level (Nace). The shaded area
represents the autocovariance and heteroscedasticity robust 95% confidence interval, for each
point estimate of the OP decomposition, following the procedure of HIM.
Trade and Size. Results presented in Figure 2.5 potentially mask heterogeneity
induced by further firm-characteristics. Therefore, we unravel potential heterogeneity in
size groups in Figure 2.6 by splitting the set of surviving firms in four mutually exclusive
groups, based on size and trade activity: Small & Domestic (S, 1); Large & Domestic
(S, 2); Small & Trade (S, 3); and Large & Trade (S, 4).40 From Figure 2.6 it is clear that
group S, 4 determines the evolution of aggregate productivity. This is in line with the
majority of exports being accounted for by few exporting firms that have more employees
and are on average more productive than smaller exporters (Bernard et al., 2014).
40Small refers to firms with less than 50 employees and at least e10 million turnover, and Large
includes the rest of the firms in the sample. Trade includes any type of trade activity, i.e. firms that are
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Figure 2.6: OP decomposition with entry, exit, trade and size
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Notes: Authors’ calculations. Ωt is the share weighted average of TFP with deflated nominal
sales as weights and is the sum of all other components in the panel. TFP is computed from
a production function estimated under IC at the industry level (Nace). The shaded area
represents the autocovariance and heteroscedasticity robust 95% confidence interval, for each
point estimate of the OP decomposition, following the procedure of HIM.
In the second row, we see that the convergence trend described above is existent
only for the group of non-domestic firms. This confirms that the trends for smaller-sized
firms above were driven by other firm characteristics. Over time, the increase in the
within-firm component for this group of firms dominates the decrease in the contribution
of the between-firm component. Overall, this translates to large firms that engage in
international trade undergoing a substantial increase in their productivity, despite lower
levels of resource reallocation. Our results indicate the importance of international trade
in shaping aggregate productivity (growth) for a small open economy such as Belgium.
not Domestic.
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2.4.3 Extensions
We extend the analysis by focusing on different factors that could drive aggregate
productivity. To proceed, we use a firm-level panel of manufacturing firms for 18 EU
countries41 during the period 2002-2012 (see Appendix 2.B for further details on the
construction and summary statistics of the data). We estimate TFP using the IC
procedure for each industry by pooling all countries available in the dataset. Once again,
we confirm the presence of significant biases in the decomposition analysis when not
controlling for the price bias in TFP estimates (see Figure 2.C.1 in Appendix 2.C).
EU and Size. As before, we split the surviving firms in groups based on their size
(see Figure 2.C.2 in Appendix 2.C). Similar patterns emerge to those in Figure 2.5. Large
firms are the main contributors to aggregate European productivity (growth). Average
firm-productivity has increased substantially over the years and dominated the decreasing
trend in the reallocation mechanism. These results suggest that Europe is facing a
period of extended resource misallocation in the manufacturing sector that does not allow
aggregate productivity to reach its potential. All remaining groups show similar signs of
convergence to the case of Belgium.
EU and Geography. In Figure 2.7 we exploit the geographical dimension in our
dataset and split the set of surviving firms into four mutually exclusive groups: Late-East
(S, 1); East (S, 2); South (S, 3); and North (S, 4). These dimensions do not only refer to
physical geography, but also embed economic and institutional characteristics that are
prevalent among certain groups of countries.42
Despite a continuous increase in the misallocation of resources in manufacturing, North
has been driving aggregate productivity in the EU through a substantial increase in its
average productivity. Late-East and South have been consistently lagging behind North,
but show signs of convergence. The interesting trend is for the East group. Until EU
accession in 2004, East’s contribution to aggregate productivity was significantly lower
than North’s. This is no longer the case after EU accession. Eastern European countries
41This includes: Austria (AT); Belgium (BE); Bulgaria (BG); Germany (DE); Estonia (EE); Spain
(ES); Finland (FI); France (FR); Croatia (HR); Hungary (HU); Italy (IT); Netherlands (NL); Poland
(PL); Portugal (PT); Romania (RO); Sweden (SE); Slovenia (SI); and Slovakia (SK).
42Late-East includes the countries that are legally bound to join the Schengen Area but implementation
has been delayed, i.e. BG, HR and RO. East includes the Central-Eastern European countries: EE;
LV ; PL; SI; and SK. South includes: ES; IT ; and PT . Finally, North includes: AT ; BE; DE; FI;
FR; NL; and SE.
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went through an extensive period of restructuring that attracted capital flows. As such,
the economy benefited not only from the presence of foreign direct investment, but also
from productivity spillovers to the local economy. Overall, after the EU enlargement of
2004, the productivity of the East group was on average comparable to that of the North
and influenced aggregate productivity in the EU. Clearly, this result could be entirely
driven by the presence of multinationals that represent the biggest share of aggregate
productivity in these economies.
Figure 2.7: OP decomposition with entry, exit and geography in EU
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Notes: Authors’ calculations. Ωt is the share weighted average of TFP with deflated nominal
sales as weights and is the sum of all other components in the panel. TFP is computed from a
production function estimated under IC at the industry level (Nace) pooling all EU countries
together. The shaded area represents the autocovariance and heteroscedasticity robust 95%
confidence interval, for each point estimate of the OP decomposition, following the procedure
of HIM.
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2.5 Conclusion
The evolution of aggregate productivity is an important determinant of economic growth.
A large literature has tried to understand the micro-origins of aggregate productivity and
various methods for its computation and decomposition have been put forth. However,
there is substantial heterogeneity in reported results, mainly for two reasons. First,
biased firm-level productivity measures skew aggregate productivity. Second, certain firm
attributes that determine aggregate productivity growth remain uncovered.
In this paper we account for these cases and estimate TFP under various assumptions.
As such, we assess the biases by contrasting different productivity measures for a given
decomposition method and weights. After controlling for such biases, we introduce a new
dimension in the decomposition based on firm attributes. This allows us to assess whether
there is a handful of firms driving aggregate productivity.
For the analysis, we use a detailed firm-level dataset for the Belgian manufacturing
sector, over the period 1998-2012. Our results can be summarised as follows. First, we
demonstrate and confirm important biases arising from ignoring output-price differences
across firms, estimating physical productivity under different assumptions (i.e. timing
of demand shocks, estimating production functions at the manufacturing instead of the
industry level, and selection of samples with larger firms). Failing to correct for these
biases may thus result in false conclusions about the evolution of aggregate productivity
and its decomposed components.
Second, after controlling for such biases, we find that the reallocation of resources
across firms has been steadily decreasing since 1998, with a rapid drop during the 2008
financial crisis. Inversely, we find that the decreasing trend in average firm-productivity
reversed during the 2008 financial crisis. Overall, the within-firm component of incumbent
firms drives the evolution of aggregate productivity, especially after the 2008 financial
crisis.
We exploit the richness of the data, and find that two-way traders are the main
contributors of aggregate productivity (growth). It appears that learning is an important
mechanism in explaining such productivity differences over time. Interestingly, firm-size
(in terms of employment) is not a determining factor of aggregate productivity compared
to the internationalisation of firms. Finally, we provide a multi-country extension of our
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analysis using a dataset containing manufacturing firms from 18-EU countries. About
and beyond to the previous results, we see that the within-firm component of firms from
the North is driving aggregate productivity of the manufacturing sector in Europe.
Firms increase their productivity over time and those that are most successful are
larger in size and more deeply engaged in internationalisation. All other firms lag behind
and prevent aggregate productivity from reaching its full potential. Knowing which type
of firms have significantly been driving the economy or suffering during good and bad
times is expected to provide policymakers and institutions with a strong reference point
for shaping future policies.
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Appendix 2.A Additional Figures and Tables
Table 2.A.1: List of NACE Rev.2 2-digit industries in the manufacturing sector.
A∗38 Division Description
CA 10 Manufacture of food products
CA 11 Manufacture of beverages
CA 12 Manufacture of tobacco products
CB 13 Manufacture of textiles
CB 14 Manufacture of wearing apparel
CB 15 Manufacture of leather and related products
CC 16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
CC 17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
CC 18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
CE 20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
CF 21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and preparations
CG 22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
CG 23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
CH 24 Manufacture of basic metals
CH 25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery & equip.
CI 26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
CJ 27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
CK 28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
CL 29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
CL 30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
CM 31 Manufacture of furniture
CM 32 Other manufacturing
CM 33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
Note: A∗38 code refers to the intermediate SNA/ISIC aggregation.
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Table 2.A.2: Long-run Effects from Learning by Trading
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Learning by . . . in % PC ICalt IC ICsize
Exportingit−1 1.78
∗∗∗ 3.65∗∗∗ 3.09∗∗∗ 0.96
Importingit−1 4.15
∗∗∗ 4.51∗∗∗ 4.16∗∗∗ 3.60∗∗∗
Two-way-tradingit−1 2.87∗∗∗ 4.60∗∗∗ 4.24∗∗∗ 4.09∗∗∗
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The long-run
effects are calculated using estimates from equation (2.2). Each
column is computed as the product of the average short-run effects
on future TFP from exporting, importing and two-way trading times
1/(1−ρ)∗100; where ρ is the average persistence of TFP. Each column
is estimated using all firms in the manufacturing sector. Standard
errors are block-bootstrapped with 200 replications over the GNR
two-step estimation procedure.
Table 2.A.3: Production Function Estimates under PC
NACE Rev.2, A∗38 SNA/ISIC aggregation
CA CB CC CE CF CG CH CI CJ CK CL CM
¯ˆ
θkit 0.057
∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ -0.005 0.051∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.032) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012) (0.004)
¯ˆ
θlit 0.232
∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.048) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.005)
¯ˆ
θmit 0.640
∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.716∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.668∗∗∗ 0.600∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.695∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.012) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
¯ˆ
RTSit 0.929
∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗∗ 0.994∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗ 0.955∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.984∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.032) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004)
¯ˆ
RTSit − 1 -0.071∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.056∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.052∗ -0.039∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.034∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.068∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.032) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004)
Learning by . . .
Exportingit−1 0.006
∗∗∗ 0.004 -0.001 0.014 0.024 0.002 0.002∗∗ 0.007 -0.332∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.002 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.009) (0.038) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Importingit−1 0.004
∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.005 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.006 -0.210∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001 0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.042) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Two-way-Tradingit−1 0.005
∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006 0.007 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗ 0.008∗∗∗ -0.907∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.002 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.032) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001)
Observations 30187 11622 24119 4757 836 15617 32006 3938 3397 9710 2974 13730
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Each column is estimated using all firms in the respective industry. ¯ˆθkit,
¯ˆ
θlit and
¯ˆ
θmit are averages of the estimated output
elasticities of capital, labour and material respectively.
¯ˆ
RTSit is the average of the estimated RTS. The lower panel gives the average, of the estimated in equation
(2.2), effects on future TFP from exporting, importing and two-way trading. Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 200 replications over the GNR two-step
estimation procedure and reported in parentheses below point estimates.
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Table 2.A.4: Production Function Estimates under IC
NACE Rev.2, A∗38 SNA/ISIC aggregation
CA CB CC CE CF CG CH CI CJ CK CL CM
¯ˆ
θkit 0.064
∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.025 0.047∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.050) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004)
¯ˆ
θlit 0.252
∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.017) (0.070) (0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.015) (0.008) (0.019) (0.007)
¯ˆ
θmit 0.705
∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.628∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.022) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.018) (0.008)
¯ˆ
RTSit 1.022
∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 1.046∗∗∗ 1.049∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗ 1.034∗∗∗ 1.032∗∗∗ 1.010∗∗∗ 1.020∗∗∗ 1.038∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.062∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.015) (0.009) (0.014) (0.047) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.019) (0.009) (0.024) (0.013)
¯ˆ
RTSit − 1 0.022∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050 0.034∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.010 0.020 0.038∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.015) (0.009) (0.014) (0.047) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.019) (0.009) (0.024) (0.013)
¯ˆ
Markupt 1.102
∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗ 1.108∗∗∗ 1.063∗∗∗ 1.046∗∗∗ 1.082∗∗∗ 1.089∗∗∗ 1.088∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 1.123∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.028) (0.011) (0.004) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.021) (0.013)
Learning by . . .
Exportingit−1 0.009
∗∗∗ 0.006∗ -0.001 0.017∗∗ 0.072 0.002 0.002∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.002 -0.000 0.004 0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.007) (0.230) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002)
Importingit−1 0.008
∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ -0.001 0.008 0.083 0.002 0.002∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.005 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.155) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Two-way-Tradingit−1 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.001 0.000 0.056 0.001 -0.000 0.023∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002 0.016∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.067) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Observations 30187 11636 24052 4764 836 15629 32032 3938 3397 9702 2954 13726
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Each column is estimated using all firms in the respective industry. ¯ˆθkit,
¯ˆ
θlit and
¯ˆ
θmit are averages of the estimated
output elasticities of capital, labour and material respectively.
¯ˆ
RTSit is the average of the estimated RTS.
¯ˆ
Markupt is the average of the estimated annual
markups. The lower panel gives the average, of the estimated in equation (2.2), effects on future TFP from exporting, importing and two-way trading.
Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 200 replications over the GNR two-step estimation procedure and reported in parentheses below point estimates.
Table 2.A.5: Production Function Estimates under ICalt
NACE Rev.2, A∗38 SNA/ISIC aggregation
CA CB CC CE CF CG CH CI CJ CK CL CM
¯ˆ
θkit 0.064
∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.025 0.049∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.056) (0.005) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011) (0.006) (0.014) (0.004)
¯ˆ
θlit 0.255
∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.306∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.017) (0.070) (0.008) (0.005) (0.013) (0.015) (0.008) (0.019) (0.008)
¯ˆ
θmit 0.705
∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ 0.692∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.723∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.022) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.018) (0.008)
¯ˆ
RTSit 1.024
∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 1.046∗∗∗ 1.049∗∗∗ 1.050∗∗∗ 1.035∗∗∗ 1.045∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗ 1.036∗∗∗ 1.042∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.062∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.015) (0.009) (0.014) (0.052) (0.011) (0.005) (0.013) (0.018) (0.009) (0.023) (0.013)
¯ˆ
RTSit − 1 0.024∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.050 0.035∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.013 0.036∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.015) (0.009) (0.014) (0.052) (0.011) (0.005) (0.013) (0.018) (0.009) (0.023) (0.013)
¯ˆ
Markupt 1.102
∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗ 1.108∗∗∗ 1.063∗∗∗ 1.046∗∗∗ 1.083∗∗∗ 1.089∗∗∗ 1.089∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 1.123∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.028) (0.011) (0.004) (0.010) (0.016) (0.009) (0.021) (0.013)
Learning by . . .
Exportingit−1 0.007
∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.001 0.016∗∗ 0.071 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.008) (0.051) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Importingit−1 0.006
∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ -0.000 0.008 0.086∗ 0.002 0.000 0.008 0.004 0.006∗∗∗ 0.004 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.050) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
Two-way-Tradingit−1 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.002 0.062 0.002 -0.002 0.010∗ 0.000 0.001 0.011∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.050) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001)
Observations 30187 11636 24052 4764 836 15629 32032 3938 3397 9702 2954 13726
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Each column is estimated using all firms in the respective industry. ¯ˆθkit,
¯ˆ
θlit and
¯ˆ
θmit are averages of the estimated
output elasticities of capital, labour and material respectively.
¯ˆ
RTSit is the average of the estimated RTS.
¯ˆ
Markupt is the average of the estimated annual
markups. The lower panel gives the average, of the estimated in equation (2.2), effects on future TFP from exporting, importing and two-way trading.
Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 200 replications over the GNR two-step estimation procedure and reported in parentheses below point estimates.
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Table 2.A.6: Production Function Estimates under ICsize
NACE Rev.2, A∗38 SNA/ISIC aggregation
CA CB CC CE CF CG CH CI CJ CK CL CM
¯ˆ
θkit 0.076
∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.008 0.053∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.003 0.042∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.028 0.047∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.016) (0.091) (0.007) (0.007) (0.029) (0.012) (0.006) (0.018) (0.005)
¯ˆ
θlit 0.197
∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.282∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.299 0.227∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.316) (0.009) (0.012) (0.046) (0.033) (0.012) (0.025) (0.012)
¯ˆ
θmit 0.799
∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.729∗∗∗ 0.683∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.701∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.033) (0.037) (0.011) (0.239) (0.012) (0.015) (0.027) (0.058) (0.011) (0.041) (0.018)
¯ˆ
RTSit 1.072
∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗ 0.991∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗ 1.064∗∗∗ 1.022∗∗∗ 1.034∗∗∗ 1.027∗∗∗ 1.062∗∗∗ 1.012∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.048) (0.050) (0.019) (0.419) (0.015) (0.022) (0.052) (0.087) (0.014) (0.056) (0.026)
¯ˆ
RTSit − 1 0.072∗∗∗ 0.051 0.076 0.017 -0.009 0.008 0.064∗∗∗ 0.022 0.034 0.027∗ 0.062 0.012
(0.009) (0.048) (0.050) (0.019) (0.419) (0.015) (0.022) (0.052) (0.087) (0.014) (0.056) (0.026)
¯ˆ
Markupt 1.078
∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 1.026∗∗∗ 1.025∗∗∗ 1.031∗∗∗ 1.077∗∗∗ 1.073∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗∗ 1.104∗∗∗ 1.051∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.048) (0.054) (0.012) (0.357) (0.015) (0.023) (0.039) (0.086) (0.013) (0.053) (0.025)
Learning by . . .
Exportingit−1 0.003
∗ 0.012 0.001 0.008 -0.010 -0.002 0.001 -0.014 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.224) (0.115) (0.014) (0.420) (0.002) (0.001) (0.024) (0.052) (0.003) (0.322) (0.002)
Importingit−1 0.001 0.010 0.001 -0.006 0.027 0.000 0.001 0.012 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.007
∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.084) (0.149) (0.009) (0.166) (0.001) (0.001) (0.016) (0.126) (0.002) (0.174) (0.002)
Two-way-Tradingit−1 0.002 0.014 0.000 -0.010 0.015 -0.002 -0.000 0.024 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.062) (0.105) (0.010) (0.253) (0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.125) (0.002) (0.080) (0.002)
Observations 11551 6424 8753 3420 643 8714 13995 1574 1886 5144 1775 5128
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Each column is estimated using all firms in the respective industry. ¯ˆθkit,
¯ˆ
θlit and
¯ˆ
θmit are averages of the estimated
output elasticities of capital, labour and material respectively.
¯ˆ
RTSit is the average of the estimated RTS.
¯ˆ
Markupt is the average of the estimated annual
markups. The lower panel gives the average, of the estimated in equation (2.2), effects on future TFP from exporting, importing and two-way trading.
Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 200 replications over the GNR two-step estimation procedure and reported in parentheses below point estimates.
Figure 2.A.1: Aggregate productivity growth.
−0.050
0.000
0.050
0.100
2000 2004 2008 2012
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Figure 2.A.2: OP decomposition with entry and exit.
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Notes: Authors’ calculations. Ωt is the share weighted average of TFP with deflated
nominal sales as weights and is the sum of all of the components in the second and third
columns. TFP is computed from a production function estimated under IC at the industry
level (Nace). The shaded area represents the autocovariance and heteroscedasticity robust
95% confidence interval, for each point estimate of the OP decomposition, following the
procedure of HIM.
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Appendix 2.B Data for EU
We construct a firm-level panel of manufacturing firms for 18 EU countries over the
period 2002 to 2012. The data source is the Amadeus database by Bureau van Dijk
Electronic Publishing (2011) (BvDEP). BvDEP regularly updates the information set in
Amadeus and releases a monthly DVD containing the latest information on ownership.
Firms that exit the market are dropped fairly rapidly. We use a time series of (annual)
DVDs to construct a consistent database that comprises a complete set of financial
information over time. This allows us to build a dataset with nearly full financial and
administrative information, i.e. balance sheet, profit and loss account activities, location,
exit and entry. Merlevede et al. (2015) describe the construction and representativeness
of the data at length.
We focus on the sample of active manufacturing firms that file unconsolidated accounts.
We retain firms reporting sales, tangible fixed assets, number of employees, material costs
and NACE Rev.2 2-digit industry classification. We remove outliers using the BACON
method, as described in the main body of the paper. This results in an unbalanced panel
of 2157986 observations for the period 2002-2012 (see Table 2.B.1).
Table 2.B.1: Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean St.Dev. p25 p50 p75
Salesa 2157986 27880 587060 357 1188 5002
Tangible fixed assetsa 2157986 7305 156500 38 175 922
Material costsa 2157986 18255 425734 126 515 2533
Employment 2157986 42 278 4 10 27
Surviving 2157986 .78 .41 1 1 1
Enteringb 2157986 .14 .35 0 0 0
Exiting 2157986 .077 .27 0 0 0
Experimenting 2157986 .015 .12 0 0 0
Notes: a monetary variables in thousand Euro, b includes Experimenting firms.
BvDEP database for manufacturing firms in 18 EU countries for the period 2002
to 2012.
Monetary variables are deflated using the appropriate NACE Rev.2 2-digit deflator.
All deflators are constructed following the approach describe in the main body of the text.
Real output Y is sales deflated with producer price indices. Capital K is tangible fixed
assets deflated with the capital deflator, and real material inputs M is material inputs
deflated by an intermediate input deflator. Labour L is the number of employees.
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Appendix 2.C Additional Figures and Tables for EU
Figure 2.C.1: Aggregate productivity, OP decomposition and markup in EU
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Notes: Authors’ calculations. Ωt is the share weighted average of TFP with deflated
nominal sales as weights and is the sum of the components in the second and third columns.
All TFP measures are based on production functions estimated at the industry level
(Nace) pooling all EU countries together. The shaded area represents the autocovariance
and heteroscedasticity robust 95% confidence interval, for each point estimate of the
OP decomposition, following the procedure of HIM. Markup contains the average across
industries of estimated markups in each year.
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Figure 2.C.2: OP decomposition with entry, exit and size in EU
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Notes: Authors’ calculations. Ωt is the share weighted average of TFP with deflated
nominal sales as weights and is the sum of all other components in the panel. TFP is
computed from a production function estimated under IC at the industry level (Nace)
pooling all EU countries together. The shaded area represents the autocovariance and
heteroscedasticity robust 95% confidence interval, for each point estimate of the OP
decomposition, following the procedure of HIM.
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3
Productivity Effects from Inter-industry
Offshoring and Inshoring: Evidence from
Belgium?
3.1 Introduction
A large literature has examined the effect of export or import behaviour on future
productivity, known as “learning by exporting” or “learning by importing” (De Loecker,
2007; Vogel and Wagner, 2010; De Loecker, 2013; Manjo´n et al., 2013). On the one
hand, product innovation, upgrading of production processes, improvements of technical
standards, managerial practices, and inventory techniques have all been suggested as
possible mechanisms for export-driven productivity improvements (Clerides et al., 1998;
Fernandes, 2007; Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; Kasahara and Lapham, 2013; Manjo´n et al.,
?This chapter is submitted to the Canadian Journal of Economics and is based on a paper co-authored
with Bruno Merlevede. We thank participants at the U4-Workshop Oct. 2014, SMYE May 2015, Ecores
Summer School May 2015, ETSG Sept. 2015, ITSG Dec. 2015, Ghent University Internal Seminar Oct.
2015, 8th FIW Dec. 2015, FREIT Jun. 2016, CIE Jun. 2016, and GTD Jun. 2016 for their comments and
suggestions. Special thanks are extended to Andrea Ariu, Sotiris Blanas, Douglas L. Campbell, Davide
Castellani, Ruben Dewitte, Gerdie Everaert, Rebecca Freeman, Dirk Van de gaer, Joep Konings, Kun Li,
Inmaculada Mart´ınez-Zarzoso, Klaas Mulier, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Glenn Rayp, David A. Rivers, Mark
J. Roberts, Ilse Ruyssen, Johannes Schmieder and Samuel Standaert.
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2013). On the other hand, various potential channels through which the import of
intermediate inputs affects future productivity include: knowledge transfer via intermediate
inputs; access to more varieties (of potentially higher quality); complementarity with
domestic inputs; and cost saving from process and product innovation (Markusen, 1989;
Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Antra`s et al., 2014; Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2015; Halpern
et al., 2015).
Increased opportunities for international trade, generated by decreases in trade and
communication costs, have resulted in the fragmentation of production within and across
national boundaries (Antra`s et al., 2012). While there is a substantial amount of research
that examines the productivity effects of firms’ or industries’ offshoring behaviour1 (e.g.
Amiti and Wei, 2005; Amiti and Konings, 2007; Tomiura, 2007; Halpern et al., 2015),
potential productivity effects of offshoring along the domestic supply chain have received
less attention. Blalock and Veloso (2007) focus on increased competition for suppliers of
domestic intermediate goods through offshoring by their clients. They find evidence that
vertical supply chain relationships serve as a channel through which indirect import-driven
productivity upgrading occurs in Indonesia.
In this paper we generalise their analysis and further examine potential productivity
effects for a given firm stemming from the fact that its suppliers also serve export
markets with intermediate goods. Mirroring offshoring, we define ‘inshoring’ as exports
of intermediate goods to both affiliated and unaffiliated foreign firms.2 To the extent
that this increases the quality and range of the set of domestically available intermediate
inputs, a given local client may benefit in terms of positive productivity effects. To cover
all possible channels, we also examine whether sourcing from local suppliers that offshore
or supplying local clients that inshore are associated with pass-on productivity effects for
a given firm.
As such, our analysis deals with potential productivity effects to a given firm associated
with the internationalisation behaviour of its local clients and suppliers. Since firms are
more likely to share new knowledge with related parties along the supply chain than with
1Our notion of offshoring includes both international outsourcing and also production transfers within
MNCs. See Crino` (2009) for an overview of definitions.
2The term was initially inspired by Slaughter (2004) who used “insourcing” to refer to subsidiaries of
foreign-headquartered multinationals, while Liu and Trefler (2008) coined the term as the flip side of
offshore outsourcing, i.e. the sale of services to unaffiliated foreign firms.
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competitors (Blalock and Veloso, 2007), we focus on the inter-industry productivity effects
of offshoring and inshoring. Local firms may then experience indirect productivity effects
of internationalisation through participation in the domestic supply chain.
The mechanisms we have in mind bear close resemblance to vertical productivity effects
from foreign direct investment (FDI) as in Javorcik (2004b) and Blalock and Gertler
(2008). However, in our case, the conduit is not FDI. Rather, it is offshoring and inshoring
by vertically related firms. On the one hand, firms potentially learn from performing tasks
(Arrow, 1962; Stokey, 1988; Parente, 1994; Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1996) required when
exchanging intermediate inputs with upstream and downstream sectors that also inshore
or offshore. Such tasks entail organisational restructuring, network sharing, technical and
managerial challenges, knowledge transfers, and indirect competition pressures that force
firms to innovate or upgrade quality and cost savings. Additionally, learning might be
relationship-specific when production requires coordination of inputs from multiple firms
(Kellogg, 2011). This includes both knowledge accumulation and personal interaction
between producers and providers of intermediate-input that work together in a contracting
relationship. Empirically, we therefore model potential productivity effects from inter-
industry offshoring and inshoring as a learning process in the production function and allow
past experience from inter-industry offshoring and inshoring to affect future productivity.
As in most empirical international trade research, productivity measurement is a core
element in our analysis. Recent literature typically relies on proxy variable methods which
aim to correct for endogeneity bias that arises when firms choose inputs while knowing
their productivity level (e.g. Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg
et al., 2006). Despite their popularity and prevalence, proxy variable methods suffer from
identification issues when the production function contains at least one flexible input such
as materials (Gandhi et al., 2016). As such, there is not enough variation outside the
production function system to identify the flexible input. To circumvent this problem,
applied economists focus on value-added production functions, i.e. they subtract materials
from output. As a result, productivity estimates suffer from a ‘value-added bias’ that
overstates their dispersion and heterogeneity. Intuitively, one erroneously attributes the
variation of material input to productivity. To correct for this, we use the estimator for
gross-output production functions with at least one flexible input proposed by Gandhi,
Navarro, and Rivers (2016) (henceforth GNR). Their approach controls for both the
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endogeneity and value-added bias. Further, we point to a common specification bias in
applied work when ignoring the dynamic nature of productivity.
We consider a small open economy to analyse productivity effects along the supply
chain driven by trade in intermediates in linked industries. We combine firm level data for
Belgian manufacturing firms for the period 1995-2011 with input-output tables (IO-tables).
The latter are used to construct industry-level measures of inter-industry offshoring and
inshoring intensities based on a measure proposed by Merlevede and Michel (2013).
The following findings emerge. We confirm important biases arising from ignoring
the dynamic nature of productivity and specifying a value-added rather than a gross-
output production function. Export of intermediates by a given firm’s local suppliers,
i.e. upstream inshoring, is the only robust channel of inter-industry productivity effects.
Sourcing from industries that also export these intermediates seem to be associated with
higher productivity levels of a given firm. This effect likely originates from access to
better intermediates that are also exported. On the basis of our preferred point estimate,
a one standard deviation increase in upstream inshoring is associated with a productivity
increase of 0.45% in the short run and 8.73% in the long run. In support of our result we
find these effects to be stronger for those firms and industries that are less likely to be
directly internationally involved. Finally, we do not find such effects if the destination of
the exported intermediates is China or Eastern Europe.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 3.2 we discuss inter-
industry offshoring and inshoring and define how the relevant proxies are constructed. In
Section 3.3, we describe the empirical methodology with a focus on the aforementioned
biases and in Section 3.4 we describe the data. Section 3.5 presents results, including an
analysis of potential biases and an exploration of heterogeneity of various forms. Finally,
Section 3.6 offers some concluding remarks.
3.2 Defining Inter-industry Offshoring and Inshoring
To measure inter-industry offshoring and inshoring activities, we construct proxies at the
industry-year level using supply-use and IO-tables from the World Input-Output Database
(WIOD) (cf. infra). For downstream offshoring, we build on a measure introduced by
Merlevede and Michel (2013) and construct similar measures for upstream offshoring
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and downstream/upstream inshoring. For a detailed derivation we refer the reader to
appendix 3.A and limit ourselves to a shorter description here. The measure to capture
downstream offshoring is the following:
OFF downjt =
∑
d6=j
θjdtΦjdt (3.1)
where θjdt is the proportion of industry j’s domestic supply sold to downstream industry
d in time t. Φjdt is constructed as a weighted sum of offshoring intensities in industry d
of products that industry j supplies to downstream industry d in time t. Weights are
defined as the relative importance of each product in the output mix of products by j.
This approach departs from simple industry averages and fully exploits information about
products exchanged between industry pairs available in supply-use tables. It captures
secondary output and allows for a more precise identification of linkages between industries.
Φjdt measures the offshoring behaviour of downstream industry d that affects (firms in)
industry j. We obtain a value of Φ for all possible industry pairs involving the focal
industry j and use θjdt to generate a single value for OFF downjt as a weighted average
of Φs. The weights used are the shares of industry j’s output supplied to downstream
industries d at time t taken from the domestic IO-table.3
Downstream offshoring captures downstream demand side shocks or import competition.
Firms compete internationally to horizontally supply differentiated intermediate inputs to
downstream industries. To survive and remain competitive, these firms need to reduce
costs and improve productivity. Should the intermediates be complements to those
offshored by downstream firms, productivity effects may result from upgrading production
processes in order to match specificities and quality standards of the complementary
intermediate inputs used in the production process of downstream firms (see Blalock and
Veloso, 2007).
In a similar spirit, we define ‘upstream inshoring’ for a focal firm as sourcing interme-
diates from (a firm in) an industry that also exports these intermediate goods to both
affiliated and unaffiliated firms in foreign countries. For instance, think of a firm in the
Manufacture of Computer and Related Services industry that supplies intermediate inputs
3Since they refer to domestic supply only, θjdt will be affected by offshoring decisions of firms in
downstream industries d. We therefore fix each θjd to its value at 1995, the start year of the sample.
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to a firm in the Manufacture of Office Machinery and Computers industry. When the
former also exports these products for intermediate use abroad, i.e. inshores, this may
affect the productivity of the firm in the Manufacture of Computer and Related Services
industry. Productivity effects then may result from the availability of higher quality
domestic inputs. However, potential productivity effects need not be limited to direct
ones. They may extend to more indirect effects such as diffusion of management practices,
benefits from international networking and organisational restructuring. To analyse such
potential effects we define IN upjt as:
IN upjt =
∑
u6=j
ζjutΨjut (3.2)
where Ψjut measures the inshoring activity of upstream industry u with respect to products
that industry j uses as intermediate inputs. More precisely, we obtain product specific
inshoring intensities by industry u and then combine them with the shares of these
products in industry j’s input mix to generate a weighted average. Next, we average
over partner industries u using ζjut, defined as the proportion of industry j’s domestically
sourced intermediate inputs from upstream industries u at time t, to obtain IN upjt.
In addition to downstream offshoring and upstream inshoring that are based on the
direct exchange of ‘common’ products, we analyse further forms of indirect internationali-
sation through domestic supply chain participation. This includes potential productivity
effects from upstream offshoring and downstream inshoring, where no product-specific
links are at play. However, offshoring in a previous stage or inshoring in a subsequent
stage of the supply chain may also result in indirect productivity spillover effects similar
to those described above. To analyse such inter-industry effects we define measures for
upstream offshoring and downstream inshoring as follows:
OFF upjt =
∑
u6=j
ζjutΩjut (3.3)
where ζjut is again the proportion of industry j’s intermediate inputs sourced from
upstream industries u at time t. Ωjut is the offshoring intensity in industry u, averaged
over all products since in this case there is no direct product link between industries j
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and u.
IN downjt =
∑
d6=j
θjdtΘjdt (3.4)
where Θjdt measures the inshoring intensities of downstream industries d and θjdt is
defined as above. Upstream offshoring is a supply side effect originating from the import
of intermediate inputs by the focal firm’s suppliers. In this case, the learning mechanisms
rely on knowledge diffusion from upstream to downstream industries (Grossman and
Helpman, 1995; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Connolly, 2003). Downstream inshoring is a
potential demand side effect that, on top of the aforementioned indirect effects, may result
from the demand for increased quality of intermediate inputs from downstream industries.
Furthermore, in our empirical model we include intra-industry offshoring and inshoring
intensities among the explanatory variables, but think of them as important control
variables for two principal reasons. First, our firm-level data do not allow us to determine
firm-specific offshoring and inshoring intensities and the industry-level intensities are an
average over firms with and without internationalisation activities. Second, our measures
in (3.1)-(3.4) poorly capture inter-industry effects and therefore exclude any intra-industry
offshoring and inshoring activity. Given that the industry classification in the IO-tables
is fairly aggregated, within-industry supply chain relations are likely to exist and will
also be reflected in the industry-level offshoring and inshoring intensities. This makes the
intra-industry variables important controls, but their interpretation is hampered by the
fact that they reflect a net outcome of different mechanisms.
All four measures, OFF downjt, IN upjt, OFF upjt, and IN downjt, are inherently
relative where firms with larger values are those in industries faced with relatively more
downstream/upstream offshoring/inshoring. Figure 3.1 plots the mean values over time for
all Belgian manufacturing industries for each of the inter-industry variables in (3.1)-(3.4).
We observe a substantial variation across industries: industry 10, Manufacture of Rubber
and Plastic Products, faces the highest values for downstream offshoring and inshoring;
Industry 13, Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment, (together with industry 16,
Other Manuafcturing) scores high on all four variables; Industry 3, Manufacture of Food,
Beverages and Tobacco, is generally confronted with the lowest values for inter-industry
internationalisation.
Figure 3.2 contains boxplots of the annual changes by industry for each of the variables.
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Figure 3.1: Inter-industry offshoring and inshoring (mean over time by industry)
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The figure illustrates that for the case of Belgium we find no clear trend for the different
measures for the different industries. The absence of any clear overall trends fits with
Belgium’s economic history as a small, heavily (intermediate) trade oriented, and deeply
EU integrated economy. However, when we calculate the variables for China and Eastern
Europe separately, we find considerable increases over the period considered for all of the
variables (cf. infra). Table 3.1 in the data section contains further summary statistics.
3.3 Empirical Methodology
3.3.1 Total Factor Productivity
To analyse potential productivity effects of inter-industry offshoring and inshoring,
we consider a flexible gross-output production function Yit = F (Kit, Lit,Mit)e
ωit+it , with
Hicks-neutral total factor productivity ωit (TFP). In logs, the production function to be
estimated is of the following form:
yit = f(kit, lit,mit) + ωit + it (3.5)
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Figure 3.2: Inter-industry offshoring and inshoring (annual differences by industry)
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where yit, kit and mit are log values of deflated (at the industry level) sales, tangible fixed
assets and material costs, respectively, and lit is the log of the total number of employees
of firm i at time t. ωit is unobserved to the econometrician but known to the firm. Ex-post
shocks, i.e. after the firm’s decision on which inputs to use, are picked up by it.
4
The applied production function estimation literature has primarily employed structural
approaches including both dynamic panel methods (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell
and Bond, 1998, 2000) and proxy variable methods (Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and
Petrin, 2003; Ackerberg et al., 2006). The main focus has been to solve for endogeneity,
also known as ‘simultaneity’ or ‘transmission bias.’ Such bias originates from the fact that
firms know their productivity level when they decide on which inputs to use (Marschak
and Andrews, 1944; Griliches and Mairesse, 1999).
Despite their popularity and prevalence, proxy variable methods suffer from identifi-
cation issues when the production function contains at least one flexible input such as
materials. These issues have been highlighted by Mendershausen (1938); Marschak and
4Given that yit is an observable variable in our dataset, we expect it to also contain measurement
error to output and prices. This is assumed to be symmetric across firms within each industry and
therefore does not affect our estimation.
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Andrews (1944); Bond and So¨derbom (2005); Ackerberg et al. (2006) and formalised by
GNR. Intuitively, there is not enough variation outside the production function system to
identify the flexible input.5
To circumvent this problem, applied economists have focused on value-added pro-
duction functions where the flexible input, materials, is subtracted from output and
thus ‘disappears’ from the production function. Such a specification, however, will fail
to identify the true variable of interest, i.e. TFP, even under very strong assumptions
(Bruno, 1978; Diewert, 1978; Basu and Fernald, 1997). Estimates suffer from a value-added
bias causing the dispersion and heterogeneity in TFP to be overstated. Intuitively, one
erroneously attributes the variation of material inputs to productivity and resultantly ends
up with a distorted image of the productivity distribution and consequently misleading
policy implications (cf. Section 3.5.1).
GNR propose a simple estimator for gross-output production functions with at least
one flexible input. They establish identification by exploiting information in the first order
condition with respect to the flexible input from the firm’s static profit maximisation
problem. This flexible approach controls for both the transmission and value-added bias.
It imposes no specific functional form, nor does it rely on strong assumptions imposed
in alternative proxy variable frameworks, e.g. the assumption of scalar unobservability
to invert the proxy demand function (e.g. Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin,
2003; Ackerberg et al., 2006). In line with most of the the proxy variable methods, the
GNR procedure follows two-steps and allows us to both estimate production functions and
identify the productivity effects from inter-industry offshoring and inshoring. Appendix
3.B outlines the assumptions and steps followed.
Note that TFP is not identical to disembodied technological change, often referred to
as the ‘Solow Residual’ (Solow, 1957). Here TFP also includes the impact of inputs that
are not explicitly measured (e.g. management and human capital skills). Further, note
that our TFP estimates are revenue based as we do not observe physical output, but only
monetary values which we deflate at the industry level. Results should be interpreted
5Firm specific prices, to the extent that they are exogenous, can potentially serve as instruments for
flexible inputs and solve for the identification problem (Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, 2013). However, in
practice it is hard to find prices at the firm/plant level that reflect differences in expected rather than
chosen prices (Griliches and Mairesse, 1999; Ackerberg et al., 2007). Therefore, in most datasets, prices
will capture market power and input/output quality differences rendering them endogenous (Fox and
Smeets, 2011; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Atalay, 2014).
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bearing this caveat in mind (Klette and Griliches, 1996).
3.3.2 Effects of Inter-industry Offshoring and Inshoring on TFP
We now specify how we model the effects of inter-industry offshoring and inshoring
on productivity as a learning process. We start with the two-stage specification that is
typical to the literature and argue why it is misspecified. We then present the correctly
specified one-stage procedure on which inference will be based.
To analyse the inter-industry productivity effects of offshoring and inshoring we allow
the relevant measures to shift the future productivity path, ωit. Typically, a two-stage
approach would be taken for such a problem. In a first stage, a TFP estimate would be
obtained using one of the techniques discussed above, to be followed by a second stage
where TFP as a dependent variable is related to the variables of interest. A non-negligible
part of the empirical literature employs a static specification (henceforth 2S-Static) in the
second stage, which in our case looks like:
ωˆit = γc + γpproxiesjt−1 + γxXit−1 + αt + αj + αr + ξit (3.6)
where proxiesjt−1 is the vector of inter- and intra-industry offshoring and inshoring proxies,
at the industry-level (j); Xit−1 is a vector of dummies indicating whether a firm belongs
to a multinational (MNC), is owned by a Belgian firm (SHH BE), or owns another
Belgian firm (SUB BE); and αt, αj and αr are a set of dummies for time, industry and
region fixed effects, respectively.
When using specification (3.6) in the second stage, a conceptual gap with stage one
emerges (Fernandes, 2007). Stage one assumes a Markov process for productivity, while
stage two uses a static specification for productivity. Stage two thus ignores the dynamic
nature of productivity which results in serial correlation that can not be eliminated with
fixed effects. As such, equation (3.6) is misspecified. The following dynamic specification
(henceforth 2S-Dynamic) resolves this issue:
ωˆit = γc + ρωˆit−1 + γpproxiesjt−1 + γxXit−1 + αt + αj + αr + ξit (3.7)
Pooling all manufacturing industries (and firms), the above equation can consistently
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be estimated since the number of industries and regions is small compared to the panel
dimension.6
However, the two-stage approach suffers from a second conceptual problem. In equation
(3.7) current productivity—conditional on lagged productivity—depends on the lagged
proxies and other determinants that are in the firm’s information set when decisions are
made. These inter-industry effects (and other determinants that possibly shift the future
productivity path) are not taken into account in the Markov process in the first-stage. To
solve for this inconsistency, we introduce the relevant proxies and control variables in the
law of motion and estimate them—as in Aw et al. (2008); Doraszelski and Jaumandreu
(2013) and De Loecker (2013)—within the GNR procedure in (3.8).7 Henceforth we refer
to the estimation of (3.8) as ‘One-Stage’ (1S-Dynamic).8
yit = f(kit, lit,mit) +
(
g(ωit−1, proxiesjt−1, Xit−1, αt, αj, αr) + ξit
)
+ it (3.8)
Because proxies are industry-year specific, (3.8) is always estimated at a more aggregate
level in order to maintain sufficient variation. Therefore, we use time αt, industry αj
and region αr fixed effects to account for macroeconomic shocks and aggregate structural
differences at the industry and region level. We use (3.8) to compare the recent GNR
procedure to that of Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2006) (henceforth ACF) which is widely
popular. We explore the value-added bias by comparing our GNR estimates to those
obtained when using the ACF method with a value-added production function as described
in Appendix 3.C. What is more, gross-output production functions with at least one
flexible input are non-parametrically non identified under any of the traditional dynamic
and semi-parametric estimation methods. Intuitively, there is not enough variation outside
the production function system to identify the flexible input. Therefore, we also compare
6In the case of firm fixed effects the latter estimation is inconsistent. To solve for the endogeneity
induced by the correlation between the persistence term and the unobserved firm fixed effects, Fernandes
(2007) and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) apply an Arellano and Bond (1991) approach. But as noted
by Blundell and Bond (1998), the latter performs poorly when ωˆit is close to a random walk. Therefore, a
“System GMM” approach can be applied. This procedure also controls for measurement error introduced
by the use of estimated lagged TFP in our specification. This is because lagged values of ωˆit−1 are
assumed to have measurement error not correlated with ωˆit−1’s measurement error.
7A direct approach where the variables of interest are incorporated in the first-step’s control function
(e.g. Fernandes, 2007; Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011) is problematic since it ignores the dynamic nature
of TFP and just provides an equilibrium relationship between TFP and the variables of interest, rather
than a learning process framework which is pertinent to us. In practice, incorporation in the control
function only helps to control for unobserved price changes induced from the relevant shocks.
8For comparability with the previous models we use a linear specification of g(·).
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GNR with a gross-output production function using the ACF estimation procedure.9 The
latter estimation is computationally feasible, but it does not identify the true production
function parameters.10
As opposed to ACF, the GNR framework allows to develop a specification that accounts
for firm fixed effects.11 GNR indicate that allowing for fixed effects does not bear an
important effect on the estimated elasticities of the production function. However, as
our main interest lies with the estimation of the impact of the proxies we do feel that
it is important to control for firm fixed effects (αi) in (3.8). Therefore, (3.9) will be our
preferred specification (henceforth 1S-D-FFE).
yit = f(kit, lit,mit) +
(
g(ωit−1, proxiesjt−1, Xit−1, αt, αi) + ξit
)
+ it (3.9)
Endogeneity issues should be less of a concern given our focus on inter-industry effects
where productivity shocks are transmitted through relevant linkages with firms in upstream
or downstream industries. To further alleviate possible endogeneity concerns, we take the
following additional steps.
First, a given firm might have some impact on the offshoring and inshoring choice of
its client or supplier industries through affiliated firms in these industries. This would
render our proxies endogenous for sufficiently granular firms. Therefore we construct two
variables to indicate whether the focal firm owns any domestic subsidiaries (SUB BE) or
is owned by any other domestic firm (SHH BE). Using the above variables and the MNC
status of a firm, we control for any type of domestic demand or supply chain relationship
between parent and affiliate firms.
Second, we assume that the activity of upstream or downstream firms is not immediately
observed. It is gradually explored by the focal firm, resulting in a delay in the transmission
of productivity effects. We use one year lagged proxies to capture such sluggishness.
Because it is counter intuitive that current firm-level TFP would affect lagged values of
inter-industry offshoring and inshoring, potential simultaneity bias is less of a concern.
Intra-industry offshoring and inshoring are expected to contemporaneously affect firm
productivity which is consistent with the timing assumption for material inputs used in
9The procedure follows from Appendix 3.C but with a gross-output translog production function.
10See Bond and So¨derbom (2005) for an exposition under a Cobb-Douglass specification.
11See Appendix C of their paper.
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estimating TFP. This is because material inputs are assumed to be flexible. In this case,
the decision to offshore or inshore is endogenous and should be modelled accordingly.12
3.4 Data
We construct a firm-level panel of Belgian manufacturing firms from 1995 to 2011
from the Amadeus database by Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing (2011) (BvDEP).
BvDEP regularly updates the information set in Amadeus and releases a monthly DVD
containing the latest information on ownership. Firms that exit the market are dropped
fairly rapidly. For a complete set of financial and ownership information over time, we
use a time series of (annual) DVDs to construct a consistent database. This allows us
to build a dataset with nearly full financial and administrative information, i.e. balance
sheet, profit and loss account, activities, location, ownership, exit and entry. Merlevede
et al. (2015) describe the construction and representativeness of the data at length.
We focus on the sample of active manufacturing13 firms that file unconsolidated
accounts.14 We retain firms reporting sales, tangible fixed assets, number of employees,
cost of employees, material costs, NACE 2-digit industry classification, NUTS region
classification and ownership information. We remove outliers using the BACON method
proposed by Billor et al. (2000).15 Firms with less than two years of data are removed from
the sample. The Manufacture of Leather, Leather and Footwear and the Manufacture of
Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel Products are removed due to an insufficient
number of observations. This results in an unbalanced panel of 3117 firms and 33842
observations for the period 1995-2011 (see Table 3.1).
Monetary variables are deflated using the appropriate NACE 2-digit output deflator
from the EU KLEMS database. Real output (Y ) is sales deflated with producer price
indices. Capital (K) is tangible fixed assets deflated by the average of the deflators of
various NACE 2-digit industries (Javorcik, 2004b).16 Real material inputs (M) is material
12See Amiti and Wei (2005); Go¨rg et al. (2008); Ito and Tanaka (2012); Michel and Rycx (2014) and
Halpern et al. (2015).
13Table 3.D.1 in Appendix 3.D provides an overview of the NACE Rev.1.1 2-digit industries included.
14This refers to accounts not integrating the statements of possible controlled subsidiaries or branches
of the concerned company.
15BACON stands for Block Adaptive Computationally efficient Outlier Nominators. It is a multiple
outlier detection method. The variables considered in the method are log of output, labour, capital and
material.
16Machinery and equipment (29); office machinery and computing (30); electrical machinery and
64
3.4. Data
inputs deflated by an intermediate input deflator constructed as a weighted average of
output deflators, where country-time-industry specific weights are based on intermediate
input uses retrieved from IO-tables. Labour (L) is the number of employees. Finally,
MNC, SHHBE and SUBBE are dummy variables indicating whether at least 10% of a
firm’s shares are owned by a single foreign firm, if a firm is owned by any other domestic
firm and if a firm owns any domestic subsidiary, respectively.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Firm-level Obs. Mean St.Dev. p25 p50 p75
Sales∗ 33842 44396 145387 7541 13734 30575
TangibleF ixedAssets∗ 33842 6077 23468 647 1685 4296
MaterialCosts∗ 33842 26355 96143 3678 7378 17256
Employees 33842 135 361 31 55 116
MNC 33842 .13 .33 0 0 0
SHHBE 33842 .37 .48 0 0 1
SUBBE 33842 .24 .43 0 0 0
ωˆGNR 33842 26 .16 26 26 26
ωˆACFV A 33662 16 .33 16 16 16
ωˆACFGO 33662 12 .08 11 12 12
Industry-level
OFF down 204 0.463 0.256 0.271 0.342 0.727
IN up 204 0.169 0.051 0.130 0.165 0.202
OFF up 204 0.155 0.034 0.128 0.155 0.183
IN down 204 0.354 0.149 0.240 0.353 0.488
Notes: ∗ Monetary variables in thousands of Euro. 3117 Belgian manufacturing
firms and 12 industries over 1995-2011.
For the measurement of proxies we use the WIOD, which provides a time-series
(1995-2011) of IO-tables for 40 countries worldwide and a table covering the rest of the
world.17 WIOD also contains industry-product supply and use tables that allow us to
consider product-specific relationships between industries. The WIOD classification (CPA)
contains 35 industries and 59 products.18 A major advantage over other databases is that
the WIOD varies over time and that information on imports of goods does not rely on
the standard proportionality assumption. Instead, a more flexible approach is followed
whereby import proportions vary over end-use categories. This provides greater variability
over time and intermediate input types. This extra level of detail is expected to unmask
apparatus (31); motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers (34); and other transport equipment (35).
17See Dietzenbacher et al. (2013) for a detailed description of the construction of the tables.
18See Table 3.D.1 in Appendix 3.D for correspondence with NACE Rev.1.1 2-digit.
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possible heterogeneity and provide better identification.
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for the firm and industry-level variables in our
sample.
3.5 Results
In this section we first assess the importance of misspecification biases that are frequent
in the literature and the impact of value-added bias on the estimated productivity effects
of inter-industry offshoring and inshoring. We then analyse the productivity effects of
inter-industry offshoring and inshoring in detail.
Table 3.2: TFP effects from inter-industry offshoring and inshoring.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GNR Gross-output ACF Value-added ACF Gross-output
2S-Static 2S-Dynamic 1S-Dynamic 1S-Dynamic 1S-Dynamic
ωit−1 0.942∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.004) (0.011) (0.020)
OFF downjt−1 -0.034 -0.039∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗ -0.070∗∗ -0.011
(0.047) (0.012) (0.019) (0.035) (0.015)
IN upjt−1 0.112
∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.026 -0.011
(0.053) (0.020) (0.022) (0.043) (0.013)
OFF upjt−1 -1.456
∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ -0.407∗∗∗ -0.056 0.008
(0.132) (0.051) (0.051) (0.150) (0.041)
IN downjt−1 0.332∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ -0.058 -0.007
(0.034) (0.012) (0.014) (0.048) (0.024)
OFF jt−1 0.034 0.074∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.009
(0.052) (0.012) (0.019) (0.055) (0.016)
IN jt−1 0.127∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ -0.021 -0.006
(0.056) (0.014) (0.020) (0.036) (0.011)
SHHBEit−1 -0.002 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
SUBBEit−1 0.018
∗∗ 0.000 0.000 -0.006 -0.001
(0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
MNCit−1 0.025∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Observations 33842 33842 30725 30600 30600
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All regressions include additive year, industry and region fixed
effects. In columns 1 and 2 standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 500 replications over the two-stage
estimation procedure (with GNR two-step estimation procedure in the first stage) and are reported in
parentheses below point estimates. In columns 3, 4 and 5 standard errors are block-bootstrapped with
500 replications over the GNR gross-output, the ACF value-added and the ACF gross-output estimation
procedures, respectively, and are reported in parentheses below point estimates.
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3.5.1 Misspecification and Value-added Bias
Misspecification. Notwithstanding that it is misspecified, we start with the static
specification (3.6) because of its frequent use in the empirical literature. In Table 3.2, one
immediately notices that the magnitude and significance of the coefficients in the first
column (2S-Static) are not entirely consistent with those in the third column (1S-Dynamic)
based on specification (3.8), leading to distorted inference. Therefore, it is crucial to at
least control for the dynamic nature of productivity. Results using specification (3.7) in
the second column (2S-Dynamic) control for the bias generated by ignoring the dynamic
nature of productivity. Comparing columns 2 and 3 we do not observe large differences
in estimated coefficients. Recall, however, that specification (3.7) still does not correctly
specify the learning process.
Value-added Bias. To explore the effect of the value-added bias, we estimate
productivity using the ACF two-step procedure with a value-added production function.
In Figure 3.3, we plot the re-centered distributions of the estimated TFPs using the GNR
gross-output and the ACF value-added. From a visual inspection we may conclude that
the latter generates a more heterogeneous and dispersed distribution of TFP estimates.
This indicates that the value-added bias can lead to seriously distorted estimates. In
column 4 of Table 3.2 we therefore re-estimate column 3 based on the ACF estimation
procedure under a value-added production function. It is clear from column 4 that the
correctly specified one-stage procedure fails to produce any significant results for ACF
value-added. Furthermore, point estimates are hardly comparable to those in column 3.
This is likely driven by the presence of value-added bias.
ACF Gross-output. GNR prove that gross-output production functions with at
least one flexible input are non-parametrically non identified under the ACF estimation
method. We now proceed as if we are not aware of this result and erroneously estimate a
gross-output production function using the ACF framework. Recall that the estimation
is computationally feasible, but results in estimates of ωit that do not represent TFP .
As shown in Figure 3.3, the TFP distribution using ACF gross-output is more similar
to that under the GNR procedure. It seems that the value-added bias is ‘controlled for’
when employing a gross-output specification. In column 5 of Table 3.2 we re-estimate
the specification from column 3 but now use the ACF estimation procedure under a
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Figure 3.3: Re-centered distribution of ωˆit
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on BvDEP
gross-output production function. As can be seen from Table 3.2 the correctly specified
one-stage procedure in column 5 produces results that are more in line with ACF under a
value-added production function than with GNR. There are no significant effects on the
variables of interest.
The findings in Table 3.2 emphasise the importance of correctly identifying gross-
output production functions, as these identification issues potentially severely distort
empirical results.
3.5.2 TFP Effects from Inter-industry Offshoring and Inshoring
In Table 3.3 we first introduce our preferred specification (3.9) and then test the
robustness of our findings for a number of alternative assumptions in the estimation
procedure (columns 2-4), the construction of the variables (columns 5-6), and the size of
focal firms (columns 7-8).
Firm Fixed Effects. Column 1 shows the results of estimating (3.9) using the GNR
procedure. The obtained point estimates are fairly similar to those from column 3 in
Table 3.2. In terms of statistical significance we observe more substantial differences.
When accounting for firm-specific effects, only upstream inshoring remains significant
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at the 1%-level, while upstream offshoring becomes significant only at the 5%-level, and
downstream offshoring and inshoring lose all significance. Considering all of the evidence
from Table 3.3 (and Table 3.4), upstream inshoring seems the only robust channel of inter-
industry productivity effects. Supplying industries that also export these intermediates
seem to be associated with higher productivity levels of the focal firm. This effect is
likely to originate from access of the focal firm to better intermediates, since they are
also exported. On the basis of the point estimate in column 1, a one standard deviation
increase in upstream inshoring is associated with an increase in productivity of 0.45% in
the short run and 8.73% in the long run.19
Table 3.3: The impact of inter-industry offshoring and inshoring using a one-stage dynamic firm fixed effects
procedure under GNR and robustness to alternative assumptions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1S- Labour Cobb Imperfect Fixed Time Size Size
D-FFE Timing Douglas Competition in 2002 Varying L < 50 L ≥ 50
OFF downjt−1 -0.039 -0.039 0.014 0.054 -0.020 -0.004 -0.038 -0.054
(0.078) (0.088) (0.067) (0.079) (0.046) (0.036) (0.140) (0.120)
IN upjt−1 0.133
∗∗ 0.133∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.077
(0.060) (0.074) (0.064) (0.067) (0.063) (0.051) (0.070) (0.108)
OFF upjt−1 -0.334
∗ -0.334 -0.625∗∗∗ -0.888∗∗∗ -0.325∗ -0.324∗∗ -0.435 -0.256
(0.186) (0.214) (0.184) (0.151) (0.185) (0.152) (0.305) (0.327)
IN downjt−1 0.053 0.053 0.019 -0.052 0.055 0.055 0.051 0.064
(0.061) (0.054) (0.048) (0.040) (0.058) (0.062) (0.044) (0.101)
Observations 25463 25463 25463 25463 25463 25463 11016 14447
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All regressions include intra-industry offshoring and inshoring
and dummies for multinational (MNC), domestic shareholder (SHHBE) and domestic subsidiary (SUBBE)
presence. Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 500 replications over the GNR two-step estimation
procedure and are reported in parentheses below point estimates.
Alternative Assumptions. Although we prefer to allow for a flexible form of the
production function we also test for a more restrictive one (Yatchew, 1998; Hulten, 2001,
2010, an issue raised by). Column 2 uses a Cobb-Douglas production function rather
than the more flexible one underlying the result in column 1. Qualitatively, results are in
line with column 1. Both upstream inshoring and offshoring are now significant at the
1%-level.
In column 3 we consider an alternative timing assumption for labour. We now assume
19The long-run effect is computed using estimates from column (1) of Table 3.3 based on the following
formula: IN upjt−1 ∗ 1/(1− ρ) ∗ sd(IN upjt) ∗ 100, where IN upjt−1 is the average short-run effect of
upstream inshoring on future TFP as specified in equation (3.9), ρ is the average persistence of TFP, and
sd(IN upjt) is one standard deviation of the measure of upstream inshoring.
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that rigidities in the Belgian labour market are so high that labour cannot adjust within
the (accounting) year. This translates to an adjustment lag, resulting in a one period lag
between the choice of labour and its realisation in the production process (hence in the
accounting data). Therefore, labour, as in the case of capital, is predetermined in period
t. To guarantee identification in the second step of the GNR procedure, we use lit instead
of lit−1 in the orthogonality conditions. Under such alternative timing assumptions, only
upstream inshoring is significant at the 5%-level.
In column 4 we account for differences in prices in the output market in the estimation
procedure. To control for unobserved variation in firm-specific prices we introduce more
structure and assumptions (such as an iso-elastic demand system coupled with monopolistic
competition similar to Klette and Griliches (1996) and De Loecker (2011)). For details
about the estimation procedure we refer to GNR. By accounting for price differences in
the output market, both the effects of upstream inshoring and offshoring turn out to be
highly significant.
Construction of Variables. In columns 5 and 6 results are fairly robust to alternative
treatment of the technical coefficients used to build the proxies. To test robustness we
replace 1995 weights with 2002 fixed weights in column 4 and use time varying weights
in column 5. Earlier findings are confirmed, with upstream inshoring reported as highly
significant, and upstream offshoring also significant but less robust. Therefore our result
does not seem to be driven by the choice of a specific weighting scheme. Notwithstanding
this result, it is advisable to choose weights at the start or even before the start of the
sample period for the reasons outlined above.
Firm Size. In columns 7 and 8 we split our sample into small (less than 50 employees)
and large (50 employees or more) firms. On the one hand, we choose a cut-off of 50 since
the large majority of Belgian firms have less than 250 employees. On the other hand, the
50 employee cut-off roughly splits the sample in two and comes with legal requirements in
terms of union representation. This specific cut-off ensures that we observe both small
and large firms in all industries considered.
We find that small firms are subject to upstream inshoring effects, but no other
inter-industry effects. Larger firms do not seem to be affected by inter-industry offshoring
and inshoring. This may reflect the fact that especially small firms are exposed to the
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effects of internationalisation through the domestic supply chain, whereas larger firms are
generally more likely to already directly participate in global supply chains.
Our overall conclusion from Table 3.3 is that upstream inshoring, i.e. the effect of local
suppliers also exporting these intermediates, is the only robust channel for inter-industry
effects of offshoring and inshoring.
3.5.3 Heterogeneity
The result on firm size raises the question as to whether the effects of indirect
internationalisation through domestic supply chain participation are specifically applicable
to firms that do not or are less likely to directly participate in international or domestic
supply chains. We test this in Table 3.4. For comparison reasons, the first column of
Table 3.4 repeats column 1 from Table 3.3, our baseline result. The results in all other
columns are also obtained from a 1-S-D-FFE estimation.
Table 3.4: TFP effects from inter-industry offshoring and inshoring
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full MNC No MNC Relatively Relatively Upstream Upstream
Sample Links Links Upstream Downstream High-skill Low-skill
OFF downjt−1 -0.039 -0.043 -0.038 0.023 -0.052 -0.061 0.294
(0.078) (0.379) (0.068) (0.180) (0.285) (5.956) (0.312)
IN upjt−1 0.133
∗∗ 0.154 0.141∗∗ 0.187∗∗ 0.024 0.297 0.247∗∗
(0.060) (0.513) (0.060) (0.086) (0.331) (1.420) (0.118)
OFF upjt−1 -0.334
∗ -0.291 -0.345∗ -0.287 -0.468 -0.685 0.029
(0.186) (1.529) (0.182) (0.330) (1.102) (5.497) (0.766)
IN downjt−1 0.053 0.094 0.048 0.054 0.015 0.164 -0.060
(0.061) (0.270) (0.052) (0.074) (0.271) (0.637) (0.138)
Observations 25463 3118 22345 13983 11480 3391 10592
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. All regressions include intra-industry offshoring and inshoring,
and dummies for multinational (MNC), domestic shareholder (SHHBE) and domestic subsidiary (SUBBE)
presence. Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 500 replications over the GNR two-step estimation
procedure and are reported in parentheses below point estimates.
Local Supply Chain Participation. Purely domestic firms are less likely to be
directly involved in an international supply chain than firms with foreign links. Therefore
we may expect purely domestic firms to be more prone to inter-industry productivity
effects. Column 2, reveals that in the specific subsample of firms that are either foreign-
owned or own a foreign subsidiary, no significant effects can be detected from indirect
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participation in international supply chains. Foreign owned firms are likely to be directly
involved in an international supply chain and their productivity (evolution) will be less
prone to inter-industry offshoring effects. On the other hand, local standalone firms are
more likely to depend on domestic clients and suppliers. For the sample of purely local
firms, we find in column 3 that the estimated impact of inter-industry offshoring and
inshoring confirms our basic result. It suggests that the domestic supply chain may act as
a vehicle for internationalisation effects through upstream offshoring.
Supply Chain Position. Fally (2011) finds a large shift of value-added towards
final stages of production, i.e. relatively downstream. He further shows that developed
countries have a comparative advantage in goods that involve fewer production stages and
goods that are closer to final demand.20 This is also in line with Antra`s et al. (2012), who
show that a better rule of law, strong financial development, and relative skill intensity
abundance are correlated with a higher propensity to export in relatively more downstream
industries. This translates to the fact that relatively downstream industries both sell
domestically and export output for final use more intensively. Conversely, this implies
that relatively less output is expected to ‘be left’ for domestic exchange in relatively
downstream industries.
As a result, more domestic relationships will be generated in relatively upstream
compared to relatively downstream industries. Therefore, we expect a larger potential
for inter-industry effects in relatively upstream industries. To account for possible
heterogeneity in the absorption of learning effects from inter-industry linkages, we generate
an industry-level measure of relative supply chain position as in Fally (2011) and Antra`s
et al. (2012) using WIOD. This measure of industry upstreamness gives the average
‘distance’ of each industry from final use. We rank industries as relatively upstream or
downstream based on the median value of the distribution of the upstreamness measure
(see Table 3.D.2 in Appendix 3.D).
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 3.4 present results for relatively upstream or downstream
industries, respectively. The expected heterogeneity of results between industries with
different supply chain positions is confirmed. On the one hand, firms in relatively upstream
industries (column 4) experience significant productivity effects of upstream inshoring,
20The latter is consistent with the predictions of Costinot et al. (2013).
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which are larger in terms of point estimates, compared to the the basic specification. On
the other hand, firms in relatively downstream industries do not experience any significant
effects from inter-industry offshoring and inshoring.
High-skill vs Low-skill. Fally (2011) finds that R&D intensive industries have
become relatively less fragmented over time. What is more, innovative industries have
been found to rely less intensively on outsourcing (see Acemoglu et al., 2007, 2010).
Therefore, relationship-specific learning that depends on links between firms through the
exchange of intermediate inputs will be more limited in high-tech industries where such
relationships are less prevalent. In columns 6 and 7 we split the sample of relatively
upstream industries in high and low-skill intensive industries, on the basis of information
available in the WIOD.21 Upstream and low-skill intensive industries are expected to
generate relatively more intermediate input based relationships than upstream and high-
skill ones. Therefore, firms in low-skill intensive industries may be expected to experience
stronger productivity effects from inter-industry offshoring and inshoring on average.
From columns 6 and 7 one can infer that only upstream and low-skill intensive industries
experience upstream inshoring productivity effects. In upstream and high-skill intensive
industries we detect no effects of indirect international supply chain participation.
China and Eastern Europe. Finally, we consider a geographical split of the partner
countries of the inter-industry offshoring and inshoring measures. Like all Western
European countries, Belgium has been confronted with two dramatic changes in the
international trade environment. One is China’s accession to the WTO and the other is
the collapse of communism. Both events led to increasing trade opportunities with China
and Eastern Europe, respectively. Figure 3.4 illustrates the evolution of downstream
and upstream offshoring and inshoring related to China and Eastern Europe (CEEC).22
China and CEEC have both become more important supply chain partners for Belgium.
Although China and CEEC are not that important in level terms, they do account for a
substantial increase and a considerable compositional effect over the period considered.
21High and Low-skill intensity is computed from the Socio-economic Accounts in the WIOD using total
hours worked by high-skilled persons engaged over hours worked by medium and low-skilled persons
engaged. High-skill intensive industries are defined based on the median value of the distribution of
average high-skill to low-skill ratios for each industry over the period considered. High-skill includes
industries with CPA: 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16 and Low-skill includes industries with CPA: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12.
22Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia.
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Figure 3.4: Inter-industry offshoring to and inshoring from China or CEEC
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on WIOD
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Table 3.5: TFP effects from inter-industry offshoring
and inshoring and the impact of China and CEEC
(1a) (1b) (1c)
non-China China CEEC
non-CEEC
OFF downjt−1 -0.042 -0.666 2.623∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.669) (0.589)
IN upjt−1 0.282
∗∗∗ -6.015∗∗∗ -1.193∗∗
(0.072) (2.110) (0.606)
OFF upjt−1 -0.794
∗∗ 23.192∗∗∗ -2.354
(0.355) (3.886) (2.519)
IN downjt−1 0.057 -0.221 -1.196
(0.087) (0.965) (0.912)
Observations 25463
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. The regres-
sion includes intra-industry offshoring and inshoring split
into rest-of-world (1a), China (1b) and CEEC (1c), and
dummies for multinational (MNC), domestic shareholder
(SHHBE) and domestic subsidiary (SUBBE) presence.
Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 500 replica-
tions over the GNR two-step estimation procedure and
are reported in parentheses below point estimates.
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In Table 3.5 we estimate our basic model, but now split the proxies according to the
partner region. Column 1a excludes China and CEEC from the measures whereas columns
1b and 1c single out China and CEEC, respectively. With respect to our main result
we find that the positive effect of upstream inshoring is driven by exports to destination
markets other than China and CEEC, which are almost exclusively advanced markets.
Exports of intermediates to China or CEEC even seem to have a negative impact along
the domestic supply chain. We think of this as an indication that the availability of higher
quality intermediates is the main channel through which productivity is affected because
quality requirements will differ between advanced destination countries on the one hand
and China and CEEC on the other. Note that the differences in the magnitudes of the
estimated effects come from the fact that the variables of interest are not standardised.
These are variables that are by construction between zero and one and are ‘demeaned’ from
the inclusion of industry and year fixed effects in the regression. However, for inference
we also need to consider their standard deviations.
Upstream offshoring to China is associated with a significantly higher productivity
of domestic clients of such industries; there is no such an effect for CEEC. This could
be reconciled with the idea that upstream industries import cheaper intermediate inputs
from China that allow them to economise and subsequently push down the marginal cost
curves of their downstream clients. For the case of CEEC such costs could be higher
relative to China, especially when thinking about their unit labour costs and institutional
environment.
Belgian firms do seem to have reacted to downstream offshoring to CEEC, i.e. import
competition, by becoming more productive, but no such effect can be found for China.
This can be reconciled by the result of Merlevede and Michel (2013), where downstream
offshoring has a robust negative effect on employment. Therefore, Belgian firms are pushed
to increase their productivity in order to outweigh the negative effect on labour demand
from ‘indirect’ import competition. This effect does not appear for the case of China
since the presence of tougher geographical and institutional barriers potentially induces
the products that are offshored by downstream firms to be direct substitutes (instead
of complements) to the products that are domestically outsourced from upstream firms.
However, as shown in the previous section, this last set of findings is not robust and thus
should be taken with a grain of salt.
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3.6 Conclusion
A large literature has examined the relationship between export and import behaviour,
on the one hand, and productivity, on the other. Yet, notwithstanding a substantial
amount of research on the direct productivity effects of firms’ or industries’ offshoring
behaviour, potential indirect or spillover productivity effects of internationalisation have
received less attention. We analyse potential productivity effects for a given firm that are
associated with the internationalisation behaviour of other firms in the domestic economy.
Since sharing new knowledge with related parties along the supply chain is more likely
than sharing it with competitors, we focus on the effects of internationalisation by local
clients and suppliers of a given firm. Local firms may then experience indirect productivity
effects of internationalisation through participation in the domestic supply chain.
We define four ‘channels’ of possible inter-industry productivity effects for a given firm:
its local client may (1) source its intermediates from abroad (downstream offshoring) or
(2) export its output (downstream inshoring). Additionally, a given firm’s local supplier
may also (3) export intermediates that the given firm sources (upstream inshoring) or (4)
import intermediates itself (upstream offshoring).
We combine firm level data for manufacturing firms for the period 1995-2011 with
I-O tables to investigate potential productivity effects along the supply chain driven by
trade in intermediates in linked industries for the case of Belgium. I-O tables are used to
construct industry-level proxies for inter-industry offshoring and inshoring intensities. No
clear upward trend is detected in these variables unless we separately consider the case of
China and Eastern Europe as trade partners, where there is a considerable increase.
Empirically, we model potential productivity effects from inter-industry offshoring
and inshoring as a learning process. Within a production function system we allow
past experience from inter-industry offshoring and inshoring to affect future productivity.
Therefore, productivity measurement is a core element in our analysis. Recent literature
typically relies on proxy variable methods which attempt to solve for the endogeneity
problem that arises from firms choosing inputs while knowing their TFP. Despite their
popularity, proxy variable methods suffer from identification issues when the production
function contains at least one flexible input, e.g. materials. To circumvent this problem,
applied economists focus on value-added production functions. As a result TFP suffers
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from a ‘value-added bias’ which leads to overstated dispersion and heterogeneity. To be
able to correctly identify a gross-output production function, we use the estimator proposed
by GNR, that controls for both the endogeneity and value-added bias. Additionally, we
point to a common specification bias in applied work when ignoring the dynamic nature
of productivity.
Our results can be summarised as follows. First, we demonstrate and confirm important
biases arising from ignoring the dynamic nature of productivity and specifying a value-
added rather than a gross-output production function. Failing to correct for these biases
may thus result in false conclusions.
Second, only upstream inshoring, i.e. the export of intermediates by a given firm’s
local suppliers, appears to be a robust channel of inter-industry productivity effects in
Belgium. Sourcing from industries that also export these intermediates is associated with
higher productivity levels of a given firm. This effect likely stems from access to better
intermediates that are also exported. On the basis of our preferred point estimate, a
one standard deviation increase in upstream inshoring is associated with a productivity
increase of 0.45% in the short run and 8.73% in the long run.
In support of our result, we find these effects to be stronger for those firms and
industries that are less likely to be directly internationally involved. The effect is more
prominent for smaller firms, for firms with non-multinational status, and for firms in
relatively upstream and/or low-skill intensive industries. Finally, we find no such effects if
the destination of exported intermediates is China or Eastern Europe. Therefore, positive
productivity effects that result from access to increased quality and variety of locally
available inputs because of local supply chain participation are strengthened. This holds
as long as intermediate goods exports face lower quality requirements when destined to
China and Eastern Europe compared to more advanced economies.
This paper provides a new channel through which internationalisation can affect firms.
This is particularly insightful for two reasons. First, our analysis suggests that policy
makers should facilitate trade with more developed economies in order to minimise the
negative indirect (through the domestic supply chain) productivity effects of trading with
less developed countries. Second, we expect our findings to motivate theoretical models
on firm heterogeneity, supply chains and trade in order to improve our understanding
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of the exact mechanisms behind our empirical findings. Such models would allow us to
generate counterfactual predictions about patterns of trade, production and productivity
from changes in policies related to internationalisation.
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Appendix 3.A Construction of Proxies
3.A.1 Intra-industry Offshoring and Inshoring
Based on the seminal work of Feenstra and Hanson (1996), intra-industry offshoring
intensity is proxied as the share of imported intermediate inputs over total intermediate
inputs used in the industry:
offjt =
MIIjt
TIIjt
(3.10)
where MIIjt refers to imported intermediate inputs and TIIjt refers to total non-energy
intermediate inputs of industry j at time t.23 Due to data limitations, our definition
of offshoring also includes production transfers within multinationals (vertical FDI),
where intermediate inputs flow between affiliated companies. Proxies are computed using
symmetric IO-tables from the WIOD.
For a symmetric treatment of the inter-industry effects of internationalisation below
it would be incorrect to restrict our attention to offshoring. We also need to examine
inshoring defined as export of intermediate inputs to both affiliated and unaffiliated firms
in a foreign country.
We proxy inshoring in the same vein as offshoring:
injt =
XYjft
TYjt
(3.11)
where XYjft is industry j’s output exported specifically for intermediate input use and
TYjt is industry j’s total output supplied for intermediate input use to both foreign and
domestic firms.
3.A.1.1 Downstream Offshoring
The previous measure of offshoring is limited to the effects of offshoring within an
industry. For example, how are firms in the Manufacture of Rubber and Plastics affected
by offshoring? Clearly, this measure ignores any inter-industry linkages. Firms in the
Manufacture of Rubber and Plastics industry also supply intermediate inputs to domestic
firms in the Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment industry. In turn, the Manufacture
23Feenstra and Hanson (1999) distinguish between narrow (intermediates from the same industry) and
broad (all imported intermediates) offshoring.
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of Machinery and Equipment industry may decide to (partly) offshore these intermediate
inputs supplied by the Manufacture of Rubber and Plastics industry. Such a change in the
offshoring behaviour of firms in the downstream Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment
industry is likely to affect the performance of firms in the upstream Manufacture of Rubber
and Plastics.
To capture the effect transmitted to firms in the supplying industry from the offshoring
activity undertaken by firms in downstream industries, we compute a proxy at the
industry-level. This proxy was proposed by Merlevede and Michel (2013) and termed
“downstream offshoring.” Define a focal industry j, a downstream industry d and a set
P = (p1, p2, . . . , pN) of all products p indexed by n = 1, . . . , N that are produced in the
economy.
From the supply tables, we retrieve the output product mix of firms in industry j,
P SUPj ⊂ P , i.e. the output produced by firms in industry j. Likewise, from the use tables,
we are able to retrieve the product mix of intermediate inputs purchased by domestic
downstream industry d, PUSEd ⊂ P . These are products that firms in industry d buy
as intermediate inputs from domestic upstream industry j. All products produced by
firms in industry j that are purchased as intermediate inputs by firms in industry d are
represented by the intersection of the two previous sets of products, Pjd = P
SUP
j ∩ PUSEd .
Given that the WIOD tables contain 59 product categories and 35 industries, Pjd will
contain more than one product in some combinations of jd. This extra level of detail
captures the importance of secondary output as well.24
Firms in downstream industry d choose between domestic sourcing or offshoring any of
the intermediate inputs n. Hence, if for example d increasingly offshores product pn ⊂ Pjd,
then firms in industry j would face a demand shock. The offshoring intensity for each
matched product pn by each dowstream industry d is computed as in (3.10) from the
international use tables:
offdnt =
MIIdnt
TIIdnt
(3.12)
24There is no consensus in the literature over which sectors should be included in the measures. Our
benchmark proxy contains products from all sectors excluding: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing;
Mining and Quarrying; Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel; Electricity Gas and Water Supply;
Construction; Hotels and Restaurants; Financial Intermediation; Public Admin. and Defence; Education;
Health and Social Work; Other Community, Social and Personal Services; and Private Households with
Employed Persons.
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where MIIdnt is imported intermediate input n and TIIdnt is total intermediate input n
used in industry d.
The extent to which downstream industry d’s imports of intermediate products n
affect focal industry j is measured as a weighted sum of offdnt for all products n that j
supplies as intermediate inputs to d that are, in turn, also potentially offshored by the
latter, Pjd:
Φjdt =
∑
pn⊂Pjd
δjntoffdnt (3.13)
where the weight δjnt = Yjnt/
∑
pn⊂PSUPj Yjnt, captures the relative importance of output
product n for industry j. It is computed as the share of industry j’s final product pn in
its output mix P SUPj , using data from international supply tables.
As a final step, downstream offshoring for industry j is defined as the weighted sum of
Φjdt for all downstream industries d that j supplies with intermediate inputs:
Down offjt =
∑
d6=j
θjdtΦjdt (3.14)
where the weight θjdt = Yjdt/
∑
d Yjdt, is computed from the WIOD and denotes the relative
importance of domestic supply to downstream industry d in total domestic downstream
supply. Combinations with j = d are excluded, as they refer to intra-industry offshoring
that is already captured from traditional offshoring measure offjt (3.10). Further, we
fix each θjdt to its 1995 value, the start year of the sample, i.e. θjd1995. This eliminates
distortions in the measure due to differences in the evolution of offshoring across time and
industries.
Overall, Down offθ1995jt is our baseline proxy for downstream offshoring, where higher
values are interpreted as industry j facing higher downstream offshoring.25
3.A.1.2 Upstream Inshoring
In a similar spirit we define upstream inshoring for a focal firm as sourcing intermediates
from (a firm in) an industry that also exports the same intermediate goods to both
affiliated and unaffiliated firms in foreign countries. Suppose that the Manufacture of
Office Machinery and Computers industry buys intermediate inputs from the Manufacture
25For brevity, we suppress the index θ1995 for the rest of the cases.
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of Computer and Related Services industry. When the latter increases its exports of these
intermediate inputs, i.e. inshores, this potentially affects the productivity of firms in
the Manufacture of Office Machinery and Computers industry. Mechanisms generating
such effects may range from the availability of increased quality of intermediate inputs to
innovation or knowledge spillovers.
Firms in upstream industry u now choose a combination of domestic supply and
exports of the intermediate inputs n they produce. As above, we are able to obtain the
inshoring intensity for each matched product pn between a focal industry j and each
upstream industry u from the use tables:
inunt =
EIIunt
TIIunt
(3.15)
where EIIunt is the export value of intermediate input n and TIIunt is the total production
of intermediate input n in industry u.
The extent to which export of intermediate products n by upstream industry u affect
focal industry j is measured as a weighted sum of inunt for all products n that j buys as
intermediate inputs from upstream industry u (product set Pju):
Ψjut =
∑
pn⊂Pju
γjntinunt (3.16)
where the weight γjnt = Yjnt/
∑
pn⊂P INPj Yjnt captures the relative importance of inter-
mediate input n for industry j. It is computed as the share of intermediate input pn in
industry j’s input mix P INPj using data retrieved from supply tables.
Finally, our measure for upstream inshoring aggregates Ψjut over all upstream industries
u and captures inter-industry effects of inshoring through client-supplier linkages as:
IN upjt =
∑
u6=j
ζjutΨjut (3.17)
where ζjut is defined as the proportion of industry j’s domestically sourced intermediate
inputs from upstream industry u at time t.
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3.A.1.3 Upstream offshoring and Downstream Inshoring
In addition to downstream offshoring and upstream inshoring that are based on the
direct exchange of ‘common’ products, we propose two new measures for indirect interna-
tionalisation through domestic supply chain participation. In this case no product-specific
links are at play. However, in the context of increasing supply chain fragmentation,
offshoring or inshoring in a previous or subsequent stage of the supply chain may result
in more indirect productivity spillover effects. To analyse such inter-industry effects, we
define measures for upstream offshoring and downstream inshoring as follows:
OFF upjt =
∑
u6=j
ζjutΩjut (3.18)
where ζjut is defined as before and Ωjut is the offshoring intensity in industry u, averaged
over all products, since in this case there is no direct product link between industry j and
u. For downstream inshoring we have:
IN downjt =
∑
d6=j
θjdtΘjdt (3.19)
where Θjdt measures the inshoring intensities of downstream industry d and θjdt is defined
as above. Upstream offshoring effects originate from the import of intermediate inputs by
the focal firm’s suppliers; downstream inshoring effects potentially result from the demand
for increased quality of intermediate inputs from the downstream industry.
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Appendix 3.B GNR Two-step Estimation Procedure
This section serves as an overview of the basic steps and assumptions of the GNR
estimation procedure. For a detailed and complete description refer to GNR.
This case considers the classic environment of perfect competition in both input and
output markets. Capital is a predetermined input and therefore chosen one year prior
to the realisation of productivity (t − 1). Labour is assumed to be a variable input,
but subject to adjustment costs. In this case, labour is chosen during the realisation of
productivity, ωit, i.e. between t − 1 and t. The only flexible input in the specification
is material, assumed to freely adjust in each period (variable) and have no dynamic
implications (static).
Conditional on the state variables and other firm characteristics, a firm’s static profit
maximisation problem yields the first order condition with respect to the flexible input,
material:
PMt = Pt
∂
∂Mt
F (Lit, Kit,Mit)e
ω
itE (3.20)
where PMt and Pt are the price of material and output respectively. Under perfect
competition in input and output markets, they are constant across firms within the same
sector but can vary across time. By the time firms make their annual decisions, ex-post
shock it is not in their information set. Hence, firms create expectations that are similar
across firms, E = E(eit).26 It is important to account and correct for this term since
ignoring it, i.e. E = 1, inherently implies that we move from the mean to the median
central tendency of eit (see Goldberger, 1968).
Combining (3.20) with (3.5) and re-arranging terms, we retrieve a share equation:
sit = ln
(
G(Lit, Kit,Mit)
)
+ lnE − it (3.21)
where sit is the log of the nominal share of intermediate inputs and G(Lit, Kit,Mit) =
∂
∂mit
lnf(lit, kit,mit) is the output elasticity of the flexible input, material. Note that the
share equation is net of the productivity term ωit, inducing the transmission bias.
26We inherently assume that the existence of any measurement error is symmetric across firms and
thus does not affect our results.
84
3.B. GNR Two-step Estimation Procedure
3.B.1 Step One
A Non Linear Least Squares estimation of the share equation (3.21) is applied, with:
G(Lit, Kit,Mit)E =
∑
rl+rk+rm≤r
γ
′
rl,rk,rm
lrlitk
rk
it m
rm
it , with rl, rk, rm ≥ 0 (3.22)
approximated by a polynomial series estimator of order r. This step identifies it (hence
E) and the output elasticity of the flexible input material.
3.B.2 Step Two
By integrating up the output elasticity of the flexible input:
∫
G(Lit, Kit,Mit)
Mit
dMit = ln
(
F (Lit, Kit,Mit)
)
+ B(Lit, Kit) (3.23)
we identify the production function up to an unknown constant of integration. By
differencing it with the production function (3.5) we retrieve the following equation for
productivity:
ωit = Yit + B(Lit, Kit) (3.24)
where Yit is the log of the expected output net of the computed integral (3.23) and
B(Lit, Kit) is the constant of integration, approximated by a polynomial series estimator
of degree ν:
B(Lit, Kit) =
∑
νl+νk≤ν
ανl,νk l
νl
it k
νk
it , with νl, νk > 0 (3.25)
To proceed we exploit the assumption over the law of motion for productivity. Similar
to the seminal work of Olley and Pakes (1996), an ‘exogenous’ first order Markov process
is assumed, ωit = g(ωit−1) + ξit. However, ‘exogeneity’ is relaxed in order to accommodate
concerns raised by Aw et al. (2008); De Loecker (2013); Doraszelski and Jaumandreu
(2013) and De Loecker and Goldberg (2014). Lagged and observable variables, such as
our measures of interest, are allowed to affect current productivity outcomes:
ωit = g(ωit−1, proxiesjt−1, Xit−1, αt, αj, αr) + ξit (3.26)
where Xit−1 = (MNCit−1, SUBBEit−1, SHH
BE
it−1). Also, time, industry and region dummies
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are included to control for shocks varying over time and across industries and regions,
respectively.27 We can now express the innovation of productivity, ξit, as a function of
the parameters of the constant of integral to be estimated ξit(α), by non parametrically
regressing ωit(α) on g(ωit−1, proxiesjt−1, Xit−1, αt, αj, αr).
This step proceeds with an iterative GMM. The moments used are E[ξit(α)⊗ n′it] = 0.
The orthogonality conditions depend on the timing assumption of inputs. For the case of
a polynomial of degree two, ν = 2, for the constant of integration (3.25), we get:
nit = (kit, lit−1, k2it, l
2
it−1, kitlit−1) (3.27)
where capital is a predetermined input chosen one year prior (orthogonal to the innovation
of productivity) and labour adjusts within the year (correlated with the innovation of
productivity, thus use lagged values).
For a polynomial of degree two for both (3.22) and (3.25) the estimated gross-output
production function is:
yit = {γ0 + γkkit + γllit + γm
2
mit + γlll
2
it + γkkk
2
it +
γmm
3
m2it
+ γlklitkit + γlmlitmit +
γlm
2
litmit +
γkm
2
kitmit} mit
− αllit − αkkit − α2lllit − α2kkkit + ωit + it
(3.28)
Using estimates of the production function coefficients γˆ and αˆ at the CPA industry level,
we retrieve productivity estimates ωˆit for firm i in industry j at time t from equation
(3.24).
From this two-step procedure, we retrieve estimates of the production function coeffi-
cients that allow us to compute productivity ωˆit and other relevant variables, i.e output
elasticities of inputs and returns to scale for firm i at time t, using (3.28).
In addition, within the second step, we can also directly identify the effects on future
productivity of firms from inter-industry offshoring and inshoring
(
∂g(·)
∂proxiesjt−1
)
.
27For comparability with the models considered in the main text we use a linear specification of g(·).
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Appendix 3.C ACF Two-step Estimation Procedure
This section provides an overview of the basic steps and assumptions in the ACF
estimation procedure. For a detailed and complete description refer to ACF. This
procedure controls for collinearity problems encountered in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
Assumptions imposed about competition and timing of firms’ decisions are as in the
previous section. The only difference is that we now use a value-added production
function, V Ait = Yit −Mit = F (Kit, Lit)eωit . A translog specification is considered based
on its high application frequency in empirical research. In logs, the production function
to be estimated is:
vait = γkkit + γllit + γkkk
2
it + γlll
2
it + γklklit + ωit + it (3.29)
where vait is the log of double deflated value-added for firm i at time t.
Conditional on the state variables and other firm characteristics, firm’s static profit
maximisation yields material input demandmit = m(lit, kit,mit). To control for unobserved
productivity, ωit, we use the inverted intermediate input demand ωit = m
−1(lit, kit,mit).
To approximate the latter, we use a third-order polynomial of lit, kit, and mit. Time,
industry and region dummies are also included additively controlling for shocks varying
over time and across industries and regions.28
First stage regression yit = φ(lit, kit,mit, zit) + it delivers a measure of output purged
from ex-post shocks and measurement errors in output, φˆit. Continuing, productivity can
be expressed as a function of the production function parameters γ to be estimated:
ωit(γ) = φˆit − xitγ (3.30)
where xit = (lit, kit). As before, we can express the innovation from the law of motion of
productivity as a function of the production function parameters to be estimated ξit(γ),
by regressing ωit on git(ωit−1, proxiesjt−1, Xit−1, αt, αj, αr).
In step two, the coefficients of the production function are estimated with an it-
erative GMM procedure. The moments used are E[ξit(γ) ⊗ n′it] = 0, where nit =
28Ideally, to exclude the possibility of other unobservable factors that would violate the scalar unobserv-
ability assumption, we should use as many relevant observable variables as possible (with the parameter
space restriction in mind).
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(kit, lit−1, k2it, l
2
it−1, kitlit−1) is based on the same timing assumptions for capital and labour
assumed in Appendix 3.B. As before, within this two-step procedure, we can directly
identify both the production function coefficients and the effects on future productivity
from inter-industry offshoring and inshoring
(
∂g(·)
∂proxiesjt−1
)
.
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Appendix 3.D Additional Figures and Tables
Table 3.D.1: List of CPA and NACE 2-digit (Rev.1.1) industries for manufacturing sector
CPA NACE Description
3 15t16 Manufacture of Food, Beverages and Tobacco
4 17t18 Manufacture of Textiles and Textile Products
6 20 Manufacture of Wood and Products of Wood and Cork
7 21t22 Manufacture of Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing
9 24 Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical Products
10 25 Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic products
11 26 Manufacture of Other Non-Metallic Mineral Products
12 27t28 Manufacture of Basic Metals And Fabricated Metal Products
13 29 Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment n.e.c.
14 30t33 Manufacture of Electrical and Optical Equipment
15 34t35 Manufacture of Transport Equipment
16 36t37 Manufacture of Manufacturing, n.e.c.;Recycling
Table 3.D.2: Upstreamness measure
Production Line Position CPA Mean
8 2.42
3 2.48
9 2.62
5 2.63
13 2.72
14 2.74
Relatively Downstream
15 2.80
4 2.82
11 2.94
10 2.96
7 2.97
16 3.13
6 3.24
Relatively Upstream
12 3.43
Notes: Computed as in Fally (2011) and Antra`s
et al. (2012) using the WIOD. Mean represents
the mean value from 1995 to 2011 for each in-
dustry and is used to rank industries on their
relative position in the production line.
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4
Market Imperfections, Trade and Firm
Performance?
4.1 Introduction
Firms’ demand for various inputs adjust more slowly than demand shocks to these
inputs themselves. Such sluggishness is mainly attributed to frictions in the input market.
On the one hand, institutions set a restrictive regulatory environment in which firms
operate. Typical regulations cover: firing costs; minimum wages; employment protection;
payroll tax rate; labour unions; and access to finance and investment subsidies. On the
other hand, general characteristics of the input market affect the way firms adjust their
inputs. Such characteristics include: screening of employees; labour market mobility;
installation costs of new capital; indivisibilities in capital; training costs; and costs of
posting vacancies. Therefore, even firms operating in economies with the most flexible
input markets face adjustment costs that impact both aggregate and firm-level outcomes
(Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996).
?I thank participants at DEGIT Sept. 2016, ETSG Sept. 2016, Ghent University Internal Seminar Sept.
2016 and 9th FIW Dec. 2016 for their comments and suggestions. Special thanks are extended to Jan
De Loecker, Ruben Dewitte, Gerdie Everaert, Rebecca Freeman, Joep Konings, Kalina Manova, Bruno
Merlevede, Peter Neary, Nina Pavcnik, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Glenn Rayp, Ariell Reshef, David A. Rivers,
Mark Roberts, Thomas Sampson, Johannes Schmieder, Felix Tintelnot and Gonzague Vannoorenberghe.
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With this in mind, it becomes clear why models that assume homogeneous and perfect
labour market conditions perform poorly. In response, the literature has also introduced
models with input market rigidities to explain patterns observed in aggregate variables
such as: employment; unemployment; job turnover; wages; investment; divestment; and
capital irreversibilities.1 Similarly, the latest developments in theoretical modelling provide
researchers with the appropriate analytical tools to model the role of specific input market
rigidities (e.g. severance payments, search and matching frictions, and credit constraints)
on the decisions and dynamics of the firm.2
International trade literature has also benefited from these advancements by incorpo-
rating labour market frictions in models with firm heterogeneity and trade. These models
provide a theoretical explanation of how specific types of labour market rigidities (e.g.
search frictions, matching frictions or severance payments) can reconcile patterns observed
in an economy with trade and trade frictions. The focus so far has been on outcomes such
as: employment; investment; wage inequality; and welfare changes within and between
industries or countries.3
Yet, not much has been said about productivity. The majority of the aforementioned
theoretical literature treats input market rigidities as financial constraints that affect
investment decisions and thus productivity of the firm. This relationship is amplified by the
presence of trade and trade frictions. However, all these models use a simplistic measure of
labour productivity and results are driven by certain types of input market frictions. This
difficulty arises from the fact that most theoretical models consider only one type of input
market rigidity at a time (e.g. matching frictions) because of ‘analytical convenience.’
This excludes other possibly equally significant interacting sources of rigidities (e.g. search
frictions or severance payments).
Furthermore, most of the empirical work is performed at the aggregate level (i.e.
country/industry) and with no robust findings at the micro level (i.e. firm/plant). One
exception is Dobbelaere and Vancauteren (2014) who use a relatively flexible approach to
express input market frictions and estimate their effects on productivity. However, they
1From the non-exhaustive list, see: Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993); Alvarez and Veracierto (2001);
Lagos (2006); Hobijn and S¸ahin (2013); and Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego (2014).
2See Autor et al. (2007); Koeniger and Prat (2007); Dustmann et al. (2009); and Card et al. (2013).
3See Helpman et al. (2010b,a, 2011, 2016); Egger and Kreickemeier (2009); Felbermayr et al. (2011,
2014); Helpman and Itskhoki (2010); Fajgelbaum (2013); and Cos¸ar et al. (2016).
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still focus on labour market frictions at the industry level, masking possible heterogeneity
and interaction effects with capital market frictions. Overall, both the theoretical and
empirical literature have not yet introduced a consistent way of expressing all existing
input market rigidities in a single firm-level measure. This reduces the flexibility to
characterise their overall impact on firm level performance.
I bridge this gap by estimating the impact of input market frictions on firm performance.
To do so, I exploit the optimal decisions from the dynamic problem of a firm with
adjustment costs. This idea is not new in the literature and is in line with the work of
Petrin and Sivadasan (2006, 2013) who use the first order conditions from the dynamic
problem of the firm to construct a statistic to measure economic inefficiency from the
presence of non-neoclassical components, i.e. hiring, firing, search costs, capital adjustment
costs, taxes, subsidies, hold-up and other contracting problems, non-optimal managerial
behaviour, and markups. Also, it is conceptually similar to the seminal work of Caballero
and Engel (1993) who show that the gap between the observed and forecasted optimal
level of employment is related to the probability of adjusting labour.4
I capture firm-level frictions for the non-flexible inputs as the wedge between the
marginal revenue product and the marginal cost of each input, respectively. This wedge
departs from the neoclassical assumption of freely adjustable inputs and is driven by
the presence of costs that adjust to the non-flexible inputs. Such a modification allows
frictions in the input market to be expressed as a function of variables typically observed
in most micro-level datasets and parameters of the production function.
Heterogeneity is expected since firm attributes shape idiosyncrasies on the firm’s cost
function.5 This would be true even if all policy-related input market rigidities were to
apply at the country level. Overall, I consider these measures as indicators of how costly
it is for each firm to adjust its non-flexible inputs, directly reflecting the level of frictions
in the input market. In this paper, I assume that material inputs adjust freely while
capital and labour face adjustment costs from the presence of frictions. This translates
to the respective empirical measures for labour market frictions (henceforth LMF ) and
capital market frictions (henceforth KMF ).
4For more on the gaps see Gali et al. (2007); Eslava et al. (2010); and Caballero et al. (2013).
5Examples of firm attributes include: training costs for new employers; composition of labour in the
firm; installation time for new capital; posting of new vacancies; screening process of employees; mobility
costs of employees; etc.
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Introducing these measures in any typical proxy variable method of estimating pro-
duction functions, I can directly estimate the effects of LMF and KMF on the future
productivity of firms as well as the parameters of the production function.6 Empirically,
I model potential productivity effects from rigidities in the input market as a learning
process. I allow past experience from LMF and KMF to affect the future productivity
of firms, similar to Aw et al. (2008) and De Loecker (2013).
For the analysis, I use a rich dataset with firm-level information from the manufacturing
sector of 16 EU countries for the period 2002-2007. The extensive data coverage across EU
countries allows me to draw conclusions with external validity and also uncover possible
patterns by exploiting variation across countries and industries.
On the one hand, I find that increases in labour market frictions positively affect the
future productivity of firms. This is in line with the idea that firms face higher costs
for adjusting their stock of labour during periods of increased labour market rigidities.
Therefore, they are forced to find alternative channels to substitute the costly adjustment
of labour to meet demand for their final output. Such channels may refer to costless
improvements in management practices and organisational forms, i.e. intrinsic motivation
(arising from the innate value of the work for the individual).
More specifically, during periods of increased frictions in the labour market, firms face
monetary constraints that reduce their ability to extrinsically motivate their employees.7
Therefore, firms turn to intrinsic motivation as a potential non-monetary instrument that
increases the creativity, transfer of tacit knowledge and multi-tasking ability of employees
(Osterloh and Frey, 2000). However, intrinsic motivation is a successful mechanism only in
the short-run. In the long-run,“crowding-out” from the presence of external intervention
via monetary incentives dominates (Frey et al., 1996; Kubon-Gilke, 1998; Frey and Jegen,
2001). Overall, the increase in future productivity of firms comes from the more efficient
use of costless intangible inputs due to the slow or non-adjustment of tangible inputs, i.e.
labour.
On the other hand, increases in capital market frictions induce significant productivity
effects but are less prevalent and weaker than before. In periods of increased capital
6Under a more restrictive set of assumptions and structure, this approach can also be applied to
dynamic panel methods.
7This arises from firm’s desire to obtain outcomes that are separate from the work itself
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market frictions it is very costly for firms to replace or update their existing capital.
Therefore, they have to come up with costless ways of reconfiguring their existing capital
in order to make their production processes more efficient to meet demand. As before,
intrinsic motivation of employees is a non-monetary mechanism that results in creative
ideas for reconfiguring capital. However, productivity improvements via this channel are
less prevalent compared to the case of labour. This is reconciled by the fact that capital
adjusts less freely than labour, as it is a tangible fixed asset. This is particularly true in the
manufacturing sector: production lines face capacity constraints that are mainly relaxed
when firms undertake new investments (e.g. new machineries or upgrading production
processes) while labour can be managed more flexibly.
Continuing, I find that, in the face of increased labour market frictions, the future
productivity of exporters increases by less than non-exporters. Openness makes firms more
willing to incur the costs associated with adjusting their workforce (Cos¸ar et al., 2016).
Therefore, compared to non-exporters, they are less likely to reorganise their existing
workforce despite the potential for relatively larger increases in future productivity.
However, no significant effects appear when interacting capital market frictions with
exporting behaviour, pointing again to the non-flexible nature of capital. On average, both
exporting and non-exporting firms are equally constrained from capital market frictions.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 4.2 I first provide
an overview of how I model imperfections in the input market. I then describe how I
retrieve a firm-level measure that captures the presence of frictions in the capital and
labour market. In Section 4.3 I provide the empirical methodology for identifying the
productivity effects from labour and capital market frictions and in Section 4.4 I describe
the data. Section 4.5 presents the main results. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Market Imperfections
To introduce imperfections in the input market I include adjustment costs in a dynamic
model of the firm. From the optimal decisions of the firm I express input market frictions
as the wedge between the marginal revenue product and marginal cost of each input,
respectively. This section provides the main steps and assumptions made. For a detailed
analysis see Appendix 4.A.
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Using capital (Kit), labour (Lit) and material (Mit) inputs, firm i in period t produces
a non-storable output that is supplied in the output market under imperfect competition.
The framework followed is general enough to cover the most common models of imperfect
competition. More specifically, as shown by Epifani and Gancia (2011) and discussed below,
such models refer to environments where firms produce homogeneous or differentiated
goods and compete in quantity or price.
The periodical information set of the firm is denoted by Iit and includes any type
of information that the firm considers when making its period input decisions. Capital
is assumed to be a predetermined input and thus included in the firm’s information set
upon use in the period’s production process, i.e. {Kit} ∈ Iit. Capital accumulates, with
a probability of one, according to Kit = (1 − δit)Kit−1 + Iit−1, where δit is the rate of
capital depreciation and Iit−1 is investment in new capital. Labour is assumed to be
a dynamic input, meaning that it is variable in period t (Lit 6∈ Iit) and has dynamic
implications ( ∂
∂Lit−1
Lit 6= 0) from the presence of adjustment costs. The only flexible input
is material that is variable in each period (Mit 6∈ Iit) and has no dynamic implications
( ∂
∂Mit−1
Mit = 0). Subtracting production costs from revenue I get the firm’s profit function:
Πit(Ait, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit,Mit) =Rit(Ait, Kit, Lit,Mit)− P IitIit − PLitLit − PMit Mit
− Cit(Ait, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit)
(4.1)
where Rit(·) is the firm’s revenue function, P Iit is the direct purchase price of new capital,
PLit is the wage offered to hire one unit of labour, P
M
it is the materials’ price,
8 Cit(·) is
the function representing the costs for adjusting the non-flexible inputs, and Ait is a
profitability shock reflecting both productivity (Ωit) and demand shocks (Xit).
Adjusting the non-flexible inputs, i.e. capital and labour, entails costs that are captured
by the function Cit(·). This cost function is firm-time specific, convex and covers both
the cases of simultaneous and sequential adjustment of capital and labour. Intuitively,
it captures any possible implicit and explicit cost arising from both the input market
conditions and any policy affecting the firm’s path of optimal input demand. Overall,
8Input prices are exogenously given to the firm before any input decision is made in each period.
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instead of a particular model of adjustment costs, such as one based on search frictions
(Cooper et al., 2007), I use a more general approach that covers any possible type of
adjustment cost but is agnostic about the exact source of adjustment frictions.
Firms decide their optimal input demand. This involves the choice for accumulation of
capital, hiring/firing of labour and purchase of materials. Decisions are made in a discrete
time setting in order to maximize the expected net present value of future cash flows. The
Bellman equation of the firm’s dynamic programming problem is:
Vit(Sit) = max
Kit+1,Lit,Mit
{
Πit(Ait, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit,Mit) + βE
[
Vit+1(Sit+1)|Iit
]}
= max
Kit+1,Lit,Mit
{
Rit(Ait, Kit, Lit,Mit)− P IitIit − PLitLit − PMit Mit
− Cit(Ait, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit) + βE
[
Vit+1(Sit+1)|Iit
]} (4.2)
where Vit(·) denotes the maximised value of firm i in period t, Sit = {Ait, Kit, Lit−1}
is the vector of state variables, β is the discount factor and E[·] denotes the expected
value conditional on the period’s available information. The expectation is taken over the
distribution of profitability shocks.
In the case of the flexible input, i.e. material, the model boils down to a static
optimization problem since there is no forward looking behaviour. At an interior solution,
conditional on the choice of the predetermined and dynamic inputs, the static first order
condition (FOC) for material is:
θMit
PitQit
Mit
(
1− 1
ηit
)
− PMit = 0 (4.3)
where θMit =
∂Qit
∂Mit
Mit
Qit
is the output elasticity of material and ηit =
∣∣∣∂Qit∂Pit PitQit ∣∣∣ is the absolute
value of the price elasticity of the firm’s residual demand in each period. In this case the
marginal revenue product of the flexible input is equal to its marginal cost.
Note that µit =
ηit
ηit−1 represents the equilibrium markup which is a function of the
demand elasticity perceived by each firm. Alternatively, we can think of the markup as an
unrestricted function.9 Epifani and Gancia (2011) build a general theoretical framework
showing that this markup function is general enough to cover the most popular models of
9As in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), we can also consider a cost minimisation instead of a profit
maximisation problem for the firm. In this case we abstain from committing to a specific structure for
output market.
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imperfect competition, such as: Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition with a continuum
of varieties; Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition with a discrete number of varieties;
Cournot competition with homogenous products; monopolistic competition with translog
demand by Feenstra (2003); the generalization of Dixit-Stiglitz preferences by Benassy
(1998); Melitz and Ottaviano (2008); and models of price competition using the ‘ideal
variety’ approach (Salop, 1979; Epifani and Gancia, 2006). In their working paper, Epifani
and Gancia (2009) discuss this convenient representation of the markup function and
show the specific forms that it takes in some of the above cases.
The FOC for capital combined with the relevant envelope condition gives:
βE
[
θKit+1
Pit+1Qit+1
Kit+1
(
1− 1
ηit+1
)
+ (1− δit)P Iit+1
]
− P Iit ≤
∂Cit(Ait, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit)
∂Kit+1
+βE
[
∂Cit+1(Ait+1, Kit+1, Kit+2, Lit, Lit+1)
∂Kit+1
]
(4.4)
where, on the right hand side of the equation, the first component is the marginal cost
of adjusting new capital, and the second component is the cost advantage of adjusting
capital tomorrow from adjusting capital today. Therefore, the right hand side captures
the contribution of the adjustment costs to optimal investment policy. It is clear that the
presence of costs for adjusting capital generates a wedge between the expected marginal
revenue product and the marginal cost of capital. Alternatively, it can be seen as the
difference between the direct and shadow price of capital.
Similarly, for the case of labour:
θLit
PitQit
Lit
(
1− 1
ηit
)
− PLit ≤
∂Cit(Ait, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit)
∂Lit
+ βE
[
∂Cit+1(Ait+1, Kit+1, Kit+2, Lit, Lit+1)
∂Lit
] (4.5)
where the right hand side of the equation captures the marginal costs of adjusting labour.
As in the case of capital, the costs for adjusting labour drive a wedge between the marginal
revenue product and marginal cost of labour. Equivalently, this wedge can be seen as the
difference between the wage of workers and their shadow wage.
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Both expressions (4.4) and (4.5) hold with inequality because of the possibility of
corner solutions, i.e. non-adjusting firms. On the one hand, when firms adjust both
capital and labour expressions hold with equality. On the other hand, when at least one of
the inputs does not adjust expressions hold with inequality. The inequality shows that, at
any other attainable level of the input that is not adjusted, the marginal cost of adjusting
is not equal to the marginal benefit.
Overall, in both expressions, adjustment costs drive a wedge between the marginal
revenue product and marginal cost for each of the non-flexible inputs. This is represented
on the right hand side of (4.4) and (4.5). In this case, the wedge captures any existing
friction in the relevant input market that does not allow firms to freely adjust their input.
Given that the exact nature of the adjustment costs and thus their functional form
are unknown, I cannot estimate the wedge from the right hand side of expression (4.4)
and (4.5), respectively. However, from the left hand side I can express this wedge as a
function of variables observed in the data and estimatable parameters of the production
function. It is important to mention that in the case of firms not adjusting to at least one
of the non-flexible inputs, these effects will be captured at a lower bound (≤).
After rearranging (4.4), I express firm-level capital market frictions (henceforth KMF)
as:
KMFit(θ
K
it , β, δit) =
∣∣∣∣∣θKit PitQitP IitKit
(
1− 1
ηit
)
+ (1− δit)− P
I
it−1
βP Iit
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.6)
Because of the time it takes for the aspect of capital to adjust, the firm can only
fully observe the benefits and costs from adjusting capital in the period that the new
capital becomes productive. This is because there are ongoing costs and benefits between
the period that the new capital is chosen (t− 1) and the period it becomes productive
(t). Since the choice for capital was made in the previous period, I also need to give a
premium to the past period’s values and thus divide all terms with the discount factor
β. To correct for the fact that the gap is measured in monetary values, I divide (4.4) by
P Iit. As such, the expression represents the share of the marginal costs of adjustment by
the direct cost of new capital. The absolute value symmetrically treats both the case of
investing and divesting.
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Rearranging (4.5), I express firm-level labour market frictions (henceforth LMF) as:
LMFit(θ
L
it) =
∣∣∣∣∣θLitPitQitPLitLit
(
1− 1
ηit
)
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.7)
Since labour adjusts within the period, the direct costs and benefits of labour are
observed by the firm during this period. Similar to capital, I express the wedge as a share
of the per-period average wage of the firm, PLit . The absolute value treats the gaps from
net hires and fires symmetrically.
Overall, I have constructed statistics that measure the presence of frictions in the
labour and capital market. These are uniteless firm-level measures expressed as functions
of variables retrieved from the data and parameters of the production function to be
estimated. They are inherently relative measures and are interpreted as follows: firms
with larger values of KMFit (LMFit) face relatively more frictions in the capital (labor)
market.10 Both measures are expected to capture any type of frictions present in the
capital and labour market.
4.3 Empirical Methodology
The effects of KMF and LMF on firm productivity are estimated by introducing
the relevant measures of frictions into a—typical in the literature—production function
estimation procedure. This section serves as an overview of the steps followed and
assumptions made. For a detailed description see Appendix 4.B.
I consider a flexible gross-output production function:
Yit = F (Kit, Lit,Mit)e
ωit+it (4.8)
where
eωit = Ωit (4.9)
with Hicks-neutral total factor productivity (TFP) ωit. In logs, it takes the following form:
10Petrin and Sivadasan (2006, 2013) consider a similar measure of economic inefficiency for the special
case of firing costs, but keep it in monetary units.
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yit = f(kit, lit,mit) + ωit + it (4.10)
where yit, kit,mit are log values of deflated (at the industry-level) operating revenue,
tangible fixed assets and material costs, respectively. lit is the log of the total number of
employees for firm i at time t. TFP is unobserved to the econometrician but known to the
firm. Ex-post shocks, i.e. after the firm’s decision about its input use, are picked up by it
and are mean independent of all variables known to the firm in t, i.e. E[it|Iit] = E[it] = 0.
The estimation of the production function is based on the flexible parametric estimator
proposed by Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2016). On top of the transmission bias, i.e.
firms observing their TFP when choosing their inputs, this estimator controls for the
value-added bias, i.e. estimating a value-added rather than a gross-output production
function.11 Appendix 4.B outlines the assumptions and steps followed.
For the core part of the analysis, I consider the classic environment of perfect competi-
tion in both input and output markets. As aforementioned, capital is a pre-determined
input and therefore chosen one period prior to the realisation of TFP. Frictions in the
labour market induce high labour adjustment costs, however, firms still manage to adjust
their labour within the period. Therefore, labour is a dynamic input that is relatively
more flexible than capital since it is chosen during the TFP realisation. The only flexible
input in the specification is material, assumed to freely adjust in each period (variable)
and have no dynamic implications (static).
In line with proxy variable methods, this procedure follows two-steps and allows to
both estimate the production function technology and identify the potential effects of
KMF and LMF on future TFP. From the first step, I can express TFP as a function of
the estimatable vector of parameters α of the production function technology f(·), i.e.
ωit(α). I proceed in the second step by exploiting the assumption over the law of motion
of TFP. I assume that ωit evolves over time according to the following stochastic process:
ωit = E[ωit|Iit−1] + ξit (4.11)
11See Gandhi et al. (2016) for an exposition of the sizeable effects of value-added bias on TFP
heterogeneity. In Chapter 3, my co-author and I show the impact of such a misspecification when
estimating learning by doing effects.
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where ξit captures, unanticipated at t−1, exogenous shocks that affect the firm’s TFP in t,
i.e. E[ξit|Iit−1] = 0. Similar to the seminal work of Olley and Pakes (1996), an exogenous
first order Markov process can be assumed, i.e. ωit = E[ωit|ωit−1]+ξit. However, exogeneity
should be relaxed in order to accommodate the fact that TFP evolves endogenously in
response to the firm’s actions. This has been shown for the case of R&D by Aw et al.
(2008, 2011) and Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013); the case of importing by Kasahara
and Rodrigue (2008); the case of exporting by De Loecker (2013); and the case of changes
in the firm’s operating environment, i.e. removing trade barriers, by De Loecker (2011).
Taking this into account, I use the case of a controlled Markov process in (4.11), so as to
explicitly allow for certain elements of Iit−1 to affect TFP. For the baseline specification
of the application, the expectation of TFP conditional on the information at t− 1 is:
ωit = g(ωit−1, kmfit−1, lmfit−1) + ρt + ρj + ρr + ρc + ξit (4.12)
where, on top of lagged TFP, lagged observable variables for firm i in period t are also
allowed to affect current TFP outcomes (in expectation)12: kmfit−1 and lmfit−1 are the
log of the measure of frictions in the capital and labour market, respectively, ρt, ρj, ρr,
and ρc are relevant fixed effects that account for macroeconomic shocks and aggregate
structural differences between countries, industries and regions, respectively.13
I can now express the ‘innovation’ of TFP (ξit) as a function of the production function
parameters by regressing ωit(α) on g
(
ωit−1(α), kmfit−1(α), lmfit−1(α)
)
and the relevant
fixed effects. Note that, as in the case of TFP, our variables of interest kmfit−1(α) and
lmfit−1(α) are expressed as functions of the estimatable parameters of the production
function. This is because their respective output elasticities θKit (α) and θ
L
it(α) are also
functions of the α’s. Specifically, the log of the measures of KMF and LMF used in the
12With lagged values, I inherently assume that it takes one period for actions to affect TFP. Such an
assumption can be relaxed and tested for robustness against alternative specifications with additional lags.
For the estimations, I use both a linear (ωit = ρωωit−1 + ρκkmf it−1 + ρλlmf it−1 + ρt + ρj + ρr + ρc + ξit)
and second order polynomial (ωit = ρωωit−1 + ρκkmf it−1 + ρλlmf it−1 + ρωωω
2
it−1 + ρκκkmf
2
it−1 +
ρλλlmf
2
it−1 + ρωκωit−1kmfit−1 + ρωλωit−1lmfit−1 + ρκλkmfit−1lmfit−1 + ρωκλωit−1kmfit−1lmfit−1 +
ρt + ρj + ρr + ρc + ξit) approximation of g(·). Fixed effects enter additively in order to restrict the
parameter space and improve the efficiency of the estimation.
13More specifically, ρt, ρj , ρr, ρc capture time, industry (if estimated at the sectoral level), nuts2-region
(if estimated at the industry or sectoral level) and country (if estimated at the EU level) fixed effects,
respectively.
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estimations are expressed as:
kmfit(α, δj) = ln
∣∣∣∣∣θKit (α) PitŶitP IitKit − δj
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.13)
lmfit(α) = ln
∣∣∣∣∣θLit(α) PitŶitPLitLit − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.14)
where Ŷit =
Yit
e̂it
is the observed output (Yit) corrected
14 for the estimated - from the first
step - ex-post shocks to production (̂it), P
I
itKit is the cost of physical capital, P
L
itLit is
the cost of labour and PitYit is total sales.
15
The second step proceeds with an iterative Generalised Method of Moments (GMM).
To estimate the parameters of interest, I form a GMM criterion function based on the
following moment conditions:
E
[
ξit(α)⊗Z ′ν
]
= 0 (4.15)
where Zν =
(
kit, lit−1, . . . , k
νk
it l
νl
it−1
)
is the - typical in the literature - ‘instrument matrix’
with its column space dimension depending on the degree ν of the polynomial used to
approximate the production function. The orthogonality conditions depend on the timing
assumptions of inputs. Capital is predetermined and thus orthogonal to the innovation of
TFP. However, I rely on lagged values for labour since current labour is expected to be
correlated with TFP and therefore E
[
ξit(α)lit
] 6= 0.
By minimising the sample analogue of (4.15), I retrieve estimates for the parameters
of the production function technology (α). Within this step, I can also directly estimate
the effects on future TFP from LMF
(
∂g(·)
∂lmfit−1
)
and KMF
(
∂g(·)
∂kmfit−1
)
.
14This is a necessary correction since potential inhomogeneities in the data can severely distort the
magnitudes of the measures. For the same reason, special attention is paid to how I trim the data.
15For both measures, since I assume that firms operate under perfect competition in the output market,
ηit →∞⇒
(
1− 1ηit
)
= 1. For the measure of capital market frictions, since I do not observe the direct
price of investment, Pit, I make the simplifying assumption that when the choice for capital is made,
its price is approximately equal to its next period’s discounted price, i.e. P Iit−1 ≈ βP Iit. Finally, the
depreciation rate of capital, δj , is directly computed from the data as the total amount of depreciation
and amortization of the assets over total assets. I use total instead of fixed assets since the numerator
contains depreciation of both intangibles, other assets and amortization. To avoid outliers I trim the top
and bottom percentile of their distribution.
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4.4 Data
I use a firm-level panel of manufacturing firms from 16 EU countries16 for the period
2002-2007. The datasource is the Amadeus database by Bureau van Dijk Electronic
Publishing (2011) (BvDEP). BvDEP regularly updates the information set in Amadeus
and releases a monthly DVD containing the latest information on ownership. Firms that
exit the market are dropped fairly rapidly. For a complete set of financial and ownership
information over time, I use a time series of (annual) DVDs to construct a consistent
database. This allows me to build a dataset with nearly full financial and administrative
information i.e. balance sheet, profit and loss account, activities, location, ownership, exit
and entry. Merlevede et al. (2015) describe the construction and representativeness of the
data at length.
I focus on the sample of active manufacturing17 firms that file unconsolidated ac-
counts.18 I retain firms reporting operating revenue, tangible fixed assets, number of
employees, costs of employees, material inputs, NACE 2-digit level industry classification,
NUTS 2-digit region classification, date of incorporation, and ownership information.19
I remove outliers using the BACON method proposed by Billor et al. (2000).20 Firms
re-entering are removed from the sample, as are firms with less than two years of data.
This results in an unbalanced panel of 146268 firms and 992047 observations for 16 EU
countries for the period 2002-2007 (see Table 4.C.2 in Appendix).
All monetary variables are deflated using the appropriate country-NACE Rev.2 2-
digit output deflator from the EU KLEMS database. (Real) Output (Y ), is operating
revenue turnover deflated with producer price indices. Capital (K), is tangible fixed
assets deflated by the average of the deflators of various NACE Rev.2 2-digit industries
(Javorcik, 2004b).21 (Real) Material (M), is material inputs deflated by an intermediate
16This includes Belgium (BE), Bulgaria (BG), Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Estonia (EE),
Spain (ES), Finland (FI), France (FR), Croatia (HR), Italy (IT), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Romania
(RO), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI) and Slovakia (SK).
17Table 4.C.1 in Appendix 4.C provides an overview of the NACE Rev.1.1 2-digit industries included.
18Accounts not integrating the statements of controlled subsidiaries or branches of the concerned
company.
19For HR I also have information on exporting statues of the firm.
20BACON stands for Block Adaptive Computationally efficient Outlier Nominators. It is a multiple
outlier detection method. The variables considered in the method are log of output, labour, capital and
material. The procedure is applied each time at the level of the estimation, i.e. industry-country, country,
industry-EU or EU specific.
21Electrical equipment (27); machinery and equipment n.e.c. (28); motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers (29); and other transport equipment (30).
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input deflator constructed as a weighted average of output deflators, where country-time-
industry specific weights are based on intermediate input uses retrieved from input-output
tables. Labour (L), is the number of employees. ‘Firm’ wage (W ) is measured as the cost
of employees to the number of employees. Table 4.C.2 shows summary statistics for the
firms in the sample.
4.5 Results
In this section, I first report the basic results of labour and capital market frictions on
TFP using the approach described in Section 4.3(Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Finally, in Table 4.3,
I present the TFP effects when input market frictions interact with exporting.
4.5.1 TFP Effects from Labour and Capital Market Frictions
Table 4.1 reports the TFP effects from labour market frictions. Each line refers to a
separate estimation at the industry level including all 16 EU countries. The first column
reports the average estimated effect for a linear approximation of equation (4.12), while
the last four columns report the average, 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles, respectively,
from the distribution of estimated effect when considering a second order polynomial
approximation.
An increase in labour market frictions (LMF) leads to a significant and positive increase
in future TFP for the majority of industries. Since higher market rigidities translate to
higher labour adjustment costs, firms need to utilise their existing labour force in a more
efficient and costless way to meet demand for their output. Possible mechanisms include
improvements in management practices and organisational forms, i.e. intrinsic motivation.
Organisational performance is a function of both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
On the one hand, intrinsic motivation is difficult to induce and its outcome is hard to
assess due to uncertainty. Therefore, organisations prefer to extrinsically motivate their
employees via a reward and command system (Argyris, 2001). On the other hand, transfer
of tacit knowledge, creativity and multi-tasking are closely related to intrinsic motivation
(Osterloh and Frey, 2000). As such, managers need to compare the benefits and costs
associated to each type of motivation.
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Table 4.1: TFP effects from LMF in EU
Industry Linear General - 2nd order
Mean p(25) Mean Median p(75)
15 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
17 0.002∗ -0.001 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
18 -0.003 -0.012∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.007 0.001
19 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.012∗∗∗
20 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
21 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
22 0.009∗∗ 0.010 0.012∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
24 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
25 0.003 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
26 0.020∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗
27 0.002 -0.000 0.002 0.003 0.005
28 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006
29 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
31 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
32 0.011∗∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
33 0.007 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.011∗∗
34 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.003
35 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.004
36 0.008∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
37 0.013∗∗∗ -0.003 0.006 0.006 0.016∗∗
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Linear and General-2nd
order refers to a linear and 2nd order polynomial approximation of
g(·), respectively. Both specifications include additive year and country
fixed effects. This table reports the marginal effects ∂ωit∂lmfit−1 from
each specification, estimated for each Nace Rev1.1 2-digit industry in
the sample. For the latter specification I report different moments
of the distribution of estimated effects. Standard errors are block-
bootstrapped with 500 replications over the GNR two-step estimation
procedure and are not reported for space considerations.
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labour.
In Table 4.1, I report the TFP effects from capital market frictions using the same
estimation methodology as above. I observe that an increase in capital market frictions
(KMF) leads to a significant and positive increase in future TFP. In periods of increased
capital market frictions it is very costly for firms to replace or update their existing capital.
Therefore, they have to come up with costless ways of reconfiguring their existing capital
in order to make their production processes more efficient to meet demand.
Table 4.2: TFP effects from KMF in EU
Industry Linear General - 2nd order
Mean p(25) Mean Median p(75)
15 0.004∗∗∗ -0.002∗ 0.002 0.002∗ 0.005∗∗∗
17 0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
18 -0.005∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.002
19 0.001 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.011
20 0.008∗∗∗ 0.000 0.003∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
21 0.003∗ -0.001 0.002 0.002 0.005∗∗
22 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002
24 0.011∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
25 0.002∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.001 0.003∗∗∗
26 0.008∗∗∗ -0.003 0.002 0.003∗ 0.009∗∗∗
27 0.006∗∗∗ -0.002 0.003 0.003 0.008
28 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
29 0.011 0.004∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
31 0.010 0.003 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
32 0.002 -0.001 0.003 0.003 0.007∗∗
33 0.007 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.007
34 0.006∗∗∗ -0.001 0.003 0.004 0.008
35 0.005 -0.007∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 0.005∗
36 0.012∗∗∗ 0.004 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
37 0.003 -0.003 0.000 -0.000 0.004
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Linear and General-2nd
order refers to a linear and 2nd order polynomial approximation of
g(·), respectively. Both specifications include additive year and country
fixed effects. This table reports the marginal effects ∂ωit∂kmfit−1 from each
specification, estimated for each Nace Rev1.1 2-digit industry in the
sample. For the latter specification I report different moments of the
distribution of estimated effects. Standard errors are block-bootstrapped
with 500 replications over the GNR two-step estimation procedure and
are not reported for space considerations.
As before, intrinsic motivation of employees is a non-monetary mechanism that results
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in creative ideas for reconfiguring capital. However, productivity improvements via this
channel are less prevalent compared to the case of labour. This is reconciled by the
fact that capital adjusts less freely than labour, as it is a tangible fixed asset. This is
particularly true in the manufacturing sector: production lines face capacity constraints
that are mainly relaxed when firms undertake new investments (e.g. new machineries or
upgrading production processes) while labour can be managed more flexibly.22
4.5.2 TFP Effects from LMF, KMF and Trade
In this section I interact labour and capital market frictions with the exporting status
of the firm, i.e. expit−1.23 From Table 4.3, I see that labour market frictions are in
line with the results presented above, while increased capital market frictions negatively
affect future TFP. Firms in Croatia’s developing economy can only increase their future
TFP over time once they face less frictions in the capital market. This implies that it
is less costly to adjust new capital that will in turn improve their production lines and
performance. Continuing, I observe a typical learning by exporting effect where a firm’s
performance improves after entering export markets as in De Loecker (2013).24
The future TFP of exporters increases by less than that of non-exporters when faced
with increased labour market frictions. Openness makes firms more willing to incur the
costs associated with adjusting their workforce (Cos¸ar et al., 2016). Therefore, compared
to non-exporters, they are less likely to intrinsically motivate their existing workforce thus
increasing their future TFP less than non-exporters. Interacting capital market frictions
with firms’ exporting status yields a negative but statistically insignificant effect, pointing
again to the non-flexible to adjust nature of capital. On average, both exporting and
non-exporting firms are equally constrained from capital market frictions.
22For the Manufacture of wearing apparel and dressing and dyeing of fur I find a negative impact of
capital market frictions on future TFP, suggesting that firms increase their future TFP once capital
market frictions are reduced via the introduction of new production processes that reduce x-inefficiencies
and also allow labour to be more productive.
23Since information for exporting status is limited only to HR, I restrict the analysis to this country.
24In this case the average learning by exporting effect is 0.5% and it is considerably smaller compared
to that estimated in the literature so far (De Loecker, 2013; Manjo´n et al., 2013; Fernandes and Isgut,
2015). The driving force for this discrepancy is that in most cases the production function estimation
procedure followed do not correct for the value-added bias discussed in Chapter 3.
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Table 4.3: TFP effects from input market frictions and trade in HR
p(25) Average Median p(75)
ωit−1 0.753∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.890∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.014) (0.019) (0.027)
lmf it−1 -0.001 0.007
∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
kmf it−1 -0.004
∗∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.002∗∗ -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
expit−1 -0.001 0.005
∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
lmf it−1 ∗ expit−1 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.005∗ -0.006∗∗ -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
kmf it−1 ∗ expit−1 -0.003 -0.000 -0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 7305 7305 7305 7305
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Estimates
are a second order polynomial approximation of the specification
g(ωit−1, lmfit−1, kmfit−1, expit−1). I report different moments of the distri-
bution of estimated results. All specifications include additive year, industry
and region fixed effects. Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 500
replications over the GNR two-step estimation procedure and are reported
in parentheses below point estimates.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper I treat frictions in the labour and capital market as a possible source
of future TFP improvements via learning mechanisms. Using a novel approach, I find
that increases in labour market frictions positively affect the future TFP of firms. This
is in line with the idea that, during periods of increased rigidities in the labour market,
firms face higher costs for adjusting labour. Therefore, they are forced to find alternative
costless channels to substitute the costly adjustment of labour in order to meet demand
for their final output. Such channels include improving management and organisational
practices, e.g. intrinsic motivation. Overall, the increase in future TFP of firms comes
from the more efficient use of costless intangible inputs due to the slow or non-adjustment
of tangible inputs, i.e. labour.
Nonetheless, increases in capital market frictions do induce significant TFP effects
but are less prevalent and significant compared to the case of labour market frictions. In
periods of increased capital market frictions it is very costly for firms to replace or update
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their existing capital. Therefore, they have to come up with costless ways to reconfigure
their existing capital in order to make their production processes more productive to meet
demand. However, TFP improvements via this channel are less prevalent compared to the
case of labour. This is reconciled with the less-flexible-to-adjust nature of capital (tangible
fixed assets) versus labour, especially in the manufacturing sector. Indeed, manufacturing
production lines face capacity constraints that can mainly be relaxed when firms undertake
new investments (i.e. new machineries or upgrade of production processes), while labour
can be managed more flexibly.
Overall, I provide suggestive evidence that firms are able to exploit any possible
flexibility in their structures (non-monetary mechanisms) in order to substitute alternative
choices (adjusting labour) that are relatively more costly during certain periods. The
higher the levels of flexibility, i.e. reassigning tasks across the existing workforce, the higher
the future TFP effects. This effect is not uniform and is more prevalent in non-trading
firms that are less likely to incur costs.
Concluding, the results should be considered as a special case from the broader set of
mechanisms induced from input market frictions that could affect firm’s efficiency. This
is important to bare in mind when assessing policy reforms on the labour and capital
market.
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Appendix 4.A A Model of Adjusting Factors
I describe in detail the elements of the model and any assumptions made. The model
is in line with the estimation procedure used in the next section. Any significant remarks
and extensions are introduced vis-a-vis the model description.
4.A.1 Production Function
A single-product firm i at time t produces a nonstorable25 output using the following
production technology:
QSit = F
S
it (Kit, Lit,Mit,Ωit) (4.16)
where Kit is the capital level, Lit is the stock of homogeneous workers, Mit is the materials
level, Ωit is the firm’s productivity and F
S
it (·) is the production technology used by firm i
in period t.26
4.A.2 Demand
Firms face a downward sloping demand curve:
QDit = F
D
it (Pit,Xit) (4.17)
where Pit is the output price level and Xit is a stochastic demand shock. Therefore,
the inverse residual demand function Pit(Yit,Xit) will depend both on its output and
the demand shifter respectively. By not imposing any further restrictions on consumer
preferences, I allow for firm-time specific price elasticities of demand that in combination
with various (static) price setting models allow for firm-time specific markups as in
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
25Both for simplicity and lack of data, I assume that inventories do not serve as a source of adjustment.
26The choice of inputs used in the production process directly depends on the data in hand. Upon
access to relevant information the model can be extended to allow for heterogeneity in employment (e.g.
high-skilled vs low-skilled or temporary vs permanent workers), materials (e.g. outsource vs offshore) and
additional inputs (e.g. energy consumption and hours worked) as in Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2014).
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4.A.3 Revenue Function
With equilibrium in the output market, Qit = Q
S
it = Q
D
it , I get the firm’s revenue
function:
Rit(Ait, Kit, Lit,Mit) = Pit(Qit,Xit) ∗Qit (4.18)
where Ait = {Xit,Ωit} includes both the shocks to demand and productivity respectively.27
4.A.4 Costs
Firms face two types of costs. First, is the direct cost of obtaining each input used in
the production process:
DCit = P
I
itIit + P
L
itLit + P
M
it Mit (4.19)
where P Iit is the direct purchase price of new capital,
28 PLit is the wage offered to hire one
unit of employment and PMit is the material price. All input prices are exogenously set
and known to the firm before any input decision is made in each period.
Second, is the cost of adjusting the non-flexible inputs, in this case capital and labour:
Cit(Ait, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit) =

CKit (Ait, Kit, Kit+1) , ifIit 6= 0
CLit(Ait, Lit−1, Lit) , if∆Lit 6= 0
CKLit (Ait, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit) , if∆Lit ∗ Iit 6= 0
(4.20)
where CKit (·) captures any type of convex cost embedded in the adjustment process of
capital (i.e. invest, Iit > 0, or divest, Iit < 0). This includes: installation costs (time and
27In the special case of CES preferences, QDit =
(
Pit
Xit
)σ
, where the price elasticity of demand (σ) is
constant for all firms, and under a Cobb-Douglas production function, QSit = Kit
akLit
alMit
amAit, the
revenue function boils down to Rit = Ait(Kit
akLit
alMit
am)
(
1+ 1σ
)
, where Ait = XitΩit
(
1+ 1σ
)
is revenue
productivity as in Klette and Griliches (1996).
28I allow the price of capital to take different values, P Iit = {P I
s
it , P
Ib
it }, when the firm sells (divest) or
buys (invest) capital, respectively. This implies that capital is not fully reversible due to transactions costs,
physical costs of resale and the market for lemons phenomenon (Abel and Eberly, 1998; Sakellaris, 2004;
Contreras, 2008). The main implications of irreversibility were originally analyzed by Arrow (1968); Lucas
and Prescott (1971); Nickell (1974). More recent investment models with irreversibility include Bertola
and Caballero (1990); Pindyck (1991); Dixit (1992); Abel and Eberly (1994); Bertola and Caballero
(1994); Dixit and Pindyck (1994). For a review of the analytical and empirical literature on irreversible
investment and evidence on its macro implications see Serve´n (1997).
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resources); learning of new technologies; disruption of productive activities; reallocation of
resources; reassignment of tasks; reconfiguration of the production process; indivisibilities
in capital; access to finance; changes in the extent of subsidies to new investment in capital
equipment; etc.
The cost function CLit(·) captures all convex costs that the firm faces when adjusting
labour (i.e. hiring, ∆Lit > 0, or firing, ∆Lit < 0). This includes: severance pay;
disruptions to production from reassignment of workers; search costs; training costs;
fees to replacement agencies; mandatory advanced notice of layoffs; overhead cost of
maintaining a human resource department; etc.
The component CKLit (·) captures any convex cost related to adjusting capital and
labour simultaneously. This includes both of the prementioned costs from adjusting
capital and labour separately, but also costs incurred from adjusting them at the same
time. Such costs could be positive (complementarity in the simultaneous adjustment of
capital and labour) or negative (cost advantage from sequential adjustment of each input).
For example, a firm may hire workers while investing in a new technology in order to
install the new capital and bring it to full productivity faster than otherwise. However,
some firms prefer to employ new workers and buy new machinery separately since the
costs associated with new workers learning a new technology include higher fixed costs
and longer adjustment periods than otherwise.
The adjustment cost function Cit(·) is firm-time specific, imposes no restrictions on
the form of convex components and covers both the cases of simultaneous and sequential
adjustment of capital and labour. Therefore, it includes any possible implicit and explicit
cost that arises from both the conditions in the input market and any policies affecting the
firm’s path of optimal input demand. Overall, instead of a specific model of adjustment
costs, e.g. search frictions (Cooper et al., 2007), I employ a more general approach that
covers any possible type of adjustment costs, but is agnostic about the exact sources of
adjustment frictions in play.
It is important to mention here that the adjustment cost is treated as a function of
Kit, Kit+1, since capital is a pre-determined input and Lit−1, Lit, since labour is a dynamic
input that adjusts within the period. If I now assume that labour is also pre-determined
I just need to update the relevant components for the cost function to Lit, Lit+1 since
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labour chosen today becomes productive in the next period.
Combining all sources of costs for the firm, I get the following cost function:
TCit = P
I
itIit + P
L
itLit + P
M
it Mit + Cit(Ait, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit) (4.21)
4.A.5 A Note on Non-convex Adjustment Costs
Early attempts of the literature, employed standard neoclassical investment models with
convex adjustment costs in order to understand aggregate investment activity (Hall and
Jorgenson, 1969; Tobin, 1969). However, even at the aggregate level, such models have
not performed well (Caballero, 1999). Aggregate statistics mask important underlying
dynamics, since they smooth over various types of capital accumulation patterns across
firms. A growing number of firm-level studies suggest a non-smooth adjustment path for
the capital stock due to the intermittent and lumpy nature of investment.29 Such studies
emphasise the importance of non-convex adjustment costs on understanding the dynamics
of capital adjustment.30
In the same spirit, although aggregate series are smooth, employment adjustment
at the plant-level is extremely lumpy (Hamermesh, 1989; Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992).
Labour adjustment distribution has fat tails, mix of small and large adjustments and
a mass point around the inaction region.31 Strand of the literature has focused on
non-convex adjustment costs as a source of this heterogeneity. More specifically, they
focus on the importance of non-convexities in adjustment costs for explaining plant level
observations.32 Their findings indicate that non-convex adjustment costs are critical for
explaining plant-level patterns employment (hours) adjustment and aggregate behaviour
29See Caballero et al. (1995); Doms and Dunne (1998); Nilsen and Schiantarelli (2003) and Sakellaris
(2004).
30Seminal contributions on the non-convex nature of adjustment costs include the discussion of
Rothschild (1971) and evidence from industry case studies for specific technologies by Holt et al. (1960)
and Peck (1974). Note that the theoretical literature had always been well ahead of its empirical
counterpart on how to accommodate these issues since access to firm-level data came at a later point in
time. Relevant studies include Rust (1987); Cooper and Haltiwanger (1993); Abel and Eberly (1994);
Caballero et al. (1995); Caballero and Leahy (1996); Cooper et al. (1999); Caballero and Engel (1999);
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and Letterie and Pfann (2007). For a review of such models see Adda
and Cooper (2003) and Bond and Van Reenen (2007).
31For micro-level studies on patterns of labour adjustment, see Hamermesh (1989); Davis and Halti-
wanger (1992); Caballero et al. (1995, 1997) and Davis et al. (1998).
32See Hamermesh (1989); Caballero and Engel (1993); Caballero et al. (1997); Aguirregabiria and
Alonso-Borrego (2014) and Cooper et al. (2015).
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(Cooper and Willis, 2004, 2009).33
In the prementioned literature, the focus is in the adjustment of only one quasi-fixed
production input. However, recent empirical evidence shows that firms adjust along
several margins and that the dynamics of capital and labour demand are interrelated.34
The results indicate that models with fully specified interrelated non-convex adjustment
cost structures outperform all other specifications.35 Therefore, it is important to consider
the additional costs from adjusting inputs simultaneously.
However, in this paper I consider convex adjustment costs that lead to analytical
solutions. In order to accommodate the possibility of periods of non-adjustment and
abstract from non-convexities in the adjustment cost function I can directly extend the
model by pushing the optimal programme forward until the firm adjusts again, as in Pakes
(1994). For an application on a model with only firing costs see Petrin and Sivadasan
(2006).
4.A.6 Profit Function
Subtracting costs from revenues, I compute the firm’s profit function:
Πit(Ait, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit,Mit) =Rit(Ait, Kit, Lit,Mit)− P IitIit − PLitLit − PMit Mit
− Cit(Ait, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit)
(4.22)
4.A.7 Adjustment and Timing of Inputs
The periodical information set of the firm is denoted by Iit and includes any type of
information that the firm uses to make its period input decisions. Capital is assumed to
be a predetermined input and thus in the firm’s information set upon use in the period’s
production process, i.e. {Ki0t} ∈ Iit. The choice for new capital is made in t− 1 while it
33For a lengthy discussion on models of labour adjustment see Hamermesh (1996) and Bond and
Van Reenen (2007), and for detailed research on the nature of labour adjustment costs see Hamermesh
and Pfann (1996); Abowd and Kramarz (2003); Rota (2004); Nilsen et al. (2007) and Kramarz and
Michaud (2010).
34For non-structural approaches using micro-level data see Sakellaris (2004); Letterie et al. (2004) and
Nilsen et al. (2009). For models with joint adjustment of capital and labour see Shapiro (1986); Galeotti
and Schiantarelli (1991); Abel and Eberly (1998); Hall (2004); Merz and Yashiv (2007); Bloom (2009).
35See Contreras (2008); Lapatinas (2012) and Asphjell et al. (2014).
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only becomes productive in t (time to adjust new capital) and faces adjustment costs.36
Capital accumulates, with probability one, according to Kit = (1− δit)Kit−1 + Iit−1, where
δit is the rate of capital depreciation and Iit−1 is the investment in new capital.
Labour is assumed to be a dynamic input, meaning that it is variable in period t,
i.e. Li0t 6∈ Iit, and has dynamic implications, i.e. ∂∂Li0t−1Li0t 6= 0, due to the presence of
adjustment costs. Labour is ‘more flexible’ than capital, since it is both chosen and becomes
productive within t (no whole period to adjust labour) but also faces adjustment costs.37
Labour evolves, with probability one, according to the law of motion Lit = Lit−1 + ∆Lit,
where ∆Lit refers to the net changes in employment.
38
The only flexible input is material, which is variable in each period, i.e. Mi0t 6∈ Iit,
and has no dynamic implications, i.e. ∂
∂Mi0t−1
Mi0t = 0.
39
4.A.8 Firm’s Decision Problem
Firms decide the optimal demand for inputs to be used in their production process.40
This involves the choice for accumulation of capital (choosing Iit is equivalent to choosing
Kit+1), hiring/firing labour and purchase of material inputs.
41
The firm decides in a discrete time setting in order to maximize the expected net present
value of future cash flows. The Bellman equation of the firm’s dynamic programming
36Adjustment costs inherently capture the costs associated with the time to adjust new capital, i.e.
disruption of production.
37This assumption represents the fact that it is easier and takes less time to adjust labour relative to
capital. However, there are countries or markets where firms face a very stringent labour market environ-
ment and therefore need a period to adjust their labour, as considered in Konings and Vanormelingen
(2015). For an extensive discussion of various cases on the timing of inputs see Ackerberg et al. (2006).
38I inherently assume that there are no simultaneous hiring and firing decisions, i.e. gross changes.
This translates to hiring when ∆Lit > 0 and firing when ∆Lit < 0. Also, the quit rate for employment is
assumed zero due to data restrictions and focus of the paper in the average behaviour of labour. For a
detailed discussion on gross and net changes in employment see Hamermesh and Pfann (1996).
39Material is assumed to face no adjustment costs or period lag. However, it can be further split
between in-house production and outsourced/offshored materials in order to account for contractual
relationships between suppliers and firms (Grossman and Helpman, 2002, 2005) that generate possible
adjustment costs as in Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2014).
40I implicitly assume that decisions are made by managers and there are no incentive problems between
the manager and the owners of the firm. Therefore, managers always maximise the value of the firm
though optimal input decisions.
41Without any loss of generality the model can be extended to any type of input that the firm owns,
hires, rents or purchases in order to accommodate the production process in each period.
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problem is:
Vit(Sit) = max
Kit+1,Lit,Mit
{
Πit(Ωit, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit,Mit) + βE
[
Vit+1(Sit+1)|Jit
]}
= max
Kit+1,Lit,Mit
{
Rit(Ωit, Kit, Lit,Mit)− P IitIit − PLitLit − PMit Mit
− Cit(Ωit, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit) + βE
[
Vit+1(Sit+1)|Jit
]} (4.23)
where Vit(·) denotes the maximised value of firm i in period t, Sit = {Ait, Kit, Lit−1}
is the vector of state variables, β is the discount factor and E[·] denotes the expected
value conditional on the period’s available information. The expectation is taken over the
distribution of profitability shocks.42
In the case of the flexible input, i.e. material, the model boils down to a static
optimization problem since there is no forward looking behaviour. At an interior solution,
conditional on the choice of predetermined and dynamic inputs, the static first order
condition (FOC) for material is:
θMit
PitQit
Mit
(
1− 1
ηit
)
− PMit = 0 (4.24)
where θMit =
∂Qit
∂Mit
Mit
Qit
is the output elasticity of material and ηit =
∣∣∣∂Qit∂Pit PitQit ∣∣∣ is the absolute
value of the price elasticity of the firm’s residual demand in each period.43 In this case
the marginal revenue product of the flexible input is equal to its marginal cost.
4.A.8.1 No Adjustment Costs
In order to understand the contribution of adjustment costs I start from the benchmark
case where adjustment costs are absent, i.e. Cit(Ωit, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit) ≡ 0 for all
Ωit, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1 and Lit. Note that the accumulation of capital remains forward
looking, i.e. time to adjust aspect of capital. The FOC for capital combined with the
42The uncertainty about the future arises because Ait evolves probabilistically. I assume that the prof-
itability shocks evolve probabilistically following a first order Markov process. Note that the distribution
of future productivity depends not only on current productivity but also on other possible factors (e.g.
frictions in the labour or capital market and exporting status) that are key components of the estimation
strategy.
43Note that the markup of firm i at time t is captured by µit =
ηit
ηit−1 . In the limit case of perfect
competition where products are perfect substitutes, ηit →∞ and therefore µit = 1.
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respective envelope condition gives:
βE
[
θKit+1
Pit+1Qit+1
Kit+1
(
1− 1
ηit+1
)
+ (1− δit)P Iit+1
]
− P Iit = 0 (4.25)
where θKit+1 =
∂Qit+1
∂Kit+1
Kit+1
Qit+1
is the output elasticity of capital for firm i in period t+ 1. The
expected marginal return on capital is equated with the cost of an additional unit of
capital today. The first term in brackets refers to the marginal profits from capital and
the second term captures the resale value of non-depreciated capital at the next period’s
price (P Iit+1).
Similar to the case of materials, the FOC for labour will come from the static per-period
maximisation solution:
θLit
PitQit
Lit
(
1− 1
ηit
)
− PLit = 0 (4.26)
where θLit =
∂Qit
∂Lit
Lit
Qit
is the output elasticity of labour for firm i in period t+ 1.44
4.A.8.2 With Adjustment Costs for Capital and Labour
The FOC for capital combined with the relevant envelope condition gives:
βE
[
θKit+1
Pit+1Qit+1
Kit+1
(
1− 1
ηit+1
)
+ (1− δit)P Iit+1
]
− P Iit ≤
∂Cit(Ωit, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit)
∂Kit+1
+βE
[
∂Cit+1(Ωit+1, Kit+1, Kit+2, Lit, Lit+1)
∂Kit+1
]
(4.27)
where the first component of the right hand side of the inequality is the marginal cost
of adjusting new capital and the second component is the cost advantage on adjusting
capital tomorrow from adjusting capital today. Therefore, the right hand side captures
the contribution of the adjustment costs on optimal investment policy. It is clear that the
presence of adjustment costs generates a wedge between the expected marginal revenue
product and the marginal cost of new capital. Alternatively, it can be seen as the difference
44In the case where labour needs one period to adjust, the firm has to choose today the labour that will
become productive next period (Lit+1). Therefore, the FOC becomes βE
[
θLit+1
Pit+1Qit+1
Lit+1
(
1− 1ηit+1
)
−
PLit+1
]
= 0. This is similar to the expression for capital (4.25), but without the extra term on the right
hand side, since labour is chosen every period and is not like capital that is accounted by the firm as a
cumulative asset that depreciates and can be liquidated next period.
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between the direct and shadow price of capital.
Similarly, for the case of labour:
θLit
PitQit
Lit
(
1− 1
ηit
)
− PLit ≤
∂Cit(Ωit, Kit, Kit+1, Lit−1, Lit)
∂Lit
+ βE
[
∂Cit+1(Ωit+1, Kit+1, Kit+2, Lit, Lit+1)
∂Lit
] (4.28)
where the right hand side of the inequality captures the marginal costs of adjusting labour.
As before, the costs for adjusting labour drive a wedge between the marginal revenue
product and marginal cost of labour. Equivalently this wedge is the difference between
the wage of workers and their shadow wage.45
Both expressions hold with inequality because of the possibility of corner solutions,
i.e. non-adjusting firms. On the one hand, when firms adjust both capital and labour
expressions hold with equality.46On the other hand, when at least one of the inputs does
not adjust, expressions hold with inequality. The inequality shows that at any other
attainable level of the input that is not adjusted, the marginal cost of adjusting is not
equal to the marginal benefit.47
Overall, I see in both expressions that adjustment costs drive a wedge between the
marginal revenue product and marginal cost of the non-flexible inputs. Compared to the
cases of no adjustment costs, (4.25) and (4.26), this wedge is represented in the right hand
side of (4.27) and (4.28). In this case, the wedge captures any possible friction in labour
and capital markets that do not allow firms to freely adjust their inputs.
4.A.8.3 Measures of Capital and Labour Market Frictions
Given that I do not know the exact nature of adjustment costs and therefore their
functional form, I cannot estimate this wedge from the right hand-side of expressions
(4.27) and (4.28). However, from the left hand side I can express this wedge as a function
45In the case of time to adjust labour, (4.28) becomes βE
[
θLit+1
Pit+1Qit+1
Lit+1
(
1− 1ηit+1
)
− PLit+1
]
≤
∂Cit(Ωit,Kit,Kit+1,Lit,Lit+1)
∂Lit+1
+ βE
[
∂Cit+1(Ωit+1,Kit+1,Kit+2,Lit+1,Lit+2)
∂Lit+1
]
.
46This produces typical Euler equations (interior solutions) where inputs adjust smoothly every period
under the assumption of convex adjustment costs. This allows for analytically solvable models which in
investment theory are labelled as Q-model. For a detailed overview see Adda and Cooper (2003) and
Bond and Van Reenen (2007).
47This highly non-convex nature in the decision rules is generated by the introduction of adjustment
costs allowing for simultaneous and sequential adjustment of capital and labour.
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of variables retrieved from the data and parameters to be estimated. It is important to
mention that in the case of firms not adjusting at least one of the non-flexible inputs,
these effects will be captured at a lower bound (≤).
After rearranging (4.27), I express frictions in the capital market as:
KMFit(θ
K
it , β, δit) =
∣∣∣∣∣θKit PitQitP IitKit
(
1− 1
ηit
)
+ (1− δit)− P
I
it−1
βP Iit
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.29)
Because of the time to adjust aspect of capital, the firm will fully observe the benefits
and costs from adjusting capital only in the period that the new capital becomes productive.
This is because there are costs and benefits that evolve between the period that the new
capital is chosen (t− 1) and the period it becomes productive (t). Since the choice for
capital was made in the previous period, I also need to give a premium to the past period’s
values and thus divide all terms with the discount factor β. To control for the fact that
the gap is measured in monetary values I divide (4.27) with P Iit. This way the expression
represents the share of marginal costs of adjustment over the direct cost of new capital.
The absolute value allows me to include in one measure both the cases of firms investing
or divesting.48 KMF is a uniteless measure of frictions in the capital market that is a
function of variables retrieved from the data and parameters to be estimated.
After rearranging (4.28), I express frictions in labour market as:
LMFit(θ
L
it) =
∣∣∣∣∣θLitPitQitPLitLit
(
1− 1
ηit
)
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.30)
Since labour adjusts within the period, the direct costs and benefits of labour are observed
by the firm in this period. Similar to the case of capital, I express the gap as a share
of the per-period average wage PLit .
49 The absolute value treats symmetrically the gaps
from net hires and fires. LMF it is a uniteless measure of frictions in the labour market
that is expressed as a function of variables retrieved from the data and parameters to be
48This implies that I inherently assume symmetry in the adjustment cost function for investing and
divesting. Further heterogeneity can be uncovered by allowing asymmetry in the measures. However, I
abstain from that since I am interested in the average behaviour of the firm and specifically the Euclidean
distance of the gap from 0. Also, it prevents the parameter space of our estimation routine from growing
exponentially and resulting in a computationally intensive estimation.
49In the case of time to adjust labour, (4.30) remains the same but is generated from the expression in
footnote 45, following the same steps as in the case of capital.
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estimated.
Overall, I structurally back-out statistics that measure the presence of frictions in the
labour and capital market. These are uniteless firm-specific measures that are expressed
as functions of variables retrieved from the data and parameters to be estimated. They are
inherently relative measures interpreted as: firms with larger values of KMFit (LMFit)
face relatively more frictions in the capital (labour) market, i.e. more stringent. As
prementioned this measure includes all types of frictions that are present in the capital
and labour market and also the way that each firm experiences them in each period.
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Appendix 4.B GNR Estimation Procedure
This section describes the steps and assumptions needed to estimate the effects of
LMF and KMF on future TFP within a GNR two-step production function estimation
procedure. For an in-depth analysis of the production function estimation procedure refer
to Gandhi et al. (2016).
This case considers the classic environment of perfect competition in both input and
output markets. Conditional on the state variables and other firm characteristics, the
firm’s static profit maximisation problem yields the first order condition with respect to
the flexible input, material:
PMt = Pt
∂
∂Mit
F (Kit, Lit,Mit)e
ωitE (4.31)
where PMt and Pt is the price of material and output respectively. Under perfect com-
petition in input and output markets, they are constant across firms within the same
industry but can vary across time. By the time firms make their periodic decisions, ex-post
shock it is not in their information set. Hence, firms create expectations over it that are
similar across firms, E = E(eit).50It is important to account and correct for this term
since ignoring it, i.e. E = 1, inherently implies that I move from the mean to the median
central tendency of eit (see Goldberger, 1968).
Combining (4.31) with production function (4.10) and re-arranging terms, I retrieve a
share equation:
sit = ln G(Kit, Lit,Mit) + lnE − it (4.32)
where sit is the log of the nominal share of intermediate inputs and G(Kit, Lit,Mit) =
∂lnFS(Kit,Lit,Mit)
∂lnMit
is the output elasticity of the flexible input, material. Note that the share
equation is net of the productivity term ωit, inducing the transmission bias.
50I inherently assume that the existence of any measurement error is symmetric across firms and thus
does not affect the results.
122
4.B. GNR Estimation Procedure
4.B.1 Step One
A Non Linear Least Squares (NLLS) estimation of the share equation (4.32) is applied,
with:
G(Lit, Kit,Mit)E =
∑
rk+rl+rm≤r
γ
′
rk,rl,rm
krkit l
rl
itm
rm
it , with rk, rl, rm ≥ 0 (4.33)
approximated by a polynomial series estimator of order r. From this optimisation routine I
identify ̂it (hence Ê) and the parameters γ̂′rk,rl,rm . I recover γ̂rk,rl,rm ≡
γ̂′rk,rl,rm
Ê , ∀ rk, rl, rm
and compute the output elasticity of the flexible input material Ĝ(·).51
4.B.2 Step Two
By integrating up the output elasticity of the flexible input:
∫
G(Kit, Lit,Mit)
Mit
dMit = lnF (Kit, Lit,Mit) + B(Kit, Lit) (4.34)
I identify the production function up to an unknown constant of integration.52 By
differencing it with the production function (4.10) I retrieve the following equation for
productivity:
ωit = Yit + B(Kit, Lit) (4.35)
where Yit is the log of the expected output net of the computed integral (4.34) and
B(Kit, Lit) is the constant of integration, approximated by a polynomial series estimator
of degree ν:53
B(Kit, Lit) =
∑
νk+νl≤ν
ανk,νlk
νk
it l
νl
it , with νk, νl > 0 (4.36)
51For the estimations I employ a polynomial of order r = 2, Ĝ(·) = γ̂0 + γ̂kkit + γ̂llit + γ̂mmit + γ̂kkk2it +
γ̂lll
2
it + γ̂mmm
2
it + γ̂klkitlit + γ̂kmkitmit + γ̂lmlitmit + γ̂klmkitlitmit. Note that I also include the triplet of
capital, labour and materials to account for possible interactions between them. I abstain from using
polynomials of higher order since estimation becomes computationally intensive but results are similar.
52Because of the polynomial sieve estimator chosen above, the integral has a closed-form solution:∫ G(Kit,Lit,Mit)
Mit
dMit =
∑
rk+rl+rm≤r
γrk,rl,rm
rm+1
krkit l
rl
itm
rm+1
it , with rk, rl, rm ≥ 0.
53For the estimations I employ a polynomial of order ν = 2, B(·) = αkkit+αllit+αkkk2it+αlll2it+αklkitlit.
I abstain from using polynomials of higher order since estimation becomes computationally intensive but
results are similar.
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Therefore after the first stage, I can express productivity as:
ωit(α) = Ŷit +
∑
νk+νl≤ν
ανk,νlk
νk
it l
νl
it , ∀ α = {ανk,νl∀νk, νl} (4.37)
To proceed, I exploit the assumption over the law of motion of productivity. Similar
to the seminal work of Olley and Pakes (1996), an exogenous first order Markov process
can be assumed, ωit = g(ωit−1) + ξit. However, exogeneity should be relaxed in order
to accommodate the fact that TFP evolves endogenously in response to the affiliate’s
actions. This has been shown for the case of R&D by Aw et al. (2008) and Doraszelski and
Jaumandreu (2013); the case of importing by Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008); the case of
exporting by De Loecker (2013); and the case of changes in firms’ operating environment,
i.e. removing trade barriers, by De Loecker (2011). Therefore, the law of motion for
productivity should be modified so as to explicitly allow for certain elements of It−1 to
affect TFP.
On top of lagged productivity, lagged and observable variables for firm i in period t
are also allowed to affect current productivity outcomes (in expectation):54
ωit = g(ωit−1, kmfit−1, lmfit−1, sit−1) + ρt + ρj + ρr + ρc + ξit (4.38)
kmfit−1 and lmfit−1 are the log of the measure of frictions in the capital and labour market,
respectively, ρt, ρj, ρr, and ρc are relevant fixed effects that account for macroeconomic
shocks and aggregate structural differences between countries, industries and regions,
respectively.55 and ξit denotes the productivity innovation.
56
I can now express the ‘innovation’ of TFP ξit(α) as a function of the parameters of
the constant of integral, by regressing ωit(α) on g(ωit−1(α), kmfit−1(α), lmfit−1(α), sit−1).
Note that, as in the case of current and lagged TFP, the measures of capital and labour
54By employing lagged values I inherently assume that it takes one period for actions to affect
productivity.
55More specifically ρt, ρj , ρr, ρc capture time, industry (if estimated at the sectoral level), nuts2-region
(if estimated at the industry or sectoral level) and country (if estimated at the EU level) fixed effects,
respectively.
56For the estimations, I use both a linear (ωit = ρωωit−1 + ρκkmf it−1 + ρλlmf it−1 + sit−1 + ξit)
and second order polynomial (ωit = ρωωit−1 + ρκkmf it−1 + ρλlmf it−1 + ρωωω
2
it−1 + ρκκkmf
2
it−1 +
ρλλlmf
2
it−1 + ρωκωit−1kmfit−1 + ρωλωit−1lmfit−1 + ρκλkmfit−1lmfit−1 + ρωκλωit−1kmfit−1lmfit−1 +
sit−1 + ξit) approximation of g(·) with additive fixed effects sit−1. Fixed effects enter additively in order
to restrict the parameter space and improve the efficiency of the estimation. I abstain from reporting
third order polynomials since results are similar and the estimation becomes computationally intensive.
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market frictions are expressed as functions of the parameters of the constant of integral,
since their respective output elasticities are also functions of α’s:
θKit (α) =
∂lnF (Kit, Lit,Mit)
∂lnKit
=
∂
∫ Ĝ(Kit,Lit,Mit)
Mit
dMit
∂lnKit
− ∂B(Kit, Lit)
∂lnKit
=
∑
rk+rl+rm≤r
γ̂rk,rl,rm
rm + 1
rkk
rk−1
it l
rl
itm
rm+1
it −
∑
νk+νl≤ν
ανk,νlνkk
νk−1
it l
νl
it
(4.39)
θLit(α) =
∂lnF (Kit, Lit,Mit)
∂lnLit
=
∂
∫ Ĝ(Kit,Lit,Mit)
Mit
dMit
∂lnLit
− ∂B(Kit, Lit)
∂lnLit
=
∑
rk+rl+rm≤r
γ̂rk,rl,rm
rm + 1
rlk
rk
it l
rl−1
it m
rm+1
it −
∑
νk+νl≤ν
ανk,νlνlk
νk
it l
νl−1
it
(4.40)
Specifically, the log of the measures of capital and labour market frictions employed in
the estimations are expressed as:57
kmfit(α, δj) = ln
∣∣∣∣∣θKit (α) PitŶitP IitKit − δj
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.41)
lmfit(α) = ln
∣∣∣∣∣θLit(α) PitŶitPLitLit − 1
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.42)
where Ŷit =
Yit
e̂it
, is the observed output (Yit) corrected for the estimated - from the first
step - ex-post shocks to production (̂it) , P
I
itKit is the cost of physical capital, P
L
itLit is
the cost of labour and PitYit is total sales.
The second step proceeds with an iterative Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)
technique. The set of moments used are E
[
ξit(α)⊗n′it
]
= 0, where nit = (kit, lit−1, kitlit−1, · · · , kνkit lνlit−1) ∀ νk, νl >
0 | νk +νl ≤ ν.58 The orthogonality conditions, directly depend on the timing assumptions
of inputs. Capital is assumed to be decided a period ahead and therefore orthogonal to
the innovation in productivity. However, for labour I rely on lagged values since current
labour is expected to react to shocks to productivity, and therefore E
[
ξit(α)lit
]
is expected
57For the estimations I employ a polynomial of order r = 2 for G(·) and ν = 2 for B(·). Hence, the
respective output elasticities become: θKit (α) = (γ̂k + 2γ̂kkkit + γ̂kllit +
γ̂km
2 mit +
γ̂klm
2 litmit)mit − αk −
2αkkkit − αkllit and θLit(α) = (γ̂l + 2γ̂lllit + γ̂klkit + γ̂lm2 mit + γ̂klm2 kitmit)mit − αl − 2αlllit − αklkit.
58For the estimations I use a polynomial of degree ν = 2 for B(·) leading to nit =
(kit, lit−1, k2it, l
2
it−1, kitlit−1).
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to be nonzero.59
On the one hand, from this two-step procedure, I retrieve estimates of the production
function coefficients that allow us to compute productivity ωˆit and other relevant variables,
i.e. output elasticities of inputs and returns to scale for firm i at time t, using the following
form of gross-output production function:60
yit =
∑
rk+rl+rm≤r
γ̂rk,rl,rm
rm + 1
krkit l
rl
itm
rm+1
it −
∑
νk+νl≤ν
α̂νk,νlk
νk
it l
νl
it + ωit + ̂it (4.43)
On the other hand, the effects on future productivity of firms from labour ∂g(·)
∂lmfit−1
and
capital ∂g(·)
∂kmfit−1
market frictions can directly be estimated within the second step. This
means that by exploiting the optimal decisions from the dynamic problem of a firm I can
capture frictions in the capital and labour market as a function of parameters that can
directly be identified within any typical semi-parametric model.
59In the case of time to adjust aspect of labour, the moment condition should include current instead
of lagged labour.
60For the estimations I employ a polynomial of order r = 2 for G(·) and ν = 2 for B(·). Hence, yit =
(γ0 +γkkit+γllit+
γm
2 mit+γkkk
2
it+γlll
2
it+
γmm
3 m
2
it+γklkitlit+
γkm
2 kitmit+
γlm
2 litmit+
γklm
2 kitlitmit)mit−
αllit − αkkit − αlll2it − αkkk2it + αklkitlit + ωit + it.
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Appendix 4.C Figures and Tables
Table 4.C.1: List of NACE Rev.1.1 2-digit industries included in the data.
Broad NACE Description
category 2-digit
DA 15 Manufacture of food products and beverages
DA 16 Manufacture of tobacco products
DB 17 Manufacture of textiles
DB 18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
DC 19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags,
saddlery, harness and footwear
DD 20 Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork, except
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
DE 21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
DE 22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
DF 23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
DG 24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
DH 25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
DI 26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
DJ 27 Manufacture of basic metals
DJ 28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, exc.
machinery/equipment
DK 29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
DL 30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers
DL 31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
DL 32 Manufacture of radio/television/communication
equipment/apparatus
DL 33 Manufacture of medical/precision/optical instruments,
watches/clocks
DM 34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
DM 35 Manufacture of other transport equipment
DN 36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
DN 37 Recycling
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Table 4.C.2: Firm-level data
Country Statistics Operating Tangible Number of Material Average Exporting SUB
Revenue Fixed Assets Employees Costs Wage Status 50%
BE Mean 57900 6579 133 38157 46234 . .13
Sd 427306 29431 360 373743 18040 . .33
Obs 23689 23689 23689 23689 23689 0 23689
BG Mean 5324 2412 164 3512 2305 . .0012
Sd 56868 20883 499 50486 3137 . .035
Obs 8297 8297 8297 8297 8297 0 8297
CZ Mean 13205 4030 148 8253 10538 0 .0049
Sd 84317 26427 457 62822 10288 . .07
Obs 30528 30528 30528 30528 30528 1 30528
DE Mean 83516 13904 298 45469 48197 . .091
Sd 245665 60317 748 141422 24660 . .29
Obs 9886 9886 9886 9886 9886 0 9886
EE Mean 1612 486 39 978 6253 .2 .0023
Sd 4825 2104 108 3098 5009 .4 .048
Obs 12585 12585 12585 12585 12585 5628 12585
ES Mean 6741 1453 31 4272 23466 . .0062
Sd 105343 16287 170 88292 14469 . .078
Obs 332585 332585 332585 332585 332585 0 332585
FI Mean 8083 1985 40 4441 32278 . .01
Sd 47542 17413 128 31025 11246 . .1
Obs 24871 24871 24871 24871 24871 0 24871
FR Mean 13122 1572 57 6314 35305 .49 .014
Sd 85806 12647 241 49177 14936 .5 .12
Obs 203420 203420 203420 203420 203420 199008 203420
HR Mean 2577 1293 45 1700 7432 .39 .0042
Sd 16534 9639 183 10122 5332 .49 .064
Obs 8649 8649 8649 8649 8649 8600 8649
IT Mean 13449 2540 53 7332 32743 . .018
Sd 91527 17067 182 65535 26368 . .13
Obs 215722 215722 215722 215722 215722 0 215722
NO Mean 9644 1710 35 5616 43714 . .0095
Sd 93316 19497 113 75084 19711 . .097
Obs 28804 28804 28804 28804 28804 0 28804
PL Mean 15762 4196 176 9654 8836 . .0016
Sd 69609 16590 325 50194 8495 . .04
Obs 18379 18379 18379 18379 18379 0 18379
RO Mean 2231 795 118 1382 1850 . .00086
Sd 25407 6836 334 19449 2423 . .029
Obs 17522 17522 17522 17522 17522 0 17522
SE Mean 5597 1338 28 2341 26634 1 .014
Sd 36047 10680 99 22748 9427 0 .12
Obs 42747 42747 42747 42747 42747 14709 42747
SI Mean 5268 2059 58 2944 15291 .86 .0058
Sd 23413 11034 188 10910 6894 .35 .076
Obs 10111 10111 10111 10111 10111 5354 10111
SK Mean 22421 8752 198 14425 18428 . .0082
Sd 151855 69293 590 113377 29787 . .09
Obs 4252 4252 4252 4252 4252 0 4252
Notes: Firm-level data from Amadeus dataset for 146268 manufacturing firms from 16 EU countries during 2002 to
2007. Operating Revenue, Tangible Fixed Assets and Material are in thousand Euro.
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5
Like Father like Son: Technology Transfers
and Productivity Effects from Firm
Ownership?
5.1 Introduction
Questions revolving around the meaning of firm ownership have generated a considerable
amount of research. On the one hand, the literature suggests that ownership structures
accommodate the efficient transfer of tangibles. On the other hand, ownership is seen as
facilitating the efficient transfer of intangibles often thought of as “know-how.”
The flow of physical goods within ownership groups is concentrated in a small number
of large affiliates that are owned by large parent firms, both domestically (Atalay et al.,
2014) and internationally (Ramondo et al., 2016; Blanas and Seric, 2017a). This provides
suggestive evidence that ownership structures are primarily used to facilitate the efficient
?This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Bruno Merlevede. We thank participants at the
ISGEP Sept. 2016 and CEP International Trade Workshop Jun. 2017 for their comments and suggestions.
Special thanks are extended to Sotiris Blanas, Paola Conconi, Jan De Loecker, Ruben Dewitte, Gerdie
Everaert, Rebecca Freeman, Paul Frijters, Holger Go¨rg, Stefanie Haller, Joep Konings, Asier Mariscal,
Gianmarco Ottaviano, Nina Pavcnik, Veronica Rappoport, Glenn Rayp, David A. Rivers, Peter Schott,
Joel Stiebale, Catherine Thomas, Felix Tintelnot and Johannes Van Biesebroeck.
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transfer of intangibles. As considered theoretically by Arrow (1975) and Teece (1982),
common ownership allows firms to transfer intangible inputs across vertically integrated
production units, since the alternative of the market is most likely a non-viable substitute.
Since the transfer of tangibles can only explain a small fraction of ownership structures
in the economy, it is important to examine the existence and prevalence of the alternative
explanation, i.e. the transfer of intangibles, in depth.1 However, relevant empirical
research to date provides only suggestive evidence of this possibility.2 Likely, this is due to
data restrictions which make it difficult to explicitly measure intangible inputs. In most
cases, researchers rely on proxies or incomplete measures, e.g. R&D, royalties paid to
parents by affiliates, corporate transferees, etc. To our knowledge, there are no micro-level
panel datasets that contain information on the full set of intangibles for both parents
and affiliates on top of standard balance sheet information. Such datasets would allow
researchers to fully specify the production function of each parent-affiliate pair, and hence
quantify any transfers of intangibles.
A notable exception is the work of Bilir and Morales (2016). They show, based on
a panel of US parents and foreign affiliate(s) with information on output, inputs and
R&D investment, that expected affiliate productivity increases with parent innovation.
However, R&D spending captures3 only a specific subset (i.e. proprietary knowledge) of a
broad range of intangibles that are potentially transferred within ownership structures.
These include but are not limited to: tacit knowledge; know-how; marketing techniques;
managerial practices; and organisational practices. Furthermore, their analysis is silent
about domestic ownership structures which, according to our data, represent a relatively
larger share of firms which are smaller in size. As such, these firms are also less intensive
in R&D spending (OECD, 2017). Finally, it is not possible to infer whether the effect they
1The existence of one explanation does not mutually exclude the other. To become productive,
transfers of tangibles can also be found vis-a`-vis transfers of intangibles, i.e. parental assistance and
coordination (Keller and Yeaple, 2013; Blanas and Seric, 2017b).
2Atalay et al. (2014) document that, despite the lack of shipments of physical goods within multi-plant
firms in the United States, newly vertically integrated affiliates start resembling their parent along
production and trade activities. Ramondo et al. (2016) confirm this lack of shipments across affiliates of
U.S. multinationals. Arnold and Javorcik (2009) and Guadalupe et al. (2012) find that foreign acquisition
of domestic firms leads to improvements in: sales; productivity; investment; wages; employment; and
innovation. For further documentation on the existence of international technology transfers within the
boundaries of the firm see Branstetter et al. (2006); Keller and Yeaple (2013) and Gumpert (2015).
3We use the word ‘captures’ since, similar to physical investment, R&D investment contributes to the
periodic accumulation of an ‘intangible’ input under an (unobserved) stochastic accumulation process.
Therefore, lagged R&D spending is actually a proxy for current proprietary knowledge used in the
production of the final output. See Griliches (1998) for an extended discussion on this modelling approach.
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estimate comes through the channel of technology transfers, i.e. input in the production
function of the affiliate, or is a pure effect on the affiliate’s productivity dynamics, i.e.
learning. Overall, there is ample space to validate or provide further empirical support to
ownership theories arguing that firm boundaries exist in order to facilitate the transfer of
intangibles.
In this paper we do so by identifying transfers of intangible inputs and demonstrating
how they determine a firm’s production technology and the evolution of its productivity.
We use a carefully constructed European panel of majority owned parent-affiliate groups
with full balance sheet information on both sides for the period 2004-2013 and extend
a typical production function estimation procedure. In response to data limitations on
intangible inputs, we devise a method to characterise the full set of intangibles transferred
between parent and affiliate firms.
Specifically, we exploit information from the balance sheet of the parent to identify its
productivity. This parent productivity captures both disembodied technological change
(e.g. innate characteristics of workers, know-how, etc.) and any potential intangible
inputs used in the production of the final output that are not observed in the data (e.g.
management practices, acquired characteristics of workers, innovation, etc.).
On the one hand, as theory suggests, if firm boundaries accommodate the transfer
of such inputs, we expect affiliates to tap into and use them in the production of their
final output. As such, parent productivity (which is now measurable) is introduced as
a ‘composite’ intangible input in the production function of the affiliate. The extent to
which parent productivity contributes to the final output of the affiliate is defined as an
intangible technology transfer from the parent to its affiliate. Similar to other tangible
inputs, i.e. labour, capital and material, this intangible input is measured as the affiliate’s
output elasticity of parent productivity. Intuitively, one may think of the impact of having,
for example, a corporate transferee at the site of the affiliate.
This modelling approach is similar to Griliches and Mairesse (1999) and Bloom et al.
(2016) where a proxy for the stock of knowledge and a score for management practices,
respectively, are introduced as inputs in the production function technology of the firm.
However, our empirical approach provides, instead of an incomplete proxy, an internally
consistent composite measure of intangible inputs transferred within the boundaries of
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the firm.
On the other hand, transfers of intangible technology are potential determinants of the
affiliate’s productivity evolution. The mechanism we have in mind is any type of learning,
where over time the affiliate absorbs/embodies any technological transfer from the parent
that affects its overall productivity level in its own intangible technology. Therefore, our
empirical methodology allows for technological transfers from the parent to affect the
dynamics of affiliate productivity. Intuitively, one may think of a lasting imprint on
the affiliates processes after a corporate transferee has left. The modelling approach we
follow is similar to Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013), De Loecker (2013), and Bilir and
Morales (2016) where firms actively learn and assimilate from their actions or changes in
their operating environment.
The following findings emerge. First, we show that the productivity of the parent is
a significant intangible input in the affiliate’s production technology. In addition, such
transfers of intangible technology are important determinants of the affiliate’s future
productivity. Exploiting richness of the data, we find that domestically owned affiliates
experience larger technology transfers from their parents, while foreign owned affiliates
benefit more from productivity increases induced by learning mechanisms. Overall, we
identify, at the firm level, the importance of productivity transfers from various types of
ownership structures and confirm the theoretically based argument that firm boundaries
exist to facilitate the transfer of intangibles.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 5.2 we present the
empirical methodology. In Section 5.3 we describe the data. Section 5.4 presents the
main results from applying the proposed methodology to the relevant data, discusses the
importance of cross-border barriers in the flow of intangible inputs within the boundaries of
the firm and provides a pseudo-placebo test to support the validity of our methodological
approach. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Empirical Methodology
We extend a typical production function estimation procedure to capture potential
technology transfers and productivity effects from parent to affiliate. By exploiting
information from the balance sheet of the parent we can identify its productivity. This
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way we can introduce it both as an ‘intangible’ input in the production function of the
affiliate and as a potential determinant of the affiliate’s future productivity. This section
describes the empirical model of intangible transfers in majority owned firms.
We consider a set of ownership groups i = 1, . . . , I over periods t = 1, . . . , T . In each
ownership-group-i, the set of active manufacturing firms in t includes firms indexed by
j = 0, . . . , J , where j = 0 denotes the parent firm that has the majority control of its
affiliate(s) j > 0. The information set of the firm in t is denoted by It and includes any
type of information that the firm uses to make its periodic input decisions.
We consider a flexible gross-output production function for the parent:
Yi0t = H(Ki0t, Li0t,Mi0t)e
ωi0t+i0t (5.1)
with Hicks-neutral total factor productivity (TFP) ωi0t. In logs, equation (5.1) takes the
following form:
yi0t = h(ki0t, li0t,mi0t) + ωi0t + i0t (5.2)
where yi0t, ki0t and mi0t are log values of deflated (at the country-industry-year level)
operating revenue, tangible fixed assets and material costs, respectively. li0t is the log
of the total number of employees of parent 0 in ownership-group-i at time t. TFP is
unobserved to the econometrician but known to the firm. Ex-post shocks, i.e. after the
firm’s decision about its input use, are picked up by i0t and are mean independent of all
variables known to the parent in t, i.e. E[i0t|It] = E[i0t] = 0.
Capital and labour are predetermined inputs and thus chosen one period prior to
the TFP realisation. Specifically, firms have information on these inputs and take them
into account in the period’s production process {li0t, ki0t} ∈ It. The only flexible input
is material that freely adjusts in each period, i.e. mi0t 6∈ It. As such, it has no dynamic
implications, i.e. ∂
∂mi0t−1
mi0t = 0. We assume that both parent and affiliate firms take
output and input prices as given.
It is important to emphasise that TFP is not identical to disembodied technological
change, known as the ‘Solow Residual’ (Solow, 1957). This refers to everything that the
firm observes but cannot quantify with scientific objectivity, e.g. innate characteristics
of workers, know-how, etc. Instead, TFP also includes the impact of inputs that are
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quantifiable with scientific objectivity from the firm, but not available in the data for the
researcher, e.g. management practices, acquired characteristics of workers, innovation etc.
In this spirit, we consider the production function of the affiliate:
Yijt = F (Kijt, Lijt,Mijt)(Ωi0t)
βeωijt+ijt (5.3)
where
F (Kijt, Lijt,Mijt) =
(
F˜ (Kijt, Lijt,Mijt)
)η
(5.4)
Ωi0t = e
ωi0t (5.5)
In logs, the production function is of the following form:
yijt = f(kijt, lijt,mijt) + βωi0t + ωijt + ijt (5.6)
where the affiliate’s joint output of capital (kijt), labour (lijt) and material (mijt), expressed
in levels from the function F˜ (·), is combined with the parent’s TFP according to a Cobb-
Douglas technology.4 The TFP of the parent is now introduced as an input in the affiliate’s
production technology. All factors captured in the TFP measure of the parent are allowed
to shift the production frontier of the affiliate. This is an input assumed to be exogenously
given from the parent to its affiliate(s) within the group. Therefore, it is known to the
affiliate at the time of making its decisions in period t. Ex-post shocks, i.e. after the
firm’s decision about its input use, are picked up by ijt and are mean independent of all
variables known to the affiliate in t, i.e. E[ijt|It] = E[ijt] = 0.
Equation (5.6) differs from equation (5.2) by the log-additive term βωi0t which captures
the relative importance of measured parent TFP in the affiliate’s production technology.
This term allows for the separation of the affiliate’s TFP from any technology transfers
from the parent. Intuitively we consider it as an ‘intangible input’ in the production
function of the affiliate. Therefore, the parameter β measures affiliate-j’s output elasticity
of its parent-0’s TFP.
4We allow for general substitution effects by not restricting the elasticity of substitution between the
flexible function of capital, labour and materials, and the parent’s TFP. Note that the parent’s TFP
could be readily introduced along the other inputs in the flexible production technology. However, since
we are interested in the average behaviour of the firm we believe that the proposed specification suffices.
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From equation (5.2), it is apparent that we implicitly assume no ‘backward’ technology
transfers, i.e. no technology transfers from affiliates to their parents. This translates to
a technologically ‘superior’ parent that transfers part of its technology to its affiliate(s),
but not vice versa. Overall, we extend a production function (standard in the literature)
by allowing for technology transfers from the parent to its affiliate(s) in the form of
intangibles.
In equation (5.6), we come across a ‘double identification’ challenge: we observe neither
the affiliate’s nor the parent’s TFP. To circumvent this problem we exploit information
from the balance sheet of the parent. Estimation of the production function is based on
the flexible parametric estimator proposed by Gandhi, Navarro, and Rivers (2016) (herein
GNR). In addition to the transmission bias, i.e. firms observing their TFP when choosing
their inputs, this estimator controls for the value-added bias that arises from estimating a
value-added rather than a gross-output production function. A detailed description of the
assumptions, steps followed, and dominance over competing estimators can be found in
GNR.5
This case considers the classic environment of perfect competition in both the input
and output market. Conditional on the state variables and other firm characteristics, the
static profit maximisation problem yields the first order condition with respect to the
flexible input for the parent:
PMt = Pt
∂
∂Mt
H(Ki0t, Li0t,Mi0t)e
ωi0tEp (5.7)
and the affiliate:
PMt = Pt
∂
∂Mt
F (Kijt, Lijt,Mijt)(Ωi0t)
βeωijtEa (5.8)
where PMt and Pt are the price of material and output, respectively. Under perfect
competition in input and output markets, they are constant across parent and affiliates
within the same country and industry, but can vary across time. By the time firms make
their annual decisions, ex-post shocks i0t and ijt are not in their information sets. Hence,
all firms form similar expectations, Ep = E(ei0t) and Ea = E(eijt).6 It is important to
5See GNR for an exposition of the sizeable effects of value-added bias on TFP heterogeneity. In
Chapter 3, my co-author and I show the impact of such a misspecification when estimating learning by
doing effects.
6We inherently assume that the existence of any measurement error is symmetric across firms and
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account and correct for this term since ignoring it, i.e. Ep = Ea = 1, inherently implies
that we move from the mean to the median central tendency of eijt (see Goldberger,
1968).
We retrieve a share for the parent by combining (5.7) with (5.2) and re-arranging
terms:
si0t = ln
(
H˜(Li0t, Ki0t,Mi0t)
)
+ lnEp − i0t (5.9)
Similarly, we retrieve a share for the affiliate by combining (5.8) with (5.6):
sijt = ln
(
F˜(Lijt, Kijt,Mijt)
)
+ lnEa − ijt (5.10)
In the above, si0t and sijt are the log of the nominal share of material, respectively.
H˜(Ki0t, Li0t,Mi0t) = ∂∂mi0th(ki0t, li0t,mi0t) and F˜(Kijt, Lijt,Mijt) = ∂∂mijtf(kijt, lijt,mijt)
are the output elasticities of material, i.e. the flexible input. Note that the share equation
for the parent is net of the productivity term ωi0t, inducing the transmission bias. The
same holds for the affiliate, where, in addition to ωijt, the ‘extra’ intangible input (Ωi0t)
β
is also eliminated.
In line with most proxy variable methods, the GNR procedure follows two-steps. In the
first step, a Non Linear Least Squares (NLLS) estimation for each of the share equations
(5.9) and (5.10) is applied, with:
H˜(Ki0t, Li0t,Mi0t)Ep =
∑
rk+rl+rm≤r
γ
′
rk,rl,rm
krki0tl
rl
i0tm
rm
i0t , with rk, rl, rm ≥ 0 (5.11)
and
F˜(Kijt, Lijt,Mijt)Ea =
∑
rk+rl+rm≤r
δ
′
rk,rl,rm
krkijtl
rl
ijtm
rm
ijt , with rk, rl, rm ≥ 0 (5.12)
approximated by a polynomial series estimator of order r. This step identifies i0t and ijt
(hence Ep and Ea) and the output elasticity of the flexible input, i.e. material, for both
the parent and affiliate.
thus does not affect our results.
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By integrating up the output elasticity of the flexible input for the parent:
∫ H˜(Ki0t, Li0t,Mi0t)
Mi0t
dMi0t = ln
(
H(Ki0t, Li0t,Mi0t)
)
+H(Ki0t, Li0t) (5.13)
and the affiliate:
∫ F˜(Kijt, Lijt,Mijt)
Mijt
dMijt = ln
(
F (Kijt, Lijt,Mijt)
)
+ F(Kijt, Lijt) (5.14)
we identify the production function of the parent and the affiliate up to an unknown
constant of integration H(ki0t, li0t) and F(kijt, lijt), respectively. By subtracting the
production functions (5.2) and (5.6) from (5.13) and (5.14), respectively, we retrieve the
following equations for parent TFP:
ωi0t = Yˆi0t +H(ki0t, li0t) (5.15)
and affiliate TFP:
ωijt = Yˆijt + F(kijt, lijt)− βωi0t (5.16)
where Yˆi0t and Yˆijt are the log of the expected output net of the computed integral of
the output elasticity of materials for the parent (5.13) and affiliate (5.14), respectively, as
estimated from the first stage. H(ki0t, li0t) and F(kijt, lijt) represent the remaining part
of the production function to be identified for the parent and affiliate, respectively, and
are approximated by a polynomial of degree ν both for the parent:
H(ki0t, li0t) =
∑
νk+νl≤ν
piνk,νlk
νk
i0tl
νl
i0t, with νk, νl > 0 (5.17)
and the affiliate:
F(kijt, lijt) =
∑
νk+νl≤ν
ανk,νlk
νk
ijtl
νl
ijt, with νk, νl > 0 (5.18)
Combining equations (5.15)-(5.18), we express parent TFP:
ωi0t(piν) = Yˆi0t +
∑
νk+νl≤ν
piνk,νlk
νk
i0tl
νl
i0t (5.19)
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and affiliate TFP:
ωijt(αν , piν , β) = Yˆijt +
∑
νk+νl≤ν
ανk,νlk
νk
ijtl
νl
ijt − β
(
Yˆi0t +
∑
νk+νl≤ν
piνk,νlk
νk
i0tl
νl
i0t
)
(5.20)
as functions of variables observed in the data (l and k), variables generated (Yˆ), and
parameters to be estimated αν = (αk, αl, . . . , ανk,νl), piν = (pik, pil, . . . , piνk,νl) and β.
We proceed in the second step by exploiting the assumption over the law of motion of
TFP. We assume that ωijt evolves over time according to the following stochastic process:
ωijt = E[ωijt|It−1] + ξijt (5.21)
where ξijt captures, unanticipated at t− 1, exogenous shocks that affect affiliate’s TFP
in t, i.e. E[ξijt|It−1] = 0. Similar to the seminal work of Olley and Pakes (1996), an
‘exogenous’ first order Markov process can be assumed, i.e. ωijt = E[ωijt|ωijt−1] + ξijt.
However, exogeneity should be relaxed in order to accommodate the fact that TFP evolves
endogenously in response to the affiliate’s actions. This has been shown for the case of
R&D by Aw et al. (2008) and Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013); the case of importing by
Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008); the case of exporting by De Loecker (2013); and the case
of changes in firms’ operating environment, i.e. removing trade barriers, by De Loecker
(2011). Taking this into account, we use the controlled Markov process in (5.21) to
explicitly allow for certain elements of It−1 to affect TFP. For the baseline specification of
our application, the expectation of affiliate TFP conditional on the information at t− 1 is:
ωijt = ρaωijt−1 + ρpωi0t−1 + φt + φsa + φsp + φca + φcp + ξijt (5.22)
where, in addition to lagged affiliate TFP, lagged parent TFP is allowed to affect current
affiliate TFP (in expectation).7 Also, φt, φsa, φsp, φca and φcp are unobserved terms
reflecting shocks/characteristics that vary over time (t), across industries of the affiliate
(sa), industries of the parent (sp), country of the affiliate (ca) and country of the parent
(cp), respectively.8
7With lagged values, we inherently assume that it takes one period for actions to affect TFP. Such an
assumption can be relaxed and tested for robustness against alternative specifications with deeper lags.
8One can consider a more general functional form for equation (5.22) by introducting a sieve of the
relevant controls. However, this case should be considered with caution since non-linearities in the
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We can now express the ‘innovation’ of affiliate TFP (ξijt) as a function of the
parameters of the production function to be estimated (αν , piν , β) by regressing ωijt
on ωjit−1, ωi0t−1 and a battery of fixed effects controlling for the unobserved terms in
equation (5.22). Note that, as in the case of current ωijt(αν , piν , β) and lagged affiliate
TFP ωijt−1(αν , piν , β), our variable of interest, ωi0t−1(piν), is expressed as a function of the
unknown parameters of the production function of the parent. Therefore, their effect on
future TFP is directly estimated within the second step (described below).
The second step proceeds with a standard iterative Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM). To estimate the parameters of interest, (αν , piν , β), we form a GMM criterion
function that is based on the following moment conditions:
E
[
ξijt(αν , piν , β)⊗Z ′ν
]
= 0 (5.23)
where Zν =
(
kijt, lijt, . . . , k
νk
ijtl
νl
ijt, ki0t, li0t, . . . , k
νk
i0tl
νl
i0t, Yˆi0t−1
)
is the ‘instrument matrix’
with its column space dimension depending on the degree ν of the polynomials used to
approximate the constants of integration in (5.17) and (5.18). The orthogonality conditions
directly depend on the timing assumptions of the inputs. Capital and labour, for both
the parent and the affiliate, are predetermined and thus orthogonal to the innovation to
productivity.9 These instruments are typical in the literature and allow us to identify αν
and piν . However, in order to identify β we use lagged values of Yˆi0t−1 (generated from
the first stage), which are uncorrelated with the unanticipated innovation to productivity
at time t− 1.
By minimising the sample analogue of (5.23), we retrieve estimates for parameters
of the production technology of the parent (piν) and the production technology of the
affiliate (αν , β).
10 We also retrieve estimates for the persistence of affiliate TFP (ρa), the
learning by the parent’s TFP (ρp) and all of the fixed-effects in equation (5.22).
As such, for a polynomial of degree two for both the elasticities of material, r = 2,
and the constants of integration, ν = 2, the estimated flexible parametric gross-output
fixed-effects would saturate the model, resulting in the incidental parameters problem.
9However, if labour is assumed to be a dynamic input then current labour and productivity are
correlated and thus the instruments should contain lagged values of labour.
10For the baseline specification we use a polynomial of degree two, i.e. ν = 2. This means that the
parameters to be estimated are: α2 = (αk, αl, αkk, αll, αkl), pi2 = (pik, pil, pikk, pill, pikl) and β, and the
instruments used are: Z2 = (kijt, lijt, k2ijt, l2ijt, kijtlijt, ki0t, li0t, k2i0t, l2i0t, ki0tli0t, Yˆi0t−1).
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production function for the parent is:
yi0t =
(
γ0 + γkki0t + γlli0t +
γm
2
mi0t + γkkk
2
i0t + γlll
2
i0t +
γmm
3
m2i0t
+ γklki0tli0t +
γkm
2
ki0tmi0t +
γlm
2
li0tmi0t +
γklm
2
ki0tli0tmi0t
)
mi0t
− pikki0t − pilli0t − pikkk2i0t − pilll2i0t − piklki0tli0t + ωi0t + i0t
(5.24)
and for the affiliate is:
yijt =
(
δ0 + δkkijt + δllijt +
δm
2
mijt + δkkk
2
ijt + δlll
2
ijt +
δmm
3
m2ijt
+ δklkijtlijt +
δkm
2
kijtmijt +
δlm
2
lijtmijt +
δklm
2
kijtlijtmijt
)
mijt
− αkkijt − αllijt − αkkk2ijt − αlll2ijt − αklkijtlijt + βωi0t + ωijt + ijt
(5.25)
Based on estimates of the production function coefficients, we can now compute other
relevant variables, i.e. TFP, output elasticities of inputs and returns to scale (RTS), for
both the parent and affiliate, using equations (5.19) and (5.20), respectively.
Finally, note that our TFP estimates are revenue based since we do not observe
physical output, but only monetary values deflated at the industry level. Results should
be interpreted bearing this in mind (Klette and Griliches, 1996).11
5.3 Data
We construct a firm-level panel of manufacturing firms from 16 EU countries12 for
the period 2004 to 2013. Data come from the Amadeus database by Bureau van Dijk
Electronic Publishing (2011) (BvDEP). BvDEP regularly updates the information set
in Amadeus and releases a DVD containing the latest information on ownership on a
monthly basis. Firms that exit the market are dropped fairly rapidly. In order to have
a complete set of financial and ownership information over time, we use a time series of
(annual) DVDs to construct a consistent database. In particular, we build a dataset with
nearly full financial and administrative information, i.e. balance sheet, profit and loss
11A future extension of the empirical model will control for unobserved variation in firm-specific prices,
by introducing more structure and assumptions. This includes an iso-elastic demand system coupled with
monopolistic competition, similar to Klette and Griliches (1996) and De Loecker (2011).
12These include Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Croatia,
Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Slovakia.
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account activities, location, ownership, exit and entry. Merlevede et al. (2015) describe
the construction and representativeness of the data at length.
We focus on the sample of affiliate firms. Of these firms, more than 50% of their
shares are owned by a domestic or foreign parent firm. Each affiliate can have only one
majority controlling parent, while parent firms can control multiple affiliates. We keep the
active manufacturing13 firms that file unconsolidated accounts.14 We retain firms which
report operating revenue turnover, tangible fixed assets, number of employees, material
costs, NACE Rev.2 2-digit industry classification and ownership information. Firms with
less than two years of data are removed from the sample. We also remove outliers using
the BACON method proposed by Billor et al. (2000).15 This results in an unbalanced
European panel of 4987 parent and 6311 affiliate firms with full balance sheet information
on both sides for the period 2004-2013 (see Table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Affiliates’ . . . Obs. Mean St.Dev. p25 p50 p75
Output† 28469 47 228 2.1 6.8 25
Capital† 28469 12 60 .18 1 4.7
Material† 28469 30 164 .85 3.3 13
Labour 28469 94 250 12 31 87
Wages 28409 61637 90875 31633 39962 51392
Parents’ . . .
Output† 22958 143 534 8.9 24 83
Capital† 22958 30 125 1.1 3.9 14
Material† 22958 84 357 3.9 12 44
Labour 22958 325 1058 38 91 259
Wages 22913 62190 83260 35467 43663 55058
Affiliates 22958 1.2 .72 1 1 1
Notes: † monetary variables in million Euro. BvDEP database for manufac-
turing firms in 16 EU countries for the period 2004 to 2013.
All monetary variables are deflated using the appropriate country-NACE Rev.2 2-
digit output deflator from the EU KLEMS database. (Real) Output (Y ) is operating
13Table 5.A.1 in Appendix 5.A provides an overview of the NACE Rev.2 2-digit industries included
and their correspondence to the more aggregate A∗38 code that represents intermediate SNA/ISIC
aggregation.
14This refers to accounts not integrating the statements of possible controlled subsidiaries or branches
of the concerned company.
15BACON stands for Block Adaptive Computationally efficient Outlier Nominators. It is a multiple
outlier detection method. The variables considered in the method are log of output, labour, capital and
material.
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revenue turnover deflated with producer price indices. Capital (K) is tangible fixed
assets deflated by the average of the deflators of various NACE Rev.2 2-digit industries
(Javorcik, 2004b).16 (Real) Material (M) is material inputs deflated by an intermediate
input deflator constructed as a weighted average of output deflators, where country-time-
industry specific weights are based on intermediate input uses retrieved from input-output
tables. Labour (L) is the number of employees. Wages is the cost of employees divided
by the number of employees and Affiliates refers to the number of majority controlled
affiliates from each parent.
5.4 Results
In this section we first assess the extent to which parent TFP contributes to the final
output of the affiliate. We measure this as the affiliate’s output elasticity of parent TFP
– similar to other tangible inputs, i.e. labour, capital and material. We then analyse in
detail whether such transfers of intangible technology constitute potential determinants of
the affiliate’s TFP evolution via learning mechanisms. Finally we discus the importance
of intellectual property/patent rights as a potential barrier to the flow of intangible inputs
within the boundaries of the firm and provide a pseudo-placebo test to support the validity
of our methodological approach.
5.4.1 Intangible Technology Transfers
In Table 5.2 we report estimates for the production function of the affiliate. In column
1, we consider the sample of affiliates from any type of ownership structure. Capital,
labour and material contribute significantly to the production technology of the affiliate,
as shown from their respective output elasticities in the first three rows of column 1. The
relative importance of each factor is in line with the extensively reported estimates of
output elasticities in the production function literature.
The estimates of β show that parent TFP is a significant input in the affiliate’s
production technology. In column 1, a one percentage point increase in the TFP of the
parent leads to a 0.06% increase in the affiliate’s output. The extent to which parent TFP
16Electrical equipment (27); machinery and equipment n.e.c. (28); motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers (29); and other transport equipment (30).
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contributes to the affiliate’s final output is roughly more than half of the contribution
from the affiliate’s physical capital (0.11%). If we were to ignore such transfers, our results
imply that the term βωi0t from equation (5.6) would be falsely subsumed in the affiliate
TFP. In turn, this coefficient would be overestimated by roughly 12%. This underscores
the fact that parent TFP is an important transfer of intangible technology to the affiliate
that should be modelled accordingly.
Table 5.2: Affiliate’s Production Function Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
All Domestic Foreign
¯ˆ
θkijt 0.112
∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.017)
¯ˆ
θlijt 0.347
∗∗∗ 0.377∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.021)
¯ˆ
θmijt 0.461
∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
β 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013)
¯ˆ
RTSijt 0.982
∗∗∗ 0.986∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.019)
¯ˆ
RTSijt − 1 -0.018∗ -0.014 -0.063∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.019)
Observations 20009 17145 3029
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Each
column is estimated using all manufacturing firms.
¯ˆ
θkijt,
¯ˆ
θlijt and
¯ˆ
θmijt are averages of estimated output elasticities
of capital, labour and material, respectively.
¯ˆ
RTSijt is
the average of the estimated RTS. All estimates in-
clude additive year, industry-affiliate, industry-parent,
country-affiliate and country-parent fixed effects, if ap-
plicable. Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with
500 replications over the GNR two-step estimation
procedure and reported in parentheses below point
estimates.
By adding up all output elasticities we retrieve the RTS for the production function of
the affiliate. With weak significance, we reject constant RTS in the last row. However,
this is expected to be a direct outcome of the fact that we estimate revenue production
functions and, as such, the coefficients of the production function would be downward
biased in the presence of output-price differences across firms (Klette and Griliches, 1996;
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De Loecker, 2011).17
In columns 2 and 3, we split the sample into domestic and foreign affiliates, respectively.
We find that domestic affiliates have output elasticities that are on average larger for
labour, and lower for capital and material relative to foreign affiliates. Moreover, we
find a smaller estimated affiliate output elasticity of parent TFP for foreign affiliates.
This confirms suggestive evidence that transfers of knowledge, know-how and technology
from parent to foreign affiliates are less likely in distorted institutional environments
(Moran, 2007), e.g. less intellectual property rights (Branstetter et al., 2006). Based
on a theoretical model of optimal knowledge, Gumpert (2015) shows that the presence
of cross-border communication costs would decrease the frequency with which foreign
affiliates and their parents actively exchange, and force the foreign affiliate to depend
more on learning practices.18 Our results confirm the former part of the argument, and
test the latter in the following subsection.
Overall, we see that parent TFP, used as a measure of intangible input accessed by the
affiliate within firm boundaries, is a significant determinant of the affiliate’s production
technology.
5.4.2 Learning
In Table 5.3, we report estimates for the affiliate’s markov process proposed in
equation (5.22). As before, the table consists of three columns where results cover all,
domestic and foreign affiliates, respectively. Fixed effects used in the estimations are
not reported in the tables due to space considerations and their non-relevant economic
interpretation in this context.
In the bottom row of column 1, we see that parent TFP is a significant determinant
of future affiliate TFP. The coefficient estimates suggest that a one standard deviation
increase in lagged parent TFP increases current affiliate TFP by 0.15%. Due to the
17In this case, we also expect the parameters estimated for both the intangible technology transfers, i.e.
β, and the parent’s production function to be ‘under-under-estimated.’ This is because the estimated
productivity of the parent would already be downward biased from any price differences in the output
market of the parent. If foreign parents charge on average higher (lower) prices than domestic parents,
this will result in a larger (smaller) downward bias for the affiliates with foreign parents.
18The parent avoids such communication costs by assigning more knowledge to their foreign affiliates.
This helps to explain why foreign affiliates have higher wages and sales relative to domestic affiliates. We
confirm that such differences are prevalent in our data and also exist across other dimensions of the firm,
i.e. labour, capital and materials, when comparing Tables 5.A.2 and 5.A.3 in Appendix 5.A.
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assumed Hicks-neutrality in TFP, this effect is also interpreted as an equivalent increase
in affiliate output. In the short-run, this is a directly comparable effect and is roughly one
third of the importance of intangible technology transfers from the parent (estimated in
the previous section). However, in the long-run, this effect dominates and allows affiliates
to experience TFP increases that amount to an average 23% of any increase in parent
TFP. In other words, the affiliate’s learning capacity is on average one forth of parent
TFP growth.19
Table 5.3: Affiliates’s Markov Process Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
All Domestic Foreign
ρa 0.915
∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.020)
ρp 0.023
∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
Observations 20009 17145 3029
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Each
column is estimated using all manufacturing firms.
All estimates include additive year, industry-affiliate,
industry-parent, country-affiliate and country-parent
fixed effects, if applicable. Standard errors are block-
bootstrapped with 500 replications over the GNR two-
step estimation procedure and reported in parentheses
below point estimates.
In columns 2 and 3 we find that this learning effect is larger for foreign versus domestic
affiliates. In the long-run, foreign affiliates appear to learn/absorb 8% more from the
technology transferred from the parent than domestic affiliates. This result supports the
theoretical view that foreign affiliates master from a higher share of the production process
by themselves, due to the presence of high cross-border communication costs (Gumpert,
2015).
5.4.3 Intellectual Property Rights
Communication barriers can be expressed in various forms; ranging from physical
distance to institutional differences. In this subsection we explore the relevance of
19A one standard deviation increase in parent TFP leads to a 1.75% increase in affiliate TFP in the
long-run.
145
5. OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES
intellectual property rights (IPR) as a potential source of communication costs within the
boundaries of the firm. Specifically, we examine the extent to which differences in IPR
influence technology transfers within ownership structures.20
To proceed, we construct a measure of IPR ‘distance’ (IPR) as the difference in the
level of protection on patent rights between the country of the parent and that of its
affiliate. For empirical robustness, we compute this measure using two different indices on
the protection of property rights.
First, we use the quinquennial country-specific index of patent rights protection
developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and updated by Park (2008). The index is
constructed as the unweighted sum of five sub-indices ranging between zero and one and
covering the following categories: duration of protection; enforcement; coverage; provisions
for loss of protection; and membership in international patent treaties. As such, the index
ranges between zero and five, with higher values indicating stronger levels of patent rights
protection.21
Second, we use a new country-year specific index on the protection of property rights
proposed by Ouattara and Standaert (2017). Based on a sate-space model, they combine
all publicly available information on property rights into an index where higher values
indicate stronger levels of property rights protection.
In both cases, we interpret IPR as a form of ‘institutional distance,’ where higher
values indicate a decline in the affiliate’s IPR institutional environment relative to that of
its parent. Note that the indices used to compute IPR are both at the country level and
thus IPR is by construction zero for all domestically owned affiliates.
We now extend our empirical model to allow for IPR to explain potential hetero-
geneity in intra-firm transfers of intangible technology and, in turn, heterogeneity in
productivity effects via learning mechanisms. Below we describe the main differences from
the methodology used previously. The production function of the affiliate (5.6) becomes:
yijt = f(kijt, lijt,mijt) + βp ωi0t + βIPR IPRct + βpIPR ωi0t IPRct + ωijt + ijt (5.26)
20For studies on the relationship between IPR and international technology transfers see Javorcik
(2004a), Park and Lippoldt (2005) and Branstetter et al. (2006).
21Given that the index is only available quinquennially between 1960 and 2010, we carry forward the
values from the years 2000, 2005 and 2010 in order to retrieve annual series for the period considered in
our firm-level sample, i.e. 2004-2013.
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where now we also include the IPR measure and its interaction with parent TFP. Similarly,
the controlled Markov process (5.22) becomes:
ωijt =ρaωijt−1 + ρp ωi0t−1 + ρIPR IPRct−1 + ρpIPR ωi0t−1 IPRct−1+
φt + φsa + φsp + φca + φcp + ξijt
(5.27)
where, on top of the previous determinants, we also allow for lagged IPR and its interaction
with lagged parent TFP to affect current affiliate TFP (in expectation).
The parameter space to be estimated has increased since β and ρ are not single
parameters anymore, but instead are vectors of parameters, i.e. (βp, βIPR, βpIPR) and
(ρp, ρIPR, ρpIPR), respectively. This implies that we need to find new instruments for the
identification of the additional parameters considered. The new ‘instrument matrix’ is
Z˜ν =
(
kijt, lijt, . . . , k
νk
ijtl
νl
ijt, ki0t, li0t, . . . , k
νk
i0tl
νl
i0t, Yˆi0t−1, IPRct−1, Yˆi0t−1IPRct−1
)
, where lag
values of IPR and their interaction with lagged values of Yˆi0t−1 are expected to be
orthogonal to the unanticipated innovation to productivity at time t− 1.
Following the same steps and estimation strategy from Section 5.2, we retrieve the
parameters of interest. However, since the IPR measure is by construction zero for all
domestically owned affiliates, we only consider the sample of foreign owned affiliates.
Otherwise, the variation in the IPR measure is either limited for the full sample or
nonexistent for the sample of domestically owned affiliates. In each of the tables presented
below, we report two columns, G&P (2008) and O&S (2017), respectively. The first
column refers to the case where IPR is computed using data from Ginarte and Park
(1997) and Park (2008) while the second column uses data from Ouattara and Standaert
(2017).
In Table 5.4 we report estimates for the production function of the affiliate (5.26).22
On the one hand, the estimates of βp confirm our previous findings that parent TFP,
as a measure of an intangible input accessed by the affiliate, is a significant intangible
input in the affiliate’s production technology. On the other hand, estimates for βIPR and
βpIPR suggest that IPR is insignificant in explaining both differences in the affiliate’s
production technology as well as any differential effects of intangible technology transfers
from the parent, respectively.
22Note that the output elasticities for capital, labour and material are similar to those in Table 5.2 and
are thus not reported for space considerations.
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Table 5.4: Affiliate’s Production Function Estimates with IPR
(1) (2)
G&P (2008) O&S (2017)
βp 0.050
∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016)
βIPR -0.739 -0.087
(2.057) (0.103)
βpIPR 0.025 0.001
(0.043) (0.002)
Observations 2935 3029
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Each column is estimated
using all manufacturing firms. All estimates include additive year, industry-
affiliate, industry-parent, country-affiliate and country-parent fixed effects, if
applicable. Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 500 replications over
the GNR two-step estimation procedure and reported in parentheses below
point estimates.
Table 5.5: Affiliates’s Markov Process Estimates with IPR
(1) (2)
G&P (2008) O&S (2017)
ρa 0.925
∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.018)
ρp 0.027
∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011)
ρIPR 1.541 0.063
(1.273) (0.055)
ρpIPR -0.028 -0.001
(0.026) (0.001)
Observations 2935 3029
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Each column is estimated
using all manufacturing firms. All estimates include additive year, industry-
affiliate, industry-parent, country-affiliate and country-parent fixed effects, if
applicable. Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 500 replications over
the GNR two-step estimation procedure and reported in parentheses below
point estimates.
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In Table 5.5, we report estimates for the affiliate’s markov (5.27). As before, parent
TFP is a significant determinant of future affiliate TFP. However, estimates for ρIPR and
ρpIPR indicate no significant learning from changes in the IPR ‘distance’ as well as no
differential learning effects from transfers of intangible technology due to changes in IPR.
Overall, we find that differences in the IPR levels of foreign owned affiliates do not
qualify as a potential source of communication costs within the boundaries of the firm.
This implies that such differences are unlikely to mitigate the transfer of intangible
technology from the parent or, in turn, increase the affiliate’s future productivity through
learning mechanisms. Note that we should interpret these findings with a grain of salt since
results could be driven by the limited variation in the IPR measure. If anything, further
robustness checks are needed to explore other relevant sources of variation that could
support the presence of communication barriers and thus explain potential heterogeneity
in the estimated results.
5.4.4 Pseudo-Placebo Test
In this subsection we validate our results by performing a set of pseudo-placebo tests.
Specifically, we match parent and/or affiliate firms with domestic firms which do not have
ownership links. We perform Mahanalobis’ distance matching based on characteristics
(i.e. output, capital, labour and materials) observed in the first year that the firm appears
in the treated sample. An additional restriction is that the matched firm should provide
information for at least the same number of years that the original firm exists in our
sample. Subsequently, we re-run the same estimation procedure described above and
compare estimated outcomes. In each of the Tables 5.6 and 5.7 presented below, column (1)
refers to the the original non-matched sample and columns (2)-(4) refer to the controlled
samples where the match is conducted for the affiliate, the parent, and both the affiliate
and the parent, respectively.
Results indicate that the effects stemming from both transfers of intangibles between
the parent and its affiliate(s), and effects on the future productivity of affiliates, respectively,
are smaller in magnitude than found previously. Although any significant result may seem
counter-intuitive at first, a statistically significant effect can be explained by spillovers
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Table 5.6: Affiliate’s Production Function Estimates with Matched Samples
Original Matched wrt.
Sample af pa af & pa
¯ˆ
θkijt 0.123
∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014)
¯ˆ
θlijt 0.334
∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.025) (0.016) (0.024)
¯ˆ
θmijt 0.459
∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗ 0.450∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
β 0.077∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
¯ˆ
RTSijt 0.992
∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗ 0.972∗∗∗ 0.969∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016)
¯ˆ
RTSijt − 1 -0.008 -0.031∗ -0.028∗∗ -0.031∗
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016)
Observations 10122 10122 10122 10122
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Each column is estimated using
all manufacturing firms. All estimates include additive year, industry-affiliate,
industry-parent, country-affiliate and country-parent fixed effects, if applicable.
Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 500 replications over the GNR
two-step estimation procedure and reported in parentheses below point estimates.
Table 5.7: Affiliates’s Markov Process Estimates with Matched Samples
Original Matched wrt.
Sample af pa af & pa
ρα 0.917
∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 0.933∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
ρp 0.030
∗∗ 0.013∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.012) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)
Observations 10122 10122 10122 10122
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Each column is estimated using
all manufacturing firms. All estimates include additive year, industry-affiliate,
industry-parent, country-affiliate and country-parent fixed effects, if applicable.
Standard errors are block-bootstrapped with 500 replications over the GNR
two-step estimation procedure and reported in parentheses below point estimates.
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and/or indirect effects, as well-established in the literature.23 As such, the presence of
smaller effects found when completing the pseudo-placebo tests lends support to the main
findings in this chapter. Moreover, these findings open the door for further research on
the relative importance of technology transfers outside the boundaries of the firm.
5.5 Conclusion
A large literature has tried to understand the role of firm boundaries. Suggestive
empirical evidence points to the theoretically based argument that firm boundaries exist
to facilitate the transfer of intangible inputs. In this paper we identify and quantify
transfers of intangible inputs, and how they determine both the production technology
and productivity evolution of the firm.
We use a carefully constructed European panel of majority owned parent-affiliate
groups with full balance sheet information on both sides for the period 2004-2013 and
extend a typical production function estimation procedure. Due to the data restrictions
on intangible inputs, we devise an empirical method that allows us to characterise the full
set of intangibles transferred between parent and affiliates.
We identify, at the firm level, the importance of productivity transfers from various
types of ownership structures and confirm the theoretically based argument that firm
boundaries exist to facilitate the transfer of intangibles. In addition, we identify a new
dimension where transfers of intangible technology are significant determinants of the
evolution of the affiliate’s productivity. Exploiting the richness of the data, we find that
domestically-owned affiliates experience larger technology transfers from their parents,
while foreign-owned affiliates benefit more from productivity increases induced by learning
mechanisms.
The results presented in this paper are particularly poignant due to inherent difficulties
in measuring intangible assets. Therefore, they are highly relevant to both policymakers
and institutions insofar as they can provide a strong reference point for shaping future
policies on intangible assets.
23See Javorcik (2010) for a literature review on technology/knowledge spillovers to domestic firms from
foreign direct investment, i.e. foreign affiliates of multinational companies.
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Appendix 5.A Additional Figures and Tables
Table 5.A.1: List of NACE Rev.2 2-digit industries in the manufacturing sector.
A∗38 Division Description
CA 10 Manufacture of food products
CA 11 Manufacture of beverages
CA 12 Manufacture of tobacco products
CB 13 Manufacture of textiles
CB 14 Manufacture of wearing apparel
CB 15 Manufacture of leather and related products
CC 16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
CC 17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
CC 18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
CE 20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
CF 21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and preparations
CG 22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
CG 23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
CH 24 Manufacture of basic metals
CH 25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery & equip.
CI 26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
CJ 27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
CK 28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
CL 29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
CL 30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
CM 31 Manufacture of furniture
CM 32 Other manufacturing
CM 33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
Note: A∗38 code refers to the intermediate SNA/ISIC aggregation.
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Table 5.A.2: Sumary Statistics for Domestic Ownership
Affiliates’ . . . Obs. Mean St.Dev. p25 p50 p75
Output† 24339 28 101 1.8 5.2 17
Capital† 24339 6.8 33 .15 .79 3.5
Material† 24339 17 73 .68 2.5 9.2
Labour 24339 76 203 11 26 71
Wages 24283 54539 75047 31064 38807 49077
Parents’ . . .
Output† 20127 124 421 7.7 20 68
Capital† 20127 28 119 .95 3.4 12
Material† 20127 73 275 3.3 10 37
Labour 20127 281 920 34 77 221
Wages 20102 60940 81574 34608 42689 53909
Affiliates 20127 1.2 .68 1 1 1
Notes: † monetary variables in million Euro. BvDEP database for manufac-
turing firms in 16 EU countries for the period 2004 to 2013.
Table 5.A.3: Sumary Statistics for Foreign Ownership
Affiliates’ . . . Obs. Mean St.Dev. p25 p50 p75
Output† 4346 231 908 10 29 101
Capital† 4346 72 507 .73 4.3 20
Material† 4346 150 597 5.4 16 61
Labour 4346 180 358 34 81 188
Wages 4341 148572 427373 37294 49297 72651
Parents’ . . .
Output† 3647 276 818 33 82 226
Capital† 3647 46 159 3.3 9.4 28
Material† 3647 160 511 16 39 115
Labour 3647 645 1435 118 254 640
Wages 3620 69211 91029 41750 50015 61600
Affiliates 3647 1.2 .55 1 1 1
Notes: † monetary variables in million Euro. BvDEP database for manufac-
turing firms in 16 EU countries for the period 2004 to 2013.
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Table 5.A.4: Parent’s Production Function Estimates
(1) (2) (3)
All Domestic Foreign
¯ˆ
θki0t 0.062
∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.006) (0.009) (0.039)
¯ˆ
θli0t 0.346
∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.024)
¯ˆ
θmi0t 0.474
∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
¯ˆ
RTSi0t 0.882
∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗ 0.893∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.049)
¯ˆ
RTSi0t − 1 -0.118∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.049)
Observations 20009 17145 3029
Notes: ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Each
column is estimated using all manufacturing firms.
¯ˆ
θki0t,
¯ˆ
θli0t and
¯ˆ
θmi0t are averages of estimated output elasticities
of capital, labour and material respectively.
¯ˆ
RTSi0t is
the average of the estimated RTS. All estimates in-
clude additive year, industry-affiliate, industry-parent,
country-affiliate and country-parent fixed effects, if
applicable. Standard errors are block-bootstrapped
with 500 replications over the GNR two-step estima-
tion procedure and reported in parentheses below point
estimates.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
De continue afname in handels- en communicatiekosten van de laatste decennia hebben
geresulteerd in een versterking van de onderlinge verbondenheid tussen economiee¨n over
de hele wereld. In dit proces, dat ook de globalisatie golf genoemd wordt, zijn bedrijven de
voornaamste drijvers van economische groei dankzij hun cruciale rol in het produceren van
goederen en diensten, het cree¨ren van jobs, en het voortbrengen van handel en innovatie.
Voor beleidsmakers belast met het verhogen van de welvaart is het dan ook essentieel
om te begrijpen hoe bedrijven werken en—in het bijzonder—hoe ze beslissingen maken. In
een perfecte wereld zouden onderzoekers en beleidsmakers dit onderliggende proces voor elk
bedrijf kunnen identificeren en de volledige productie structuur (of productietechnologie)
in kaart kunnen brengen. Jammer genoeg is dit in de praktijk onmogelijk aangezien de
input voor deze processen in vele gevallen niet waarneembaar is (bv. managementbeleid,
de vakkundigheid van werknemers, innovatie, etc.) of moeilijk te meten is op een weten-
schappelijke en objectieve manier (bv. de karakteristieken van werknemers, knowhow,
etc.)
Gegeven deze informatiebeperkingen kunnen we de productietechnologie van een bedrijf
slechts tot op zekere hoogte identificeren. De niet-identificeerbare restant word in de
handelsliteratuur samengebracht onder de verzamel term ‘productiviteit.’ Naar analogie
met de productietechnologie, heeft de productiviteit van bedrijven een bepaalde structuur
en kan deze be¨ınvloed worden door verschillende factoren. Sommige van deze factoren
liggen in de beslissingensfeer van het bedrijf (bv. beslissingen i.v.m. import, export of
offshoring), terwijl andere bepaald worden door de omgeving van het bedrijf (bv. externe
handelsschokken, veranderingen in de regulering, economische crisissen, etc.).
Tijdens de laatste globalisatiegolf is het niveau van complexiteit van de productie-
technologie en productiviteitsstructuur nog verder verhoogd. Om de huidige structuur
te ontrafelen is het daarom ook noodzakelijk geworden om inzicht te verwerven in de
onderliggende processen op micro-economisch niveau. Aangezien productiviteit niet recht-
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streeks geobserveerd kan worden, zijn we daarbij gedwongen om dit te berekenen of te
schatten op een indirecte manier.
Deze elementen indachtig, kan ik de grootste bijdrage van mijn thesis in twee punten
samenvatten. Ten eerste benadruk ik in deze thesis het belang van productiviteitsmetingen
door aan te tonen hoe verschillende metingen, veronderstellingen en schattingsprocedures
economische bevindingen be¨ınvloeden. Hiertoe focus ik op een aantal verkeerde speci-
ficaties die in de gangbare literatuur vaak buiten beschouwing gelaten worden bij het
identificeren van productiviteit en de determinanten daarvan. Ten tweede probeer ik
de determinanten van productiviteit ten gronde uit te diepen. Specifiek richt ik mij op
handel, productieketens, markt imperfecties en eigendomsstructuren in een internationale
en sterk verweven context. Deze bijdragen zijn beschreven in de vier hoofdstukken van
mijn doctoraatsthesis, die hieronder kort worden beschreven.
Hoofdstuk 2 toont aan dat wanneer de productiviteit op een incorrecte wijze wordt
geschat, dit tot foutieve conclusies kan leiden over de evolutie van de totale productiviteit
en zijn verschillende componenten. Eens voor deze fouten wordt gecontroleerd, ontleden
we de totale productiviteit in verschillende groepen die opgesteld zijn volgens, economische
significantie. Onze resultaten wijzen er op dat de productiviteit van bedrijven is toege-
nomen overheen de tijd. Bovendien, zijn de bedrijven die de grootste toename hebben
gekend zijn degenen die het meest ge¨ınternationaliseerd en het grootst zijn. Bij andere
bedrijven was het effect veel kleiner, waardoor de totale productiviteit zijn maximale
potentieel niet kon bereiken.
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat na of er indirecte effecten zijn van internationalisering op de binnen-
landse productieketen. Ten eerste tonen we aan dat wanneer de schattingen geen rekening
houden met bekende specificatie problemen van de productietechnologie, dit leidt tot foute
conclusies over de eigenlijke determinanten van productiviteit. Ten tweede vinden we dat
wanneer bedrijven aankopen plaatsen bij andere exporterende bedrijven, zij ook hogere
niveaus van productiviteit kennen. Dit is hoogstwaarschijnlijk gedreven door het feit dat
ze toegang hebben tot intermediaire goederen van hogere kwaliteit die ook gee¨xporteerd
worden.
Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert hoe veranderingen in de omgeving van het bedrijf gekoppeld
met de toename in internationale handel de productiviteit be¨ınvloeden. Enerzijds vinden
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we dat wanneer lokale bedrijven op de arbeidsmarkt meer frictie ondervinden, hun
productiviteit daarna in grotere mate toeneemt dan bij exporterende bedrijven. Dit
suggereert dat bedrijven die enkel voor de lokale markt produceren minder bereid zijn
om kosten van veranderingen in hun werknemersbestand te dragen. Bijgevolg vallen ze
vaker terug op aanpassingen in de bedrijfsorganisatie en management praktijken, wat
zich op termijn vertaalt in een verhoogde productiviteit door middel van leereffecten. De
productiviteitseffecten van fricties in de kapitaalmarkt zijn anderzijds minder frequent en
be¨ınvloeden alle types bedrijven op dezelfde manier, wat er op wijst dat kapitaal minder
flexibel is en duurder is om aan te passen.
Hoofdstuk 5, ten slotte, bekijkt hoe de structuur van eigenaarschap de productietech-
nologie en productiviteit be¨ınvloedt. Samen met mijn coauteur, kwantificeer ik het belang
van technologie transfers van verscheidene eigenschapsstructuren. Hierbij, bevestigen we
de theorie dat bedrijfsgrenzen er bestaan om de transfers van immaterie¨le goederente
faciliteren.
Samengevat, verwacht ik dat dit doctoraatsonderzoek ons begrip versterkt over welk
type bedrijf het meeste bijdraagt aan economische groei of achteruitgang, tijdens positieve
en negatieve economische tijden. Daarbij hoop ik beleidsmakers en instituties een sterker
referentiepunt te kunnen bieden om toekomstig beleid te vormen.
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